119. b.

EPICURUS's MORALS,

Collected

Partly out of his own Greek Text, in *DIOGENES LAERTIUS*,

And

Partly out of the Rhapsodies of *MARCUS ANTONINUS*, *PLUTARCH*, *CICERO*, & *SENECA*.

And faithfully Englished.

Mea quidem ista sententia est (invitis hoc nostris popularibus dicam) Epicurum, *& recta præcipere, &, si propius accesseris, tristia.*

Seneca lib. de vita beata, cap 13.

144

LONDON,

Printed for *H. H.* and are to be sold by *Simon Miller* at the Sign of the *Star* at the West End of St. *Pauls*. 1670.

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AN

APOLOGIE

FOR

EPICURUS,

As to the three Capital Crimes whereof he is accused.

Written in a Letter, to a Person of Honour.

SIR,

YOur beloved EPICURUS, *having lately learn'd English, on purpose to converse more familiarly with you; comes now at length to wait upon you, and at your vacant hours to entertain you with grave Discourses touching the Happiness of Man's life, and the right means of attaining it, Wisdom. I have no reason to doubt of his welcome and kind reception by you, considering that he comes not, but upon your frequent, and (I am confident) hearty invitations of him;*

your own ingenious and commendable desire to be intimately acquainted with his Principles and Doctrine of Morality, and to hear him speak his own Thoughts purely and sincerely having been the only occasion and motive to my assistance of him in his Travels from Greece *into this Country, and my accommodation of him with an such an Equipage, as might be exactly suitable as well to your wishes, as to his own mind. Nay more, I have reason to presume, that a few days conversation will create in you a very great dearness towards him, as well because I am assured you will soon find him what you expect, a sublime Wit, a profound Judgment, and a great Master of Temperance Sobriety, Continence, Fortitude and all other Virtues, not a Patron of Impiety Gluttony, Drunkenness, Luxury and all kinds of Intemperance, as the common people (being mis-inform'd by such learned men as either did not rightly understand, or would not rightly represent his opinions) generally conceive him to be; as because I have perceived him not only to give strong and lively hints to sundry of those sublime speculations, wherewith your thoughts are sometimes delightfully employed; but also solidly to assert many of those Tenents, which I have often heard you defend, with the like Reasons*

and which indeed nothing but the voluntary and affected Ignorance of Superstition will deny. So that, if the Rule hold, that Similitude of Opinions, is an Argument of Similitude in Affections, and Similitude of Affections the ground of Love and Friendship, certainly I am not altogether destitute of support for my conjecture, and consequently that you will soon admit him into your Bosom, and treat him with all the demonstrations of respect due to so excellent a Companion.

But, as there is no Beauty without some moles, no Chrystal without some specks; so is not our EPICURUS *without his imperfections, and you will discover in him some things which cannot escape your reprehension; and yet I expect, that your censure of him should be much more moderate and charitable, than that of the ignorant and scarce humane Multitude hath been for many ages together. And therefore I ask leave to state the Nature of his guilt unto you, and afterwards to give you my Judgment thereupon; in the mean time humbly leaving you to the Liberty of your own more judicious sentiments of both the one and the other. For, my design therein, is not to possess your breast with my thoughts concerning the crimes usually charged upon this Philosopher, but to dispossess it of an opinion that I might have the same in-*

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dignation against him in respect of some unjustifiable positions of his, as not only the common people, but even the greatest number of Scholars, have for many hundred of years entertain'd. And what I shall say to that purpose I humbly desire you will be pleas'd to understand to be intended as an Exercitation, *to take off from his memory the greatest part of that unjust Odium, and Infamy which envy and malice on one hand, and Ignorance and Inhumanity on the other, have cast upon it, to the eclipsing even of all his excellent merits from the Commonwealth of Philosophy, and not as a defence of any unreasonable or dangerous Errour, whereof he is found really guilty. Which was more perhaps then was needful for me to advertise you of, who well understand the difference betwixt a* Vindication *and an* Excusation; *that it is one thing to mitigate a too severe and rash sentence, and another to justifie the Offender. And therefore without any further Apologizing for my short Apology for* EPICURUS, *I directly address to my Province.*

The Opinions, which, being asserted by him in this Treatise concerning Ethicks, *have so much incens'd the world against him, are principally these three.* (1.) That the Souls of men are mortal, and so uncapable of all, either happiness or misery after death.

death. (2.) That Man is not obliged to honour, revere, and worship God, in respect of his beneficence, or out of the hope of any Good or Fear of any evil at his hands, but meerly in respect of the transcendent Excellencies of his Nature, Immortality, and Beatitude. (3.) That Self-homicide is an Act of Heroick Fortitude in case of intolerable or otherwise inevitable Calamity. *These, I confess, are Positions to be rather wholly condemned and abominated, than in the least measure patroniz'd by us Christians, whose understandings (thanks be to the mercy of the Fountain of Wisdom) are illuminated by a brighter light than that of Nature; and yet notwithstanding when I remember, that our Philosopher was a meer Naturalist, born and educated in times of no small Pagan darkness, and consider that neither of these Tenents will be found upon due Examination so destitute of all support of Reason, as rash and unexamining heads have apprehended, I profess I cannot but think it an argument of much more inhumanity than judicious zeal in any man, upon this account alone, to invade him with the crimination of superlative* Impiety, Blasphemy, *and absolute* Atheism. *For,*

As to the FIRST, viz. *That the humane*

mane soul doth not survive the funerals of the body, but absolutely perish in the instant of death; as I need not tell you, how uncomfortable an Opinion it is to all Virtuous Persons, and how manifestly repugnant to Christianism, and indeed to the fundamental Reason of all Religions beside (if I may be admitted to use that improper phrase of the vulgar, while I well know that there can be but one Religion truly so called, and that all the rest are more properly called Superstitions) so I need not advertise you how highly difficult it is to refute it, by satisfactory and convincing Arguments desumable from meer Reason. For, to suspect the light of Nature, is scarce strong enough by its own single force, to dispel all those thick mists of difficulties, that hinder our discernment of the full nature of the humane soul, and scarce bright enough clearly to demonstrate the immortality of that noble Essence, so, as to leave no room for diffidence or contradiction; I hope it can be no Heresie in any man, because no disparagement to either his Faith or Reason. You have, Sir, I presume, attentively perused that so worthily commended Discourse of Plato, *touching the immortality of Mans soul, and acquainted your self moreover with all those mighty Arguments, alledged by Saint* Thomas, Pomponatius

ponatius (*who will hardly be out-done in subtlety, touching the same Theam, by any that comes after him, and yet he was forced to conclude himself a Sceptick, and leave the Question to the decision of some other bolder Pen*) Des Cartes, *our noble friend sir* Kenelm Digby, *and divers other great Clerks, to prove the Soul of Man to be a substance distinct from, and independent upon that of the body, and to have eternal existence* à parte post; *and yet if I were not assured, that your perswasion of its immortality is founded upon a much more firm basis, than that of the most seemingly apodictical of all their Reasons, I might well doubt of the impregnability thereof. And this I may say somewhat the more freely and boldly, both because I my self, having with all possible attention, and equity of mind, examined the validity of most of those Arguments, for the immortality of mens souls, which their Authors have presented as perfect Demonstrations thereof, cannot find any of them to make good that glorious Title, or satisfie expectation to the full; and because I have observed many learned men, Divines, and others, who have long laboured their thoughts in the same Disquisition, to concur with me in opinion,* That to believe the Soul of Man to be immortal, upon Principles

ciples ſupernatural, is much more eaſie, then to demonſtrate the ſame by Reaſons purely Natural. *Now, if for the moſt ſublime Wits, even of our times (wherein the Metaphyſicks have, doubtleſs, received a very great encreaſe of clearneſs, and mens Speculations ſeem to be highly refined, in regard of ſundry lively and fruitful hints, that are inſperſed upon the leaves of ſacred Writ, concerning as well the Original and Nature of the Soul, as the ſtate of it after death) it be ſo hard a task to erect a firm perſwaſion of the immortality of the humane ſoul, upon a foundation of Natural Reaſon alone; I appeal to every impre-judicate man, with what juſtice our* EPICURUS *is ſo highly condemned, for being ignorant of that unattainable Truth, when he could ſteer the courſe of his judgment and belief by no other Star, but that remote and pale one of the Light of Nature, that bright North-Star of Holy Scripture appearing not at all to the Horizon of* Greece, *till many Ages after his death.*

Again, EPICURUS *is not the only man amongſt the Ancients that is to be accuſed, for entertaining and divulging erroneous conceptions of the nature and condition of the reaſonable ſoul after death, it being well known, that moſt of the Grecian Philoſophers did indubitate the incorruptibility thereof,*

thereof, either implicitely and upon consequence, or immediately, and in direct terms. This perhaps may seem a Paradox to you, and therefore I ask leave to make it good. The Grecian Scholiarchs may all be divided into two Classes, in reference to this subject; the First *consisting of those who* Asserted, *the other of such as expresly* Denied *the Immortality of Man's Soul, the former containing the greater, the latter the lesser number. And among all those that are on the Affirmative part, you shall not find one that is not (more or less) tainted with that so common Errour, of the* Refusion of all mens Souls after death, into the *Anima Mundi*, or general Soul of the Universe, *which is upon consequence, That*, they cease to exist, *per se*, or to be what they were before, so soon as they are separated from the body. *For your further satisfaction of this unfrequent Truth, be pleased to observe, that, as they generally conceived the soul of every individual man, to be a certain particle of the Mundane, or universal soul, immitted into the body at its conception, and therein contained during life, as a drop of water is contained in a Glass Phial; so did they also conceive, that the same soul, upon the breaking of the Glass, or dissolution of the Body, doth flow forth, and again return and unite it self to*

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the universal soul, from whence it was at first deſumed. Thus Plutarch (4 Placit. 9.) *expreſly tells us, that* Pythagoras *and* Plato *maintained, that Mans Soul having taken its farewel of the body* [εἰς τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὸν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενὲς] in congeniam ſibi animam Mundi concedere, *doth return to the Soul of the world, which is of the ſame ſubſtance and nature with it. Now by this common Soul of the world, it is manifeſt, that they ſometimes meant* God, *in reſpect they acknowledged him to be the ſupreme Intelligence, or Mind, which diſpoſeth and ordereth all parts of the body; and ſometimes the* Heavens, *becauſe as Heaven is the moſt pure and noble part of the Univerſe, ſo is the ſoul the moſt pure and noble part of Man.*

This conſidered, you have here an opportunity (at leaſt, if a ſhort and pertinent digreſſion may be opportune) of taking notice in what ſence we are to underſtand ſome remarkable paſſages in their Writings, touching the humane ſoul, which are often mentioned, but ſeldom rightly interpreted.

Firſt, we may hence collect what their true meaning was, when they ſaid, Animam eſſe divinæ auræ Particulam, *that the Soul is a particle of Divine breath, or as* Cicero *ſpeaks (in* Cato Major) Ex Divina mente unive-

versa delibutos animos habemus: *We have our souls derived from the Universal Divine Mind*; *And again, when they affirmed, that our Souls were taken from Heaven, and to return thither again after their emancipation from the body: All which the Prince of Poets elegantly insinuateth in these Verses*;

-----Deum namq; ire per omnes
Terrasque tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum;
Heinc homines, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas,
Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri
Omnia, nec morti esse locum; sed viva evolare
Sideris in numerum, atque alto succedere cœlo.

Secondly, we may hence learn the sence of Empedocles, *as well in that saying quoted by* Plutarch (de exilio) Præsentem vitam esse exilium, è quo tandem animus sit in pristinam sedem demigraturus, *That this present life is a banishment of the soul, from which it is at length to be recall'd to its primitive place*; *as in that mentioned by* Clem. Alexandrinus (Lib. 4. Stromat. 2.

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hypotypoſ. 24.) Animos ſapientum De
os fieri, *That the ſouls of Wiſe-men becom*
Gods.

Thirdly, we may hence know how to un
derſtand the true ſence of Plato's *opinion*
that all Learning is only Reminiſcence.
For ſuppoſing the Soul of the Univerſe to b
omniſcient, and each particle thereof to b
of the ſame nature and faculties with th
whole; he thereupon infers, that the ſoul o
each man being a particle of that Univerſa
and omniſcient ſoul, muſt be likewiſe omni
ſcient, though in the moment, when it is im
mers'd into the body, it becomes dim and be
clouded, ſo that as if it had been made drun
with Lethe, *or the Waters of Oblivion, i*
forgets all its Original knowledge, and mu
recollect and call to mind the notions of parti
cular things, by the help and mediation o
the ſenſes.

Laſtly, why Pythagoras *and* Plato, *t*
this opinion of the Souls Remigration *t*
the Univerſal Soul, connected that thei
other ſo famous one of the Tranſmigratio
of Souls from body to body ſucceſſively
For, having imbibed this latter errour o
the Souls tranſmigration, in their converſati
on with ſome Egyptian Prieſts, as Stobæu
informs us (in Eccl. Phyſic.) *they ſtriv*
ed to accommodate the ſame to their ow

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former opinion, of the ſouls being a particle of the Anima mundi; *inſomuch as it might thence follow, that the ſoul being exhal'd from its firſt body, and wandring up and down in queſt of its Fountain, the univerſal ſoul, might probably enough light upon ſome other body then in the act of Conception, and being united thereunto, animate it, or being by inſpiration attracted into ſome living creature, unite it ſelf to the ſoul præexiſtent therein, and ſo become one with it, eſpecially if the body it meet with be of the ſame, or like conditions and affections with the former, which it hath ſo lately forſaken. True it is, nevertheleſs, that they delivered this Doctrine of the Tranſmigration of ſouls, very obſcurely, and wrapt up in Fables and Allegories, but their deſign herein was to make men more manſuete and mild in their diſpoſitions, by bringing them to put a greater value upon the lives of Animals (for, according to this Doctrine, who would kill a Beaſt, when for ought he knew, his Fathers Soul might animate that Beaſt) and a greater degree of horrour againſt ſhedding of Blood, that ſo having deveſted them of all ſavageneſs and cruelty, they might have a greater deteſtation againſt Homicide, and preſerving the peace and ſafety of Societies.*

Nor can the Stoicks *be exempted from the ſame Errour, of the* Refuſion *of all ſouls into the Univerſal one; inſomuch as it was their conſtant tenent, that the world was animated by a certain fire, which they called* Jupiter; *that mens ſouls were particles derived from that fire, and ſhould again be reunited thereunto, ſome ſooner, others later, but all in that general Conflagration of the Univerſe, when all things ſhall be (as they dreamt) ſublimed into Jove again.*

Now if we look narrowly into the buſineſs we ſhall diſcover even Ariſtotle *himſelf to be in ſome meaſure guilty of the very ſame deluſion, as well in reſpect of his* Animal Heat, *which, diſcourſing of the Generation of Animals* (Lib. 2. Cap. 3.) *he affirms to be reſpondent in ſome proportion to the Element of Celeſtial bodies, and wherewith all things in the world are impregnated, as of his* Intellectus Agens, *which he teacheth to be diffuſed through the whole world after the ſame manner as the light of the Sun is diffus'd through the air, and ſo applyd and conjoyned to the* Intellectus Patiens, *or proper ſoul of every man, as the external light is applyed and conjoyned to the eye, and as the eye by the conjunctio*

of external light comes to see visible objects, so doth the proper passive Intellect of every man, by the illustration of the general active Intellect, come to understand intelligible Objects. Adding thereunto, that the Intellect passive is separable, corruptible, and capable of utter dissolution; but the Active, inseparable, incorruptible, immortal. For, thus much may be collected from several places of his Books de Anima, *and thus are those places explained by the best of his Greek interpreters,* Alexander, *and the best of the Arabians,* Averrhoes, *whose opinion of the* Unity of the Intellect *in all the world, is sufficiently known.*

And thus much of the Philosophers of the former *Classis, who though they seem to affirm, do yet in reality, upon natural consequence, deny the Immortality of the Humane Soul, in that they all concur in that contradictory Errour of the Resolution thereof into the* Anima mundi. *For, the proper Notion of Immortality, is,* the eternal existence of a thing in the self same nature, and *per se; and therefore, if a thing be devested of its own proper nature, so, as to become invested with that of another, and to have no existence or subsistence, but what is dependent upon its union with that other, to*

which it is assimilated and identified; for my part, truly, I cannot understand how it can be said to be immortal without manifest contradiction. And whether it be not as gross an absurdity to say, that the soul of a man shall be for ever the same (i. e.) the soul of a man, and yet that it shall be identified, or made the same with the soul of the world; as to say, that such a thing shall be for ever the same, and not the same, is no hard matter to determine.

As for those of the latter, *who in downright terms* denyed *the Immortality of the soul, they subdivide themselves into two different Sects, some having contended for the total* destruction, *or* absolute Annihilation, *and others for only the* exsolution *and* disperſion *of it into the* matter *or* principles *of which it was composed.*

To the former *of these Sects we may justly annumerate all such, who conceived the soul of man to be only a certain harmony, not of Musical sounds, but a contemperation of parts, humours, and qualities, and consequently, that as of Musical Harmony, nothing can remain after the sounds are vanished, so of the soul nothing can remain, after death hath once destroyed that harmonious Contemperation of parts, humours, and qualities,*

lities, from whence it did result. And this purely was the opinion of not only those antienter Greeks, Dicæarchus, Aristoxenus, Andræas, *and* Asclepiades, *all which are thereof strongly accused by* Plato (in Phæd.) *and* Aristotle (Lib. 1. de Anima. Cap. 5.) *but also our Master* Galen, *who was positive and plain in his definition of the soul, to be a certain Temperament of Elementary Qualities. In the same list may we also inscribe the names of all those, who imagining the soul to be nothing else but a certain* Act, *or* Form, *or* Quality *inseparable* (i. e.) *a certain special* Modification *of* Matter, *have accordingly concluded, that as the* Figure, *or special* Mode *of a thing must inevitably vanish, immediately upon the immutation or change of the thing figurate, so must the soul, being only a special Mode of the Matter, necessarily vanish immediately upon the immutation of that Mode by death. Which* Origen, Justine, Theodoret, *and some other* Fathers, *understanding to have been the Tenent of* Aristotle, *have written sharp invectives against him, as an assertor of the souls mortality, and this so justly, that if his Zealous Disciple, honest Mr.* Alexander Rosse, *were alive again, he would never be able to discredit that their charge.*

To the latter *we are to refer all such, as held the soul to be* Corporeal. *For, as they would have it to be composed of* material *principles, so would they also have it to be, by death, again resolved into the same material principles; so that in their sence, the extinction of the Soul is no other, but the dissipation thereof into those very corporeal particles, of which it was composed. And this seems to be the true meaning of* Demonax *in* Lucian, *when being interrogated whether he thought the Soul to be immortal, he answered,* mihi videtur, sed ut omnia; *it seems to me to be immortal, but no otherwise than all things are immortal,* i. e. *as to the matter only, or component Principles of it, which are incapable of Annihilation. In this Catalogue we may worthily place* Marcus Antoninus, *in regard of his saying* (Lib. 4.) Animas hominum dispergi in auras, *that mens souls are dispersed into Aer: and* Seneca, *for his* Animam hominis magno pondere extriti permeare non posse, & statim dispergi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber; *as also* Democritus *and* Epicurus, *who equally contested, that the soul was nothing but very* Atoms, *in such a special order, in such a special position &c. contemperated, and Death nothing but*

a discomposure of that determinate Contexture, and a Resolution of the soul into separated Atoms again; and therefore are they always conjoined by the good Lactantius (Lib. 3. cap. 7. & lib. 9. cap. 8. & 13.) *as confederates in the Doctrine of the Dissolution of Souls.*

And thus, Sir, you may at once plainly perceive the justice *of my Attainder of the most, and most eminent of the antient Grecian Philosophers, with the guilt of having been (either obliquely or directly) Impugners of the Souls Immortality; and the great* Injustice *of their Sentence, who more particularly condemn* Epicurus *for the same Errour, when so many others were equally culpable with him therein.*

As to the SECOND, *viz.* That man is not obliged to honour, revere, and worship God upon the motive of his Beneficence, or upon the account of either Good or Evil expected from him; but only out of a sentiment of the superlative Excellencies of his Nature, and chiefly of his Immortality and Beatitude. *I might well plead for him, that living in a time, when there was scarce any Religion, but sottish Idolatry, when there were more Gods then Nations, yea, then*

Temples; *and when all Devotion was absurd and ridiculous Superstition: He seems rather to be honour'd, for that he came so neer to the knowledge of the true God, then condemned for coming no neerer*; *rather to be admir'd for having so clear and genuine an apprehension of some of the Divine Attributes, then reproached for not comprehending them all. Especially, when I should not infringe the Law of charity, to doubt, that among us Christians, and even such as think themselves not a little vers'd in Theologie, there may be some, who, if they were put to give but an Adumbration of that mysterious piece, the Divine Nature, would discover themselves to have as imperfect an Idæa thereof, as* EPICURUS *had. But this excuse would be too general for his particular vindication, from the imputed crime of perfect* Atheism, *and therefore we shall fix only on such Reasons as are more properly accommodate to that purpose.*

First, I dare say, his Piety, *in deriding the incompetency of those Conceptions, that men in his time commonly entertained of the supreme Essence (for they ascribed generally unto it, all the self same passions and affections, which they perceived to be in themselves, and so copied out an imperfect Divinity,*

vinity, by the infinitely disproportionate Original of Humanity) was much greater than his Impiety *could be, in teaching, that the Deity was of so transcendently excellent a nature, as to be wholly unconcern'd in any thing but it self, and far above all sentiments whatever, besides those of its own eternal and compleat Felicity; and consequently, that it was to be reverenc'd and worshiped solely and purely for its own sake, without the least mixture of self-Reflections. For, as by the one, he judiciously attempted to subvert the false and unreasonable Religion, or (rather) Superstition, in the worship of* Bacchus, *and other the Imaginary Deities, wherewith his Country swarmed in his days (there being no better way to alienate mens minds from the Veneration of False Gods, than to acquaint them with notions comprehending the Essential and Incommunicable attributes of the true God) so by the other, he seems to have laid a very firm foundation for the true Religion, in that he would have the Right or Justice of all Divine worship to be founded wholly and entirely upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature. How far therefore he was from being a Professor and Seminary of down-right Atheism, as some (whose zeal may well be*

thought

thought to have been much greater th
their knowledge, as to that particular) ha
represented him to the World; every ma
who hath but so much reason, as to und
stand, that Polytheism *is the great*
Atheism, *may easily judge.*

In the next place, I can hardly allow h
to deserve the odious Epithete of, M
highly Impious, *which most men brand h*
withall, upon the account of this latter D
drine only, because I meet with not a few,
contemptible Reasons, that incline my ju
ment to more moderation. In particul
you well know, Sir, how highly unreason
ble it is, for any man to expect, from EP
CURUS, *the knowledge of the true and*
gitimate worship of God, when that was
God himself prescribed only to the anci
Hebrews, and professed only by their
sterity, and no other Nation in the World
if so, why should more be expected fr
Him, *than from* Plato, Zeno, Socrat
Aristotle, *or any other of the elder Gre*
an Philosophers, they being all equally
mghted with Paganism? why should he
so severely sentenc'd, and all the rest p
unquestioned, one and the same charge
invincible ignorance of the true Religi
lying against each of them? Besides,
m

mane Justice will hardly permit, that any man should suffer meerly for wanting that, which, without supernatural means, was impossible for him to obtain; and he that will adventure to determine, whether or no, at the Tribunal of Divine Justice, any one shall be condemned simply upon that score, must have dived very deep into that fathomless gulf of Prædestination.

You likewise know, that our Christian Doctors assign only Two causes, *or* Fundamental Considerations, *why men should worship God: The* one *they teach to be the transcendent Excellency of the Nature of God, which singly, and without any respect to our own Utility or Advantage, doth justly claim the highest veneration of our minds. The* other, *they admit to be the benefits, we either have received, or (which is the stronger motive of the two) hope to receive at his hands. Hereupon, if any man be induced to revere and worship the Divine Majesty solely and simply upon the* former *motive, they say that he bears a* Filial *respect and affection to God; and if only by the* latter, *a meer* servile *or mercenary. Now though the servile or mercenary love of God, be not altogether to be disliked, in regard it is a kind of gratitude due to him as*

a Benefactor; yet I conceive no man w
gainsay, but the filial and free love is mu
the nobler and more acceptable, inſomu
as it hath no other than the nobleſt of o
jects, God Himſelf. And ſure I am (ho
ever) that the moſt Learned, moſt Pious, a
moſt Religious of our School Divines, ha
been earneſt in their adviſoes to us, to e
tract all ſelfneſs from our love of God, a
(as much as our frailties will admit o
to fix all our affections entirely upon Hi
as he is infinitely Good, and Amiable i
Himſelf.

Moreover, you may remember, Sir, th
Cicero *in his Book touching the nature o*
the Gods, hath theſe very words, Quid e
cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dica
cum dii ipſi non modo homines non co
lant, ſed omnino nihil curent? Et qu
porrò Pietas ei debetur, à quo nihil acce
peris? Aut quid omnino, cujus nullu
meritum ſit, ei deberi poteſt? *By whic*
it is evident, that he would exclude all o
ther inducements to Religion, beſides a me
mercenary and ſervile reſpect: And yet
dare ſay, that you do not remember, th
ever you heard him accounted Impious fo
that opinion. Why therefore ſhould EPI
CURUS *have ſuch hard meaſure, as t*

e stigmatiz'd with the name of Atheist, Im-ious wretch, Secretary of Hell, Enemy to ll Religion, *&c? and all for asserting, that man ought to be induc'd to a reverence and veneration of the Divine Majesty, only by the sentiments of a* Filial *Piety (not supernatural Piety, arising from Grace justifying, and by which we are made the Sons of God, but a pure Natural one) such as* Right Reason *had suggested unto him? Certainly, of the two opinions,* Epicurus's *will appear much more venial, to an Equitable Arbiter. Sundry other arguments there are, which might be advantagiously alledged on our Authors behalf, in this case. But, considering that these few already urged, are of importance enough, to evince the temerity of his Accusers judgment, and that the prolixity of this discourse, hath long since, given you just occasion to question, by what right I call it a Letter; I perceive my self obliged in good manners, no longer to exercise your patience, then, while I briefly express my sentiments of the* LAST *Article of his Charge.*

Which is, His asserting of Self-Homicide, in case of intolerable, and otherwise inevitable Calamity. *This, as a* Christian, *I hold to be a bloody and detestable opinion, because expresly repugnant to the* Law *of* God; *and yet in the person of a meer* Philosopher, *I might, without being unreasonably Parodoxical, adven-*

adventure to dispute, whether it be so hig *repugnant to the Law of* Nature, *as men h* *generally conceived. For,*

First, if all the precepts of the Law of N *ture concenter in this one point;* Fly. Ev pursue Good; *as those who have most labo* *ed to conduct our understanding out of t* *intricate Labyrinth, the ambiguous Sence* *the word,* Law of Nature, *have unanimou* *determined; certainly, that man assumes* *very easie task, who undertakes to prove, t* *in case of insupportable distress, and where* *other hopes of evading, or ending that mi* *ry (than which there can be no greater* Ev *for a man to free himself from that extrem* *of* Evil, *and seek the* Good *of ease and qui* *by taking away his own life, which chie* *makes him subject to, and only sensible of t* *misery, is an infringment of the Law of* Natu

Again, if we understand Self-preservati *(which all men allow to be the foundation* *Natural Law in General) to be no other, but* *innate Love, or Natural affection to Life,* a Good, *when life ceaseth to be a* Good, & *generates into an* Evil, *as commonly it doth* *men, in cruel torments of the body, or high d* *content of mind, (the more desperate afflictio* *the two by much) & when all the Stars of h* *and comfort are set in the West of black des* *ration, why should not the force or obligati*

of that Law also, cease at the same time? Or rather, why should not self-homicid, in such cases, be an absolute accomplishment of the Law of self-preservation, it being manifest, that we are by the tenour of that Law, obliged to use such means, as conduce to our preservation from the greatest Evil; *and as manifest, that to free ones self from misery, which cannot otherwise be avoided, but by breaking asunder the Ligaments of Life, is a pursuance of the only means we can discover, to be conducible to our end: that is, to preservation from more sufferings, and to* Indolency, *which in Death we propose to our selves as a* Good?

But lest we seem to give any encouragement to that, which God, *the* Church, *and the* Civil Power *so highly condemn; let us grant, that Self-murther, in whatsoever case, is a violation of the Law of Nature, and yet we shall have one consideration left, that seems strong enough to refract the violence of their malice, who exclaim against* EPICURUS, *as the grand abettor of self-assasination; and that is, that he was not single, nor most vehement in the justification of it. For, if we look upon the* Doctrine *of other Philosophers, we shall soon perceive, that the* Stoicks *generally, not only approved thereof, but strictly enjoyned men to embrace death voluntarily, and from*

their

their own hands; *That* Cicero *doth* (Lib. de Legibus) *implicitly allow of it in these words*: Eum damnandum esse censeo qui seipsum interficit, si neque ex decreto Civitatis fecerit, neq; ullo Fortunæ casu intolerabili inevitabiliq; coactus, neque obrutus ullâ pauperis, miseræq; vitæ ignominiâ; *and expressly confirms it* (in 2. Tusculan.) *in these*, Eam in vita servandam Legem quæ in Græcorum conviviis obtinet, Aut bibat, aut abeat; quoniam ut oportet aliquis fruatur paritè cum aliis voluptate potandi, aut ne sobrius in violentiam vinolentorum incidat, aut discedat; sic injurias Fortunæ quas ferre non, nequeas, defugiendo relinquas. *And if the Practice, we shall assoon find many of them have laid violent hands upon themselves, and that in cases of far less moment, than those of insupportable and inevitable Calamity, which only* EPICURUS's *precept is limited; while He, leaving others to become examples of that Rule, with admirable patience, and invincible magnanimity, endured the tortures of the Stone in the Bladder, and other most excruciating Diseases for many years together, and awaited, till extreme old age gently put out the Taper of his life. Thus* Zeno, *a man of the most spotless fame of any Philosopher among*

the Antients, having by a fall bruised one of his fingers against the ground, and interpreting that to be a summons of him to the earth, went presently home and hanged himself, and was therefore by Diogenes Laertius *honoured with this Elogie*; Mirâ felicitate vir, qui incolumis, integer, sine mora è vivis excessit. *Thus* Demosthenes, *you know, to prevent his being beholding to any man but himself, either for his life or death, drank mortal poyson out of his own Quill, which had given him immortality long before. Thus also* Democles, *to prevent his pollution, by the unnatural heat of a certain lustful Greek Tyrant, who attempted to force him, leaped into a Furnace of boyling Water. And thus* Cleanthes, Chrysippus, *and* Empedocles, *all brake open the Gates of Death, and forced themselves into the other World. To these you may please to adde the memorable Examples of that Prince of* Roman *wisdom* (as Lactantius *calls him*) Cato, *who with his own hands and Sword, opened a floodgate in his Bowels, to let his life flow forth, having all the night before prepared himself to fall boldly, with the Lecture of* Plato's *Discourse, of the Immortality of the soul; and of the famous* Cleombrotus, *who, upon no other incitement, but* Plato's *rea-*

ſons in the ſame Diſcourſe, threw him
from a precipice, as if he went inſtan
to experiment the truth of what he had ne
read; and though Ariſtotle *would not a*
mit, that he did it upon any other accou
but that of Puſillanimity *and* Fear, *y*
Saint Auguſtine (De Civit. Dei, Lib.
cap. 22.) *aſcribes it altogether unto* Grea
neſs of mind, *his words being theſe*; Wh
no Calamity urged him, no Crime, eith
true or imputed, nothing but greatne
of mind moved him to embrace deat
and diſſolve the ſweet bonds of li
And Lactantius, *who was ſevere enough*
his cenſure, both of the Act, *and the* Bo
that occaſion'd it, ſays of him; Præcipite
ſe dedit nullam aliam ob cauſam niſi qu
Platoni credidit.

SIR,

By this time you are ſatisfied, both of t
injuries done to the memory of the Te
perate, Good, *and* Pious EPICU
RUS, *and of my willingneſs and dev*
to redreſs them. And my dull and uneq
Apology for him being now ended, I ſhou
begin another for my ſelf, *in that I ha*
rather diſturbed than either delighted or i
formed you. But this being much the great
difficul

difficulty of the two, I think it safer for me, to put my self upon your mercy for an absolute forgiveness, than to trust to my own wit, to make excuses for my failings herein, especially, since your patience cannot but be already overcome by the tediousness of

Your very Humble Servant,

W. CHARLETON.

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EPI

EPICURUS'S MORALS.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction.

IF Action be the end of Speculation, and the knowledge of Nature, but the way that leads Man to the knowledge of himself; and the best of mans knowledge be that which teacheth him how to order his Mind, and regulate his Actions, so as that he may assuredly attain to the highest degree of Happiness, of which his Nature is capable, during life: then certainly, must ETHICKS or MORAL PHILOSOPHY be the noblest part of all Human Learning, the Crown and perfection of all our studies; insomuch as it is that alone, which both gives us the infallible Tokens, by which we may know what is truly the *summum Bonum* of life, and prescribes us most

Esse illius Philosophi orationem prorsus inanem, quæ Affectum nullum in Homine curat; quia, ut Medicinæ usus nullus est, nisi à Corpore morbos abigat: sic nec Philosophiæ, nisi malum ex Animo pellat; inquit *Stobæus* in *Sermon.* 8.

plain and certain Rules for the Acquisitio of it.

II.

By *Ethicks*, or *Morals*, we understand th part of Philosophy, which hath for its pr per Object the End, or Final and main sco of Mans Life; containing certain Direc ons and Precepts, for the right informati of his Understanding, and (consequentl the conduct of his Will, in the Election real Good, and Avoidance of Evil, in o der to his attaining the true End of his lif the Supreme Good, or Felicity.

III.

That the End of Man's Life is *Felicity*; a men most readily allow: and, if you a him, no man will deny, that he aims at th End. But, seeing it is too certain, that mo men miss of that end; it cannot be doubte that the Frustration of their Hopes and E deavours doth of necessity proceed fro hence: either that they do not propose t themselves that Felicity, which they ought or do not use such Means, or pursue suc Courses, as do conduce thereunto.

IV.

We cannot but observe, that there ar Myriads of men, who though their propi tious Fortunes have abundantly accommo dated them with all things necessary for th

use

uſes of life, (for, their Exchequers overflow with treaſure, their bodies enjoy perfect health and vigour, their titles ſwell with attributes of honour, their fair, chaſt, and fruitful Wives furniſh them with Troops of beautiful and ingenious Children, in a word, they poſſeſs all things, that all that are below them uſually meaſure happineſs by:) do yet live full of Anxiety and Complainings, having their minds perpetually on the rack of cares, ſollicitude, and fears: ſo as they cannot but confeſs, that they lead lives truly miſerable. Conſidering this, we may from thence ſafely conclude, that theſe men are wholly ignorant wherein true Felicity doth conſiſt, and whence or how it is to be attained: and therefore, the heart of every ſuch perſon may be fitly compared to a Veſſel, which being in ſome part full of holes, can never be filled; and in other parts deeply imbued with ſome evil tincture, doth deprave and corrupt the moſt wholſom and cordial Liquor that is poured into it.

V.

Well worth our labour, therefore, is it, by the help of this Philoſophy (which teacheth the nature of, and way unto Felicity) to cleanſe and make ſound that Veſſel, the Heart of Man; that ſo it may be eaſily filled with a few things, and find a ſweet-

ſweetneſs and comfort in every the ſmalleſt thing that occurrs unto it. And to this (*a*) Philoſophy we are to addict our ſelves betimes, as ſoon as poſſible, even this very day; not to defer it ſo much as till to morrow: becauſe it highly concerns us to live happily to day; and Folly hath this evil always annexed unto it, that it doth always begin to live, or purpoſe to begin to live, but in the mean time never doth live.

(*a*) Atqui, non cum vacaveris, Philoſophandum eſt: omnia alia negligenda ſunt, ut huic aſſideamus; cui nullum tempus ſatis magnum eſt, etiamſi à pueritia uſque ad longiſſimos humani ævi terminos vita protenditur. *Seneca, Epiſt.* 59. vide etiam *Galenum de affect. dignoſcend. & vitand. cap.* 3. *itemque, Epictetum, in Enchir. lib.* 3 *c.* 15.

VI.

Once we were, twice we cannot be Born; and our Age muſt have a period; but when we know not. If ſo, is it prudence, or folly in thee O man! when thou haſt not to morrow in thy power, to (*b*) procraſtinate thy making thy ſelf happy till the Future, and in the mean time loſe the opportunity of the preſent, of which

(*b*) *Marcus Antoninus* [ὀὲν βασιλεῦσι φιλοσοφώτατος] notans procraſtinationem ſtudii & conatus ad optima enitendi, inquit. Μᾶλλον ὃ θέλεις ἀγαθὸς ἄνεσον γένεσθαι, ἢ σημερὸν. *De ſeipſo lib.* 3. *Sect.* 4. (*c*) Ille potens ſui Lætuſq; viget, cui licet in diem dixiſſe, Vixi. *Flaccus Carmin. lib.* 3. *od.* 29. (*d*) Maxima jactura vitæ dilatio eſt. Illa primum quemque extrahit diem: illa arripit præſentia, dum ulteriora promittit; *&c. Senec. de brevit. vit. cap.* 9.

which only thou art certain? By such delay is it, that the Lives of most men are lost: and hence comes it, that every one (*c*) dies in the Immaturity, if not the beginning of his Designs. Every man so goes out of the World, as if he had but newly entred into it: and therefore (*d*) old men may justly be affirmed, not to have survived the rawness and folly of their Infancy: because trifling away their years in business that concerns them not, they have scarce known that they have lived at all, and in the chief Harvest of life, they have never reaped the Fruits of it.

VII.

Let us therefore, endeavour so to live, as that we need not repent us of our time past: and so enjoy the present day, as if we were nothing concerned in To morrow. For, He arives most sweetly at To-morrow, who doth, the least need, or desire it: and an hour comes most grateful to him, who had the least expectation of it. Since it is troublesome, always to begin to live: let us make every moment, the total sum of life; as if no part of it remained behind. The life of a Fool is unpleasant, and full of Fears, and depends wholly upon the Future: but it

Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum; Grata superveniet, quæ non sperabitur hora. *Hor. lib.* 1. *Epist.* 4.

it becomes us ſo to order our Minds a
Actions, as that ours may be pleaſant, ſ
cure, and fixt in the ſafety of the pr
ſent.

VIII.

Certainly, the way, at length, to avo
Fooliſhneſs, is for a man to advance himſ
into the Arſenal, or Fortreſs of Wiſe me
from whence, as from a Watch-Tower, h
may look down upon the ſwarms of oth
men, led, by their paſſions, wandring u
and down in a Wilderneſs of Errors; and u
ceſſantly afflicting themſelves in the purſu
of ſuch things, which, being found, en
creaſe their miſerable Deviations. If yo
account it a pleaſure, to ſtand upon a ſaf
Rock, and behold Mariners at Sea diſtract
edly ſtriving with a Tempeſt; or, from
ſecure Caſtle to look upon two Armie
maintaining a long and fierce Battail: aſſu
redly, it muſt be much more delightful
from the ſerene Tower of Wiſdom, to con
template the Tumults, Hurries, and Con
tentions of the fooliſh Multitude below.
Not that it is delightful, to ſee others afflict
ed with Evils; but, to ſee our ſelves not to
be involved in thoſe Evils.

IX.

Now that we may, to the utmoſt of our
power, afford aſſiſtance to thoſe, who deſire
to

o arive at this height of Wisdom; we conceive our selves obliged, in humanity, so to collect and compile such Notions, concerning these things, which our frequent Meditations have brought unto our mind: that we may discourse first of *Felicity*, which is Mans *Chiefest Good*; and afterward, of such *Means*, as certainly conduce to the Creation and Conservation thereof, and which, indeed, are no other but the *Vertues* themselves.

CHAP. II.

Of Felicity, or the Supreme Good; as far as Man is capable thereof.

FElicity is therefore called the *End*, *Extreme*, and *Highest* of Goods, because there are some things named Goods, which invite the Appetite to prosecute them immediately for themselves; and others again which are desireable mediately or in relation to others, that are Superior: but, as for Felicity, it is that Good, to which all other Goods ought to be referred, and cannot it self be referred to any thing.

II.

II.

Nor doth it hinder, since felicity and Beatitude, or a Blissful Life, are one and the same; that it is sometime stiled the End of a blissful life: for in that we speak the phrase of the Gentiles, which accept the End of a blissful life, and a blissful life it self, for the very same thing; not that we thereby intend, that there is any further End to which a blissful life may be conceived referrible.

Eadem prorsus ratione *Cicero* (*de finib. bonorum*) finem boni appellat, bonum omnibus numeris absolutum, quod qui sit assequutus, præterea nihil desideret.

III.

This premised, it behoves us to distinguish Felicity into *Supreme*, viz. that which is incapable of intention and remission, of Flouds and Ebbs of pleasure: and *Subaltern* or *Gradual*, viz. such as is subject to Addition and Detraction, or Encrease and Decrease of pleasures.

IV.

The *Former*, we conceive to be a certain State, than which none can be thought more sweet, more desireable, more perfect; wherein there is no Evil to be feared, no Good, which is not fully enjoyed; wherein is nothing to which the Will can have an inclination, and may not possess it; finally,

which

which is more Conſtant than ever to be loſt.

V.

The *Later*, we underſtand to be a certain State, in which a man may be as Happy as the Frailty of his Nature will permit; or ſuch, wherein he may enjoy very much of neceſſary Goods, and ſuffer very little of Evils: and conſequently, wherein He may ſpend his days pleaſantly, calmly, and permanently, ſo far forth as the Condition of his Country, Society, Courſe of life, Conſtitution, Age, and other Circumſtances ſhall give leave.

VI.

Nor is it without good Reaſon, that we thus Diſtinguiſh, and define Felicity. Becauſe, though it be manifeſt, that the Former, or *Supreme* Felicity is competent only to the *Divine Nature*: yet there have been ſome, * who thinking over-highly of themſelves, and ſpeaking magnificently of their own Wiſdom, have ſo far dared to promiſe and arrogate to themſelves this perfect Felicity, as to affirm themſelves to be, in that reſpect, equal to God, and account the expreſſion modeſt, when they ſaid they were inferior only to *Jupiter* himſelf.

* The Stoicks.

VII.

VII.

These, truly, may be judged to have been forgetful both of the Mortality and Imbecility of their Nature; when all that are conscious or mindful of either, must soon acknowledge, that Men are capable only of the Latter, or imperfect Felicity: and that Wisdom doth perform a very high work upon a man, if, while most others remain surrounded with diverse Miseries, it advance him to such a condition, as renders him the least miserable of all men; or, if among those various Degrees of miseries to which his Birth hath made him obnoxious, it place him in such a state, wherein he may have the least share of those miseries. For, to be happy, in this life, it is sufficient to be exempted from those miseries, by which one might have been afflicted: and in the mean time, to enjoy such Goods, as that the condition of our Nature is not capable of greater.

VIII.

And this, seriously, is the Reason, why we conceive; that a Wise man, though he be deprived of the two best of his Senses, his Sight and Hearing, may yet partake of a happy life; forasmuch as he may nevertheless continue in the fruition of such and so many Goods, as his maimed nature is capable

pable of; and want those Evils, if not of his Body, yet at least of his mind, which might otherwise have vexed him.

IX.

Nay upon the same ground we further profess, that a Wise man may be Tormented most cruelly, and yet continue the possession of his Happiness. For, still he may enjoy, not that Divine, but this Humane Felicity; since in a Wise man it is always as the Condition of the present time will permit him to make it.

X.

We confess, that in the midst of his torments, he cannot but be sensible of pains; and may sometimes, by the violence of them, be forced to groan and roar out: but, in the mean while, because calmly submitting to the necessity of his suffering them, he doth not exasperate or encrease his pains, either by his Impatience, or Desperation, but rather mitigates and lessens them, by as great Constancy of mind, as his generous resolutions can fortifie him withal: in that respect, doubtless, he must be much more happy, than if he had, with pusillanimity, fear, reluctancy, and despair, entertained them; or than another man, who being under the same torments, doth not endure them with equal courage and constancy, as not having

the like encouragements and ſupplies from Wiſdom: (which adfers, at leaſt, Innocence of life, and ſecurity of Conſcience) by which thoſe torments might be lightned.

XI.

Wherefore, there is no reaſon neither why any man ſhould, by way of Cavil, object unto us; that according to this Aſſertion, *Phalaris* Bull, and a bed of Roſes muſt be all one to us; and conſequently, that a Wiſe man ought, while he is in the flames of that Brazen Engine of torture, to ſmile, and cry out, *O how pleaſant this is! O how much am I above theſe torments! how little do I feel or care for them!* Foraſmuch as we do not gainſay, but there are ſome things, which a wiſe man had rather ſhould happen to him, as the health of his Body, exemption from all incommodity, and freedom of his Mind; that ſo he might ſolace himſelf in the contemplation of his Goods: and other things which though he would not, they ſhould befal him; yet when they do befal him, he does not only conſtantly and bravely endure, but alſo welcomes and commends them, inſomuch as they give him an opportunity of experiment and gratulate his Virtue; and with internal alacrity, to exclaim, *I am burned, but not overcome; why ſhould it not*

more deſireable, not to have the fire overcome my Conſtancy, than not to have it conſume my Body? And this we ſay, in regard it is not to be expected, but that a Wiſe man may alſo be obnoxious, as to the pains of Diſeaſes, ſo alſo to the tortures of Tyrants: though he neither incur thoſe, nor provoke theſe willingly, ſo far forth as he can, with ſafety of his Virtues, avoid it.

CHAP. III.

That pleaſure (without which there is no Notion of Felicity) is a Good, of its own Nature.

FOraſmuch as it's ſweet, or pleaſant, for a man to live without pain; and ſweet, or pleaſant likewiſe, to enjoy Good things, and be recreated by them: it is an evident truth, that without both theſe ſweetneſſes or Pleaſures, or one of them at leaſt, Felicity cannot be underſtood (for, we accept Pleaſure, Suavity, Jucundity, and other Terms of the like importance, for one and the ſame thing:) though there have not wanted ſome, who with great pomp and oſtentation, have ſo diſcourſed of Pleaſure, as if it were certain Evil, in its own nature; and upon

conſequence, concluded it to be not onl
inconſiſtent with, but wholly Alien fro
wiſdom and Happineſs. And therefore, b
fore we come to enquire, whether *Felici*
doth conſiſt in pleaſure, or not; requiſite it i
that we remonſtrate, that *Pleaſure is a re*
good, in it ſelf; and that its Contrary, *Pai*
is a real Evil, in it ſelf.

II.

Since that is Good, which helpeth, whic
pleaſeth, which is amiable and inviting t
the Appetite; and on the contrary, that
Evil, which harmeth, which diſpleaſet
which is ungrateful, and ſo inciteth the A
petite to an odium and averſion: certain
there is nothing, which doth more pleaſ
more delight, is more amiable, more de
derable, than Pleaſure; and on the contrar
nothing that doth more incommode, mo
offend, is more to be abhorred and avoide
than pain: Wherefore, Pleaſure ſeems t
be not only a Good, but alſo the Eſſenti
Reaſon, or very *Root* of Good; inſomuc
as it is that very and only thing, for who
ſake, or in reſpect whereof an object is Goo
or Deſirable; as on the reverſe; pain ſeem
to be not only an Evil in it ſelf, but alſo t
Formal *Reaſon*, or very *Root* of Evil; inſ
much as it is that alone, in reſpect where
any thing is Evil or Hateful. For, thou

we ſometimes avoid Pleaſure; yet it is not the pleaſure it ſelf which we avoid, but ſome pain that is annexed unto it, or impendent on it: as likewiſe if we ſometimes court and purſue a pain, it is not the pain it ſelf, that we purſue, but ſome pleaſure that is conjoyned unto it.

III.

To ſpeak more expreſly; No man doth neglect, hate, or decline pleaſure, as it is pleaſure, but, becauſe uſually very great pains follow and overtake ſuch, who know not to follow Pleaſure with Reaſon and Moderation; nor is there any man, that loves, deſires, and purſues Pain, ſimply as it is pain; but becauſe he expects ſome very great pleaſure to accrue to him thereupon; and ſuch frequently may be the conſtitution of the time, as that he hath no other way that leads him to the pleaſure he aims at, but what lies in the rough tract of Labour and Pain.

IV.

To inſtance in very ſmall things; who is there among us, that undertakes and endures any laborious exerciſe of the body, unleſs to the end, that he may thereby acquire ſome commodity or benefit? And who can juſtly reprehend him, who deſires and endeavours to enjoy that pleaſure, upon

which nothing of trouble or discommodi
doth attend? Or him, who endeavours
eschew that Pain, by which no Pleasure c
be procured? But, we may justly accus
and esteem those persons worthy of co
tempt, who being intricated and corrupte
with the blandishments of present Ple
sures, do not foresee nor provide again
those pains and troubles, that must ensu
as being inevitably impendent upon
heads that are blinded with cupidities. Th
like blame is due also to those who forsak
their stations, and desert the duties of the
places and offices, out of a certain softne
and weakness of Mind, *i. e.* of Fear, of La
bour, and Pains.

V.

Now, of these things, the *Distinction*
easie and expedite. For, in times of free
dom, when all lies open to the arbitrary di
position of our own choice, so that there
no impediment, but we may do that whic
is most pleasing to us; in such case, it is law
ful for us to pursue and embrace all pleasure
and avoid all pain. But, such frequently
may be the constitution of the times, as that
pleasures are rather to be repudiated, and
labours and troubles not to be refused.

VI. So

VI.

So, though we esteem all pleasures to be a real good, and all pain to be a real evil; yet we do not therefore affirm, that we ought, at all times, to pursue that, and avoid this. For, it is good for us, to sustain some pains, that we may afterward enjoy more abundant pleasures; and expedient to abstain from some pleasures, that we may not by them incur more grievous pains.

VII.

Hence, as from a Fountain, was it, that discoursing of the true *Criteria*, or judges of good and evil, we deduced several Canons, or Rules, for the guidance and regulation of our Affections, or Passions: accounting Pleasure and Pain, for the most certain Criterion of Election and Aversion. And this upon very good reason; seeing that from the Benefit or Harm that redounds unto us from the fruition of them; all the Objects of our Affections or Passions ought to be judged Good or Evil; and that we sometimes use Good as Evil, and other times Evil as Good.

VIII.

From these Considerations, therefore (that we may inculcate the matter) we conclude, that no pleasure is of it self Evil;

but ſome things there are, which albeit they afford ſome pleaſures, yet they are ſuch, as occaſion and induce pains much greater than themſelves. Whereto, by way of Conſequence, we ſuperadde this; if any one pleaſure could be ſo collected into itſelf, or ſequeſtred from all droſs, as that it ſhould neither comprehend in it, nor leave behind it any the leaſt meaſure of pain: aſſuredly, by that Collection and ſimplicity it would become no leſs perfect and abſolute, than are the chiefeſt Works of Nature; and ſo pleaſures could have no Difference either of Qualities or Degrees among themſelves, but would all be equally deſireable.

IX.

Further, if thoſe very things, which are the Efficients of Pleaſures to *Luxurious* men, were ſuch, as that they could render them ſuperior to the terrors of Meteors, Earthquakes, Thunder, and Lightning, Eclipſes, and other the like accidents, cauſed by bodies ſuperterreſtrial; and free them from the baſe fears of pains and death: truly, we could find nothing in them to be reprehended; inſomuch as they would be wholly filled with Pleaſures, and could not, in the leaſt, know any thing of Pain, or Trouble, of Sickneſs, *i. e.* of Evil.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

That Felicity doth consist Generally in Pleasure.

WE are now come to our main purpose, *viz. That Felicity is rooted in Pleasure*; and therefore, we are first to demonstrate it to be so in the *General*, that we may afterward the more securely determine in what Pleasure it doth consist in *Special.*

II.

In the General, pleasure seems to be as the beginning, so also the end of a happy life; forasmuch as we deprehend it to be the first Good, and Congenite to our Nature, and to all other Animals whatever; and that very and only thing, according to which we direct our selves, in the Election and Rejection of any Object whatever, and define it to be Good or Evil.

III.

That Pleasure is the *First Good*, and Congenial, or, as Philosophers speak, the First *Aptum* and *Accommodatum* to Nature, may be demonstrated from hence; that every Animal, as soon as born, doth affect, pursue, and delight in Pleasure, as its chiefest Good:

Good: and on the contrary, doth hate, for
void, and to the utmoſt of its power, re
Pain, as its Chiefeſt Evil; provided that
ſenſe of the Animal be not depraved, but
Nature remain in its primitive perfection,
as to enable it to judg truly.

IV.

This conſidered, there is no further n
of any Reaſoning, or Diſputation to evin
why Pleaſure is to be deſired, and pain to
avoided; ſince the ſenſe alone doth e
dently demonſtrate it, no leſs than it d
that Fire is hot, that Snow is white, that H
ny is ſweet: and ſufficient it is for us only
obſerve it. For, if when we have tak
away from man all his ſenſes, the Remain
muſt be nothing; neceſſary it is, that w
is according to Nature, what againſt N
ture, muſt be judged by Nature it ſelf: a
conſequently, that Pleaſure is to be deſi
for it ſelf, and pain to be avoided for it ſe
For, what perceives, or what judges, tha
may either purſue, or avoid any thing, b
ſide pleaſure and pain?

V.

That Pleaſure is alſo the *Laſt* or *Higheſt*
Goods, or the end of all deſiderable thin
may be ſoon underſtood even from hen
that it is Pleaſure alone, for which we deſi
all other things: and never deſire Pleaſu

for any thing but it ſelf. For, other things we may deſire, to the end we may be affected or delighted with Pleaſure: but no man did ever require a reaſon, why we would be affected and delighted therewith; truly, no more, than for what Cauſe, or to what End we ſhould deſire to be happy. Seeing that Pleaſure and Felicity ought to be reputed as in the ſame degree, ſo alſo for one and the ſame thing: and conſequently, for the end, Extreme, or Supreme of Goods, to which all other things ſubordinately conduce, and which is it ſelf ſubordinate or referrible to nothing.

VI.

The ſame may be Confirmed from hence; that (as we have premoniſhed) Felicity cannot be underſtood, unleſs it be conceived to be a certain ſtate wherein a man may live moſt ſweetly, moſt pleaſantly, *i. e.* in the greateſt Pleaſure, of which his Nature is capable. For, but take away from life that ſweetneſs, that jucundity; and pray, what Notion of Felicity can remain? we ſay of Felicity; not only ſuch as we termed Divine, but alſo that, which we account Humane, and which is not otherwiſe capable of more and leſs, or of Intenſion and Remiſſion, than only as it may admit of more and leſs of Pleaſure.

VII. That

VII.

That we may further manifeſt this Tru
by a Comparation of Pleaſure with pai
let us ſuppoſe a man to enjoy many, gre
and laſting pleaſures both in mind and b
dy; no pain moleſting him in the preſe
nor threatning him in the future: and th
what ſtate can be imagined more deſireabl
more happy than this? For, in him, who
thus affected, there muſt be a Conſtancy
firmneſs of Mind, fearing neither Death, n
Pain; becauſe Death is inſenſible of a
pain, and in life, if pain be long, it muſt b
light, if great, it cannot be long; ſo th
the Brevity is a comfort againſt the violen
thereof, and the Levity againſt Diuturnit
When a man arrives at ſuch a Condition, a
that he doth not tremble at the thought
Divinity, nor ſuffer the preſent pleaſures
ſlip away unenjoy'd, while his mind is take
up either with the memory of paſt Good
or expectation of future; and doth ever
day ſolace himſelf with the aſſiduous reco
dation of them: what greater Good
there, that can be added to encreaſe th
Happineſs of this mans Condition?

VIII.

Suppoſe again, on the other ſide, that
man is afflicted with as great anguiſh o
Mind, and violent pains of Body, as his na
ture

ure can receive; that he hath loſt all probability, all hopes of any the leaſt Extenuation of his Miſeries; and that his tempeſtuous thoughts cannot lay hold of any comfort in the apprehenſion of any pleaſure, paſt, preſent, or expected: and what can be imagined more wretched, more miſerable than this man?

IX.

If, therefore, a life ſurrounded with pains, be moſt chiefly to be avoided: ſeriouſly, the Higheſt Evil, is to live in pain; and of neceſſary conſequence, *The Higheſt Good is to live in Pleaſure.* Nor, indeed, hath the mind of Man any other point, wherein, as in the Centre and Period of all his hopes and deſires, he may conſiſt, but only Pleaſure. And all Diſeaſes, Languors and Diſtempers are referred to pain, nor is there any thing beſide pain, that can invade Nature in her Throne, eject her from it, or diſſolve her.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

That Pleasure, wherein Felicity doth consist, is the Indolency of the Body, and Tranquillity of Mind.

FOrasmuch as there are *Two* kinds of Pleasures, *viz. One*, that may be considered as dependent upon, or radicated in *Quiet*; and so is nothing else but a constant Placability, Calmness, and Vacuity or Immunity from all perturbation and dolour: and *Another*, that may be considered as resident in *Motion*; and so consisteth only in a certain sweet affectation, or pleasant titillation of the sense, as may be exemplified in joy, hilarity, eating and drinking when we are hungry and thirsty, the pleasure of all which doth arise only from a pleasant motion in the Organs: therefore is it necessary for us to determine, *Whether Felicity doth consist in both these Kinds of Pleasures conjoyned; or in one of them alone; and in which of the Two.*

II.

Accordingly, therefore, we affirm; that the Pleasure, wherein Felicity doth consist, is only the Former, *i. e.* in the stable kind of pleasure: and so can be no other, *but*

e Indolency of Body, and Tranquillity of e Mind.

III.

And, therefore, when we ſay; that Plea-re in the General is the end of a happy fe, or the Chiefeſt Good; we are very far om underſtanding thoſe Pleaſures, which re ſo much admired, courted and purſued y men wallowing in Luxury, or any other leaſures that are placed in the meer motion r action of Fruition, whereby, the ſenſe is leaſantly tickled; as ſome, either out of gnorance of the right, or diſſent of opini-on, or prejudice and Evil will againſt us, ave wrongfully expounded our words: ut only this (the importance of the matter will excuſe our repetition of it.) Not to be pained in Body, nor perturbed in Mind.

IV.

For, it is not perpetual Feaſtings and Drinkings; it is not the love of, and Fami-liarity with beautiful boys and women; it is not the Delicacies of rare Fiſhes, ſweet meats, rich Wines, nor any other Dainties of the Table, that can make a Happy life: But, it is Reaſon, with Sobriety, and conſe-quently a ſerene Mind; inveſtigating the Cauſes, why this Object is to be Elected, and that to be Rejected; and chaſing away

thoſe

thoſe vain, ſuperſtitious and deluding opinions, which would occaſion very great disquiet in the mind.

V.

Now, that you may the more clearly understand, why we affirm this kind of pleaſure alone to be the end of life, or chiefeſt good, be pleaſed to obſerve, that Nature does not tend to any other pleaſure, primarily or as to her principal ſcope, but only to what is *ſtable*; which follows upon the removal of all pain and Moleſtation. For ſhe does not propoſe to her ſelf the Moveable pleaſure, as the end at which ſhe aims; but has provided it only as the means conducible to that end, that it might be as it were a Condiment to ſweeten that Natural operation which is neceſſary to the Eradication of all Pain and Moleſtation. For inſtance; ſeeing that Hunger and Thirſt are things troubleſome and incommodious, in the preſent, to an Animal; the Primary End of Nature, is to conſtitute the Animal in that ſtate, in which it may be free from that trouble and offence: and becauſe that cannot be effected, but by Eating and Drinking; therefore hath ſhe wiſely provided, that the Action of Eating and Drinking ſhould be accompanied with a certain pleaſantneſs and jucundity, that ſo the Animal might be thereby

invited

nvited the more willingly and readily to erform that neceſſary action.

VI.

Moſt men, indeed, living præpoſterouſly, nd being carried away with inconſidera- ion and intemperance, propoſe to them- elves, as the ſummary of their deſires, and ccompliſhment of all their Hopes, that meaner Pleaſure, which depends upon Mo- ion: but, Wiſdom being called to our aſ- iſtance, doth ſoon reduce all Pleaſures to Order and Decorum; and teacheth us that we are not to look upon any Pleaſure, as the perfection and End of our lives, but what Nature her ſelf hath ordained for that End, and which can be no other, but what we have declared. For while Nature is our Guide, whatever we do, muſt conduce on- y to this; that we may not be pained in bo- dy, nor perturbed in mind: and when we have once attained to that ſtate, all the Tempeſts of our mind ceaſe, and all our Hopes and Deſires are loſt in Fruition, and there can be nothing beyond it, to which to aſpire, in order to the Complement of our Happineſs. For, we then want Pleaſure, when the abſence of it doth produce pain in us: but, when we are not pained, then do we want no Pleaſure.

VII.

Hence comes it, that the Sum or Hei
of all Pleaſures doth conſiſt only in the
motion of all Pains, or in that ſtate wh
follows upon that Amotion: for, where
Pleaſure is, there can be nothing of pa
of anxiety. And hereupon it follows a
that the higheſt Pleaſure terminated in
privation of pain, may indeed be var
and diſtinguiſhed; but can never be a
mented or amplified; for, Nature ſo l
as ſhe hath taken away all pain, doth
creaſe pleaſure; but, all pain being rem
ed, ſhe ſuffers not pleaſure to be encrea
in Magnitude, but only admits ſome cer
Varieties thereof, that are not then at
neceſſary, as being ſuch, that are
comparated to this, that we may not
pained.

VIII.

Moreover, from hence it appears, t
thoſe men inſult without cauſe, who acc
us, not to account this, *To want all Pain*,
be ſomething conſiſting in the middle
twixt pain and pleaſure: but, ſo to confou
it with the other member of the Diviſion,
to make it not only a Pleaſure, but e
the *Higheſt of all Pleaſures*. For, becau
when we are Exempted from pain, we
in that very Exemption and Vacuity fr

all moleſtation, and every thing wherein we joy is a pleaſure; as every thing wherewith we are offended, is a pain: therefore is the privation of all pain, by us, rightly named a Pleaſure. For, as when Hunger and Thirſt are expelled with meat and drink; that very Expulſion of the trouble of them doth adfer the Conſequution of a pleaſure: ſo, in every thing elſe, the very Amotion of pain cauſeth the ſucceſſion of pleaſure.

IX.

Hence alſo may we deſume a convincing reply to thoſe who urge againſt us, that there is no Reaſon, why this Middle ſtate of Indolency ſhould be eſteemed rather a pleaſure than a pain. For, upon the detraction of pleaſure, diſcontent doth not preſently enſue, unleſs perhaps ſome pain immediately ſucceed into the room of that former pleaſure: but, on the contrary, we always conceive a joy upon the loſs of any pain, though none of thoſe pleaſures ſucceed, which conſiſt in the delightful affection of the Senſe. By which we may clearly underſtand, how great a pleaſure it is, *Not to be in Pain*: whereof if any man doubt, let him ask of thoſe, who are infeſted with thoſe ſharp pains of the Gout, Tooth-ach, or any other acute diſeaſe.

X.

There are also, who deride this our o
nion; Objecting, that this pleasure of
dolency, is like the condition of a slee
man, and fit only
Slothful and Unacti
spirits. But, these c
sider not, that this
dolent constitution
far from being a
Torpor, or slugg
ness, as that it is the only state, wherei
can perform all the actions of life vigoro
ly and cheerfully. And, as we would notha
the life of a wise man to be like a Torr
or rapid River; so would we not have it
be like a standing and dead Pool: but rat
as a clear stream sliding on in a constant
lence and gentleness. Wherefore we c
tend; that a Wise mans pleasure is not t
which is Dull, Heavy, and Unactive; b
that which Reason makes Constant, Fi
and Sprightful unto him.

* Demetrius Cydonius, sermonem de Epicuri Commilitonibus instituens, homines notat ἐκλελυμένους, βλακεύοντας Ἐκνδρισμένους, Fatiscenteis Socordeis, enerveis.

XI.

But, to leave these our Opponents, a
return to our Theme; there are two go
things, of which our Highest Good,
chiefest Felicity doth consist; *viz. To h*
the Mind free from perturbation, and the
dy free from pain; and so, that these go

e full, and above the capacity of Encreaſe. or, how can that which is full be encreaſ- d? If the Body be immune from all pain, hat addition can be made to that Indolen- y? If the Mind be conſtantly ſerene and mperturbed, what Addition can be made to hat Tranquillity? Nor do thoſe External landiſhments of the Senſe, in any meaſure ugment; but only ſerve to condite and weeten this ſtate of Higheſt Felicity: for, hat Conſummate Good of Humane Nature, s contented with only the peace of mind, nd quiet of body.

CHAP. VI.

Of the means to procure this Felicity.

NOw ſeeing that this Tranquillity of mind, and Indolency of Body, do conſtitute the chief Felicity of man; nothing can more concern us, than to conſider thoſe things, which conduce to the attainment and conſervation thereof: inſomuch as while we have that, we have all things; and while we want it, all we do is to attain it, though (for the Cauſes aforeſaid) we ſeldom do attain it.

II.

In the first place, therefore, we are
reason of Felicity, no otherwise than
Health; it being manifest, that that stat
in which the mind is free from perturbatio
and the body from pain, is nothing else, b
the perfect Health of the whole man: a
naturally consequent thereupon, that as
the body, so also in the mind, those thin
which produce and conserve Health, a
the very same with those, which either pr
vent the Generation of Diseases, or cu
and expel them when they are generated.

III.

As for the Diseases of the *Body*; since t
excellent Art of Medicine is ordained
well for the prevention, as Cure of the
leaving the præscription of both præserv
tive and curative remedies to the learn
professors of that Art, we shall sufficient
discharge our present duty, if we admoni
you of only two things. The *one* is, th
we always observe *Temperance*, and li
soberly and continently, to the end th
we may avert all diseases, or at least mak
them more gentle and more easily curable
since for the most part, the Harvest of Di
eases doth arise from the seeds of Intemp
rance and Incontinence. The other, th
when we are invaded with Diseases, we i
stant

ſtantly have recourſe to Fortitude; that ſo we may both endure them with Conſtancy of Mind, and not exaſperate them by impatience, and comfort our ſelves with this, that if our pain be great, it muſt be ſhort; if long, light.

IV.

And as for the Diſeaſes of the Mind, againſt them Philoſophy is provided of Remedies; being, in that reſpect, juſtly accounted the Phyſick of the Mind: but it is not with equal facility conſulted, nor applied by thoſe who are ſick in Mind. And this, becauſe we judge of the Diſeaſes of the body, by the Mind: but the diſeaſes of the Mind we neither feel in the body, nor know or judge of them as we ought; becauſe that, whereby we ſhould judge, is diſtempered.

V.

Hence it appears, that the *Diſeaſes of the Mind are more grievous and dangerous than thoſe of the Body:* as among Diſeaſes Corporeal, thoſe are moſt dangerous, which deprive us of our ſenſes; ſuch are the Apoplexy, Lethargy, Phrenſie, *&c.* Again, that the Diſeaſes of the Mind are more pernicious than thoſe of the Body, is manifeſt from the ſame reaſon, which demonſtrateth that the Pleaſures of the mind are much

better than those of the Body, which is this that we feel in the body nothing but what is present, but in our mind we are sensible of also what is past, and what's to come. For as the Anxiety of the mind arising by consent from the pains of the body, may be very much aggravated, if we have possessed our selves with a conceit, that some Eternal and Infinite Evil is impendent over us: so may it be very much mitigated, if we fear no such Evil. And this likewise is manifest; that the greatest Pleasure, or Trouble of the mind, doth more conduce to an happy, or miserable life; than either of the other two, though it should be equally lasting in the body.

VI.

Now, because there are two Capital diseases of the Mind, namely Cupidity and Fear, with their several branches, and with discontent or trouble conjoyned, after the same manner as pain is adjoyned to the diseases of the body; therefore is it the part of Philosophy to apply such Remedies, as may prevent them from invading the mind; or at least overcome and expel them, when they have invaded it. Such chiefly are the vain Desires of Wealth, of Honours, of Dominion, *&c.* and the Fear of Cœlestial Powers, of Death, *&c.* which having once assaulted

assaulted and taken possession of the mind, they leave no part thereof sound or unshaken.

VII.

Now the Remedies, which Philosophy doth apply, are the *Virtues*, which being derived from Reason, or more General Prudence, easily drive away and expel those Desires and Fears. We say, from Reason, or more General Prudence; because, as there is a more Special Prudence, inservient to the direction of all the particular actions of our lives: so also is there a more General Prudence, which is nothing else but very Reason it self, or the Dictamen of Reason, and is, by most, accounted the same with Sapience or Wisdom: and Virtue is only a certain perfect Disposition of the Mind, which Reason or Prudence doth create, and oppose to the Diseases of the Mind, *i. e.* to the Vices.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Right Reason, and Free Will, from whence is all the praise of the Virtues.

HEnce we are to advance to the consideration of Virtue, and the several Species thereof; but, not without præmising a few Obſervables, touching Reaſon it ſelf, and that which doth conſiſt therein, *viz.* Free-will: foraſmuch as all the praiſe belonging to Virtue, doth derive its right only from thence; as likewiſe doth its Oppoſite, Blame, which is due to Vice.

II.

Since Reaſon, in the General, is nothing elſe but the Faculty of Ratiocinating, or judging, or inferring one thing from another; we do here underſtand that Reaſon in Special, which diſcourſeth, judgeth, and determineth of ſuch things, as fall under the power of mans Election, or Refuſal.

III.

But, becauſe this Reaſoning or judgment may be as well Falſe as True, Wrong as Right; therefore can we not well allow that Reaſon, which makes a falſe judgment, to be called Reaſon, but rather Opinion: however, if you pleaſe to keep conſtant to the vulgar

vulgar phraſe, let it ſtill be called Reaſon, provided it be underſtood to be Wrong; as on the other ſide, Right Reaſon may alſo be called Opinion, provided we underſtand it to be Right.

IV.

As for Right Reaſon; that ariſeth to us both from the Goodneſs of our Nature, or Ingenuity, and from the ſedulous Obſervation or frequent Experience of things: whence it comes, that being grounded upon firm and corrected principles, our Reaſoning comes at length to be ſolid; and we of right appeal to the judgment of him, who is Expert and Prudent in the things, of which judgment is to be given.

V.

In the mean while, when we ſay, *of things which fall under our power of Election or Refuſal*; we ſuppoſe, that there is in us alſo a *Free* or *Arbitrary* power of Reaſon, *i. e.* a Faculty of Electing and Proſecuting what Reaſon it ſelf hath judged to be Good; and of Refuſing and avoiding what it hath judged to be Evil.

VI.

Now, that this Arbitrary Freedom of our Will, is the congenial prærogative of our Nature; is Demonſtrated unto us not only by our own Experience, but alſo by Common

mon Sense: which manifesteth, that nothing is worthy of Commendation or Vituperation, of Praise or Blame, but what is done Freely, Voluntarily, deliberately, and of Election; and therefore must depend upon something within us, which is above all Compulsion, superintendency, command, or controllment, and in respect whereunto all Rewards and Punishments are rightfully ordained by the Laws: Than which Laws nothing can be more unjust, if the actions of men were to be imputed to that rigid Necessity, which some have derived from Fate, as the sole Commandress of all things; declaring, that what event soever comes to pass, or whatever action is done, doth inevitably flow from an Eternal Decree, and the succession of connected Causes.

VII.

Truly, it is much better, to be addicted to that false Opinion, which vulgar heads entertain, of the Government of the Universe, and all things in it, by the Gods; than to be slaves to the belief of the Fate of some Naturalists, imposing the same upon our necks, as a Sempiternal Lord, or Tyrant, of whom we are to be afraid night and day. For, that opinion, that the Gods are to be Revered and Entreated, hath the Comfort of Hope

Hope annexed unto it: but, the other of Fate, imports an inexorable Decree, an indeclinable Neceſſity, and conſequently the higheſt of miſeries, Deſpair.

VIII.

Moſt true it is indeed, that in things void of Reaſon ſome Effects are Neceſſary (though not ſo neceſſary, as not to have been prevented, as we have declared in our Philoſophy) but in Man, endowed with Reaſon, and eſpecially ſo far forth as he makes uſe of that reaſon, there can be no Neceſſity at all: and therefore was it, that we endeavoured to aſſert the Declination of motions in Atoms, to the end we might from thence deduce, how Fortune might ſometimes intervene and put in for a ſhare in the ſucceſs of Humane affairs, and yet the Freedom of mans Will remain abſolute and Entire.

IX.

And requiſite it is for us, to turn the edge of our Wit wholly againſt Fate or Neceſſity; that we may by all means poſſible conſerve our Will free from that Sempiternal Motion imagined by the Fatiſt; and ſo not permit Pravity or Wickedneſs to eſcape inculpable.

X. But

X.

But, what we here ſay of Fortune, do not in the leaſt import, that we ought to ſcribe any Divinity thereunto; not only the Vulgar, but thoſe Philoſophers alſo, wh accounting Fortune as ſome inſtable Cauſ though they do not conceive, that ſhe do diſtribute to men any thing of Good or E vil, that may conduce to an happy life; yet think, that ſhe doth give occaſions very conſiderable Goods and Evils. A that our words of Fortune imply, is on this; that as many things are effected by n ceſſity and Counſel, ſo alſo by Fortun and therefore, that it is the Duty of a wi man, to arm and provide himſelf again Fortune.

XI.

Now, ſeeing that whatever of Goodnes or Malice there is in Humane actions, ha dependence upon no other foundation, b only this; that a man doth thoſe Actio Knowingly and Willingly, or Freely: there fore is the Mind to be accuſtomed to thi that it may know truly, *i.e.* uſe Right Re ſon; and Will truly, *i. e.* that the Will b bent to that, which is truly Good, and a verted from what is truly Evil. Foraſmuc as this Aſſuefaction doth beget that Diſpo ſition in the mind, which we have defin

Virtue to be: as the Assuefaction of it to the Contrary, doth beget that disposition, which we may justly define Vice to be.

XII.

We insist not upon this; that that is *truly Good*, which produceth Pleasure, as sincere, so also without any pain, trouble, or repentance attending and ensuing thereupon: and that *truly Evil*, which produceth pain, as sincere, so also without any Pleasure or Allubescence to succeed upon it. Only we touch upon both, that we may discriminate either from what is only *Apparent* and Dissembled; such as that Good, which creating present pleasure, introduceth future pain and trouble: and that Evil, which procuring pain or trouble in the present, draws on pleasure and content in the future.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Virtues, Generally.

FOrasmuch as Virtue is either Prudence it self, or the very Dictamen of Right Reason, as we accustom our minds to the constant exercise thereof; or is, at least, regulated by, and dependent upon Prudence,

or

or the Dictamen of Right Reaſon: from thence it is manifeſt, that to this Latter Kind belongs both that Virtue, whereby a man ſtands affected toward himſelf; and that whereby he is affected toward others; ſince Prudence is that, whereby a man is compa-rated and enabled to Govern not only himſelf, but others alſo.

II.

That Virtue, which relates to *Others*, is commonly called by the name *Juſtice*: and that, which concerns only a *mans ſelf*, is vulgarly Diſtinguiſhed into two branches *viz. Temperance* and *Fortitude*. But, we uſe to comprehend both under the ſimple term of *Honeſty*; as when we ſay, that to do an act out of Virtue, is no more nor leſs than to do Prudently, Honeſtly, Juſtly: and this, becauſe they, who live ſoberly and continently, are ſaid to live honeſtly, according to Decorum, or as becomes them; and they, who behave themſelves Magnanimouſly, or Bravely, are reputed to behave themſelves honeſtly or Becomingly.

III.

Hereupon, we (as others) make Virtue Fourfold, *viz. Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude*, and *Juſtice*. But ſo, as that we oppoſe not *Prudence* ſo much to any affection, as to *Incogitancy, Ignorance, Fooliſhneſs*; unle-

t be by accident only, as any perturbation doth eclipse Reason, and make a man do mprudently: nor *Justice* so much to any Affection, as to *Malice*, whereby a man is nclined to Frauds; unless by accident only, in as much as Anger, Hate, Avarice, or ome other passion may cause a man to do njustly: and *Temperance* we oppose to *Cupidity*, and *Fortitude* to *Fear*.

IV.

It appears from hence, that what we formerly said [*viz. that it is sober and well ordered Reason, which procures a pleasant or happy life*] aimed at this; that Right Reason doth produce a pleasant or happy life, by the means of those Virtues, which it inenerateth and maintaineth. Likewise, that what we subjoined, as the Reason thereof, [*viz. that Reason doth investigate the true causes, why things are to be Elected, or Rejected, or chaseth away such opinions, as might occasion very great Perturbations of mind*] was intended only to teach, that Right Reason is the very same with more General Prudence, the Principle upon which we ground all our Elections and Avoidances, and so a very great Good; because the Virtues, arising from that Reason or Prudence, are able to appease and prevent all Perturbations, and this by convin-

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II.

That Virtue, which relates to *Others*, is commonly called by the name *Justice*: and that, which concerns only a *mans self*, is vulgarly Distinguished into two branches *viz.* *Temperance* and *Fortitude*. But, we use to comprehend both under the simple term of *Honesty*; as when we say, that to do an act out of Virtue, is no more nor less than to do Prudently, Honestly, Justly: and this, because they, who live soberly and continently, are said to live honestly, according to Decorum, or as becomes them; as they, who behave themselves Magnanimously, or Bravely, are reputed to behave themselves honestly or Becomingly.

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cing, that no man can live pleasantly or happily, but he that lives Prudently, Honestly, Justly; as (*è converso*) that to live Prudently, Honestly, Justly, is to live pleasantly or happily.

V.

By this you may perceive the Ground of our Assertion, That *Happiness and Virtue are Convertible*; or, that the Virtues are Cogenite and Essential to a happy life, so that it is impossible to separate these from that. For, all other things, as being caduce and mortal, may be abstracted from germane and constant pleasure: but, Virtue alone, being a perpetual and immortal Good, can never be separated from it.

VI.

From these things we may further understand, *that all the Virtues are connected together*; and that by a twofold relation: the First, because all the other Virtues are conjoined to, and dependent upon their Princess, Prudence, as the members of the body are conjoined to the Head; or as the streams are conjoined to the Fountain from which they flow; the other, because as well Prudence, as all the others concur and unite in the point of a happy life; being that a happy life cannot consist without the

Virtues, nor the Virtues without a happy life.

VII.

However, though the Virtues be all Connected thus together; yet are not they therefore all *Equal*; as some * have conceived, who contend that all Vices and Faults, or Crimes are also Equal. For, a man may be comparated more to Justice than to Temperance; and Temperance may be more perfect in one man, than in another; as may be exemplified in *My Self* (without envy be it spoken) who have attained to so high a degree of sobriety, that I make a sufficient meal usually for less then an half-penny; and *Metrodorus*, * my Friend and Companion, who cannot satisfie himself with altogether so course and spare a diet. Besides, experience assures, that one man is Wiser than another: and all that walk in the ways of Virtue, have not the like Rewards allotted to them; nor all Delinquents the like Punishments. Lastly, we appeal to Common sense, whether or no they are in the right,

* The Stoicks.

* *Metrodorus Lampsacenus*, qui ex quo tempore primùm Epicurum novit, nunquam ab eodem discessit, nisi sex tantum menses; quibus cùm domi abfuisset, ad Epicurum reversus est, & per totam deinceps vitam, illi arctiss. necessitudine conjunctus, in iisdem & hortis & studiis convixit. Legendus est *Gassend. cap.* 8. *lib.* 1. *de vita Epicuri.*

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that he offends as highly, who beats his ſe
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ther; that it is all one, for to eat a Bean,
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VIII.

Others there are, who condemn and b
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X.

Certainly, that Total Exemption from Grief and Sorrow, which theſe men ſo much boaſt of; muſt proceed from ſome Greater Evil, *viz.* from Immanity, immoderate ambition of vain Glory, and in a manner downright madneſs. So that it ſeems much better, to feel ſome Paſſion, to be affected with ſome Grief, to ſhed ſuch tears, as are to diſtil from their Eyes, who profeſs Love and tender affection: than to Grin, and declare a Brutiſh inſenſibility, according to the rigid rules of that inhumane Wiſdom, to which theſe ſo much pretend.

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CHAP. IX.

Of Prudence General.

THus far of the Virtues in General; we now come to treat briefly of Each in *Particular.* Which that we may do the more methodically, let us begin at *Prudence* whose office being to Govern a mans life and so to provide, as that all Occurrents may be directed only to Happiness; well may we allow it to comprehend the offices, or Duties of all the other Virtues.

II.

And, that it is the Office, or Duty of Prudence, to order and compose all the accidents and actions of a mans life, so as that they may conduce only to Felicity, or the Pleasure formerly described: is more than manifest. For, as we esteem the Knowledge of Physicians, not for the Art of Physick itself, but the End of it, Health; and as the skill of a Pilot is not liked of and commended for the ingenuity, but Utility of it: even so Prudence, which is the art of Living well would never be considered nor desired, if it were of no use or benefit in a mans life; and it is studied and desired, as the sole art, by which

which Happineſs, or pleaſure is to be acquired.

III.

For, it is Prudence (or if you pleaſe Sapience) alone, which doth not only prevent the incidence of any thing, that may cauſe Pain in the Body; but alſo above all things doth expel ſadneſs from the mind, and ſuffers us not to ſtartle at thoſe things, at the very mention whereof the multitude uſually trembles with fear: and which being our Directreſs, conducts us to tranquillity, by extinguiſhing the ardor of all cupidities. For, cupidities are inſatiable, ſubverting not only ſingle perſons, but alſo numerous and opulent Families, yea ſometimes the moſt potent and flouriſhing Common-wealths. From Cupidities ariſe Hatred, Diſſentions, Seditions, Wars; nor do they only diffuſe themſelves abroad, or invade others with blind fury: but being included in private breaſts, they cauſe inteſtine mutinies therein, and totally evert the œconomy and peace thereof. So that it follows, that they muſt of neceſſity make life moſt irkſom and bitter; and that none but the Wiſe, or Prudent man, who have cut off all Inanity and Errour, and circumſcribed his deſires with the modeſt boundaries of Nature; can live

without ſollicitude, without Diſcontent, without Fears.

IV.

It being evident, therefore, that all the Perturbations of our life ariſe originally from Errour and Indiſcretion; and that it is Prudence alone, which vindicates us from the violence of Luſts and Fears, and teacheth us gently to bear the injuries of Fortune, and pointeth out unto us all the ways that lead to Quiet and Tranquillity: pray what reaſon is there to diſcourage us from affirming, that Prudence is to be ſought after, in reſpect of Pleaſure; and Imprudence to be avoided, for the prevention of Troubles?

V.

Now the Reaſon, why we ſay, *that a Prudent man doth temperately bear the injuries of Fortune*, is this; that albeit he doth not previſe and provide againſt any injury in particular, yet doth he foreſee and provide againſt all in General. Nor doth he, if any infortune intervene croſs to his Hopes, or Counſels, therefore afflict himſelf: becauſe he well knows it not to be in the power of Humane Reaſon, Sagacity, or Policy, either to previſe, or prevent the intervention of every adverſe and troubleſome Accident. He holds it much better, to be Infortu-

nate

nate with Reaſon and ſage advice (ſuch as Human frailty will admit) than to be Fortunate with Inconſideration and Temerity: and thinks nothing more grateful, than, if Fortune bring about any thing fairly and proſperouſly unto him, that he did not enterpriſe it without judgment and deliberation.

VI.

He moreover ſo deports himſelf, as that cutting off all vain Cupidities, he contracts his deſires to only Neceſſaries; which are indeed, ſo few and ſmall, as ſcarce any unkindneſs of Fortune can rob him of them: ſo that ſince very little of Fortune can intervene to a wiſe man; he may well ſay to her, *I have prevented thee, O Fortune, and ſo barrocadoed all thy ways of acceſs, as that thou canſt not approach me!*

Occupavi te, Fortuna, atq; cepi, omneſq; aditus tuos intercluſi, ut ad me adſpirare non poſſes: fidenter exclamaſſe legitur Metrodorus, Epicuri amicus & diſcipulus, apud *Ciceronem, Tuſcul.* 5.

VII.

But, concerning the way of Cutting off all Cupidities, hereafter; in preſent, foraſmuch as Prudence may be conſidered, either as a man doth thereby govern himſelf, or order his Family, or govern a City, or

or a Common-wealth; and ſo as it is diſtinguiſhed into *Private*, *Domeſtique*, *Civil*, it is convenient, that we ſpeak ſomewhat of each.

CHAP. X.

Of Prudence Private.

OF Private Prudence the whole ſum conſiſteth in no more but this, that a man well underſtand his own Genius, and enterpriſing nothing, to which Nature hath a repugnancy, he looks well into the conditions of that ſtate, in which he is to ſpend his whole life, and to which he is ſo to accommodate all his actions, as that, as much as poſſible, he may live in Indolency and Tranquillity.

II.

For, it behoves him to have the Eye of his mind conſtantly and immoveably fixed upon this end, or ſcope of his life; and conſulting with right reaſon, to proceed according to the evidence of thoſe Criteria by which we are wont, when we perpend the Good or Evil of objects, to erect our determinations. Since otherwiſe, all things will be full of indiſcreet temerity and con-

fusion, and late Repentance will attend upon all his undertakings.

III.

Moreover, in case you do not direct every one of your Actions, upon what occasion soever, as to this grand scope, so also to that very end of Nature which you proposed to your self in the designment of it; but turn aside to any other sinister purpose, either in the prosecution or avoidance of any Object whatsoever: then, certainly, shall not the Actions of your life be consentaneous to your discourses; but extolling Tranquillity (for instance) in your words, you shall betray your self to be really addicted to multiplicity of business, and obnoxious to very much trouble.

IV.

Now, that man doth clearly understand the Ends prescribed by Nature, in the course of life to be instituted and undertaken; who well knows, how easily that is procurable, which is necessary to life, or what is sufficient to the detraction of all, that can, by indigence, cause pain in the Body. For, from thence he so well knows how to order the whole series of his life, as always to be above the want of such things, as are full of business, and Contention, and consequently of Chance and Danger.

V. Here-

V.

Hereupon a Wiſe man hath no reaſon to be much afraid of Poverty; becauſe it is very rare to find a man ſo poor, as to be in want of thoſe things, which are neceſſary to life. But in caſe our Wiſe man ſhould be reduced to ſuch a low ebb of Fortune, as to want things neceſſary to the ſuſtenance of his life: yet will he not, with the Cynicks, betake himſelf to the ſhameful refuge of Begging; but, rather undertake the Erudition of ſome others in Wiſdom, that ſo he may both take a courſe beſeeming the dignity of his Prudence, and at the ſame time deſervedly accommodate himſelf with neceſſaries, from thoſe, who have abundance.

Tu poſcis vilia; verùm es dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem. *Horat. Epiſt.* 17. *lib.* 1.

VI.

And while he is conſtrained, to take this, or ſome other honeſt and beſeeming courſe, that by an acquired confidence of mind, he may generouſly receive thoſe things, which happen to him for the inſtant day, he is to have recourſe to the Oracle of his own Wiſdom, and call Philoſophy to his relief: for we then reſign the arbitration of thoſe things, that ſo neerly concern us, to an Evil Councellour; when we meaſure and provide againſt indigence, by any other pro-

proportion but the ſimple neceſſities of Nature, and the rules of Philoſophy.

VII.

Wherefore, it behoves a Philoſopher to provide for ſuch competent means, as may ſupply his neceſſities; and ſo long to apply himſelf to that proviſion, as till his diligent care hath furniſhed him: but, ſo long as any part of them may be ſpared, and his confidence yet remain perfect; he is in no caſe to addict himſelf to the getting of riches, and ſtoring up of proviſions.

VIII.

In the proviſion of theſe things, therefore our care is to be proportioned by Philoſophy; and ſo, in a ſhort time, we ſhall come to know, what a Virtue, and how great a Good it is, to require only what is ſimple, light, and very ſmall: becauſe, what is moſt ſweet, and free from trouble in all a mans life, depends wholly upon this; to be contented with the leaſt, *i.e.* only ſo much, as ſufficeth nature. And, as for thoſe impediments, which the ſollicitous hunting after more doth draw upon us; when they once diſcover themſelves (as ſoon they muſt) either by the great labour of the body, or the difficulty in the very procuring them, or the abduction of the mind from more worthy and advantageous

tageous ſpeculations (which we ought evermore highly to eſteem) or the inſatisfaction reſulting from the fruition of them certainly, we ſhall clearly perceive the ſame to be altogether fruitleſs, and inſufficient to compenſate the conſequent perturbations.

IX.

And, whereas we premoniſhed, that every man ſhould, before he determines on what courſe of life to put himſelf, ſtrictly examine his own Genius, and adviſe with himſelf concerning the inclination thereof; that ſo he may at length happily devote himſelf to that, which he finds moſt agreeable to the Deſtination of it: our purpoſe therein was, to intimate, that nothing can be more miſerable and more inconſiſtent with tranquillity, than for a man to be engaged in that courſe of life, to which Nature made him unfit.

X.

It follows from hence, that an Active life is not fit for a ſlothful and heavy perſon; nor a ſlothful lazy kind of life fit for an active: for as idleneſs is quiet, and action labour to the one; ſo to the other idleneſs is a labour, and action quiet. Thus, a Souldiers life is unfit for a Timorous and ſoftly man; and an umbratile life odious to an impatient

and

and bold man: for one cannot endure the heat of War; nor the other the cool shadow of peace. So that nothing can be more safe or hopeful, than for a man to devote himself to that, to which he finds no adverseness or repugnancy in his nature.

XI.

Whereunto you may please to add this one rule; that every man, to the end the state of life which he chooseth, may be the more secure and tranquil, ought to choose a mean state, or such as is neither very eminent, nor very abject; at least if it be in his own power. Because, it behoves him to live in a Civil society, neither as a Lyon, nor as a Gnat: lest he be exterminated, as the one; or ensnared and crushed, as the other.

CHAP. XI.

Of Prudence Domestick.

THis sort of Prudence divides it self into Two branches; the *First* concerns a man in the capacity of a *Husband*, and a *Father*; the other, as he is a *Master* of Servants, and *Possessor* of House, Goods, Lands, *&c.*

II. Con-

II.

Concerning the Former, *viz.* *Conjugal* and *Paternal* Prudence, let us observe only what may be inferred from the Premises, touching the Directions of a man, in the Election of his course of life. Thus if you find your Constitution to be such, as that you cannot, without the ardors of the flesh, live single; that you can with patience endure a morose and unquiet Wife, and untoward and undutiful Children; that you shall not be subject and apt to vex, repine and grieve, when you shall hear your Children crying and bawling, see them groaning on the bed of sickness, or snatcht away by death before you; and that you shall not be perplexed and distracted with those cares and sollicitudes, that accompany the provision of all things necessary to a Conjugal state: why then, indeed, it may be convenient for you, to take a Wife, and beget Children; for which you may provide by a Conjugal and Paternal Prudence.

III.

You may presume, indeed, that your Wife will be sweet and Complacent; that your Children will be of ingenious and tractable dispositions; that your cares for them will not be great, nor many; that you have so laid your designs, as that you cannot expect any thing but prosperity and

good

good ſucceſs: and yet you can but preſume all this, nor do I know any God, who will oblige himſelf, that your affairs ſhall ſucceed according to this your preſumption. Wherefore, ſeeing the buſineſs is very doubtful; it is far below the part of a Wiſe man, willingly to put himſelf upon Chance, to undergo the hazard, and engage himſelf in that condition, from whence, in caſe he ſhould afterward repent, he cannot withdraw himſelf.

IV.

We ſay, *Willingly*; becauſe there may be ſome ſuch Circumſtance, as may require a man, though much againſt his will, to marry and generate Children; as, for inſtance, in caſe he live in a Country but thinly peopled, and where he is to be ſerviceable to the Common-wealth by encreaſing the members of it. Some, we know, pretend the propagation of their ſpecies, to which Nature ſeems to oblige all; but certainly, there is no fear that mankind ſhould fail, there being in all times and places enough that give themſelves to Marriage and Procreation: ſo that ſome few Wiſe men may well be permitted to abſtain, and leave the buſineſs of Propagation to be performed by others.

V.

Now if any ſuch Caſe, or certain Counſe
or any neceſſity ſhall conſtrain you to ma
ry; then are you ſo to diſpoſe your Wif
as that ſhe may be loving and complacent
you, and a partner in your Cares: and
take ſuch care for your Children as is pr
ſcribed to you partly by Nature, which
ſtrong inſtinct obligeth us to love & cher
them as ſoon as they are born (and ſo mu
even Wolves, Tygers, and all other wi
Beaſts always do) and partly by Prudenc
which admoniſheth us ſo to educate and
ſtruct them in the rudiments of Morality,
that they may be obedient to the Laws
the Country, and deſire nothing ſo much
to be made Wiſe themſelves.

VI.

Nor are we to take this care only for o
own Children; but alſo for thoſe of o
friends, and eſpecially if they be our P
pils. For, nothing is more beſeeming t
Dignity of Friendſhip, than for a man
become a Tutor, and ſupply the place
a Parent to thoſe, whom his deceaſ
Friend both dearly loved, and left as O
phans, and ſo in need of Protection a
Tuition.

VII. A

VII.

And as for the other branch of Domestick Prudence, which teacheth a man how to deport himself in the Capacity of a *Master*, or as he hath Servants at his Command, and *Possessions* at his Dispose; both which though necessary, are yet, for the most part, not very pleasant: the sum of it consists in this. Let him endeavour to prevent the sawcineſs, morosity, and insolence of his Servants; deport himself with mildness and gentleness toward them, so far as may stand with his superiority, and their obedience; with a kind of * unwillingness Chastise and Correct even the perverse and disobedient, as remembring that they also are men; Connive at some involuntary faults, and forgive some others, especially if they be diligent, and not of an evil disposition. Nor this only, but, if he find them to be capable of, and inclined to the study of Wisdom (such we have sometimes met with, and chiefly my servant *Mus**) it is his duty to encourage and assist them there-

* Qui placidus delicta domat; nec dentibus unquam, Instrepet horrendum, fremitu nec verbera poscit. *Claud. de Macil.*

* Hunc servum Epicuri, Murem inter Philosophantes clarissimum [ἐνδοξότατον] evasisse testatur *Laertius, l.* 1. *c.* 12. *neque Macrobius* (*Saturnal. cap.* 11.) oblivioni dat inter eos, qui Philosophis ex servis non incelebres evaserunt.

in, to allow them the Familiarity of Friend and account it pleasant or good to perm them to Philosophize toghther with hi self.

VIII.

In the matter of his Estate, he is not on to live within compass, but so to proport his Expences, as still to be laying up som what for the Future; yet without Avari and the sordid desire of heaping up weal For, it is not the part of a Wise man to ne lect his houshold Affairs; insomuch as livelyhood depends thereupon, and if through negligence permit all to run to r ine, so that he come at length to want N cessaries; he must very much obstruct progress in Philosophy: being that then must either addict himself to the laborio Getting of what might have been kept wi little Care; or to the importunate Begg of that at the Charitable hands of Othe which his own easie Providence might ha furnished him withal; or grow old, craz diseased, and die in such want, as must no small hindrance to the Tranquility of mind.

IX.

And besides such things as are absolute necessary to the uses of life; there are so others, that may be accounted necessa

Respectively, or according to the Condition of the Person, Place, Time, and other Circumstances, and therefore they ought not to be neglected. But the chiefest of our Familiar Care must be for those things, without which, Nature her self must suffer and decay, and such is chiefly the provision of Grain and other lasting Fruits of the Earth; and for that reason we more commend those, who have their Granaries well stored with Corn, than those who have their Houses adorned with gawdy and rich Furniture. It much delights me to remember, that not long since, when, in our City long and straitly besieged, many perished by Famine; we were able to preserve our selves and divers Friends in good plight: not with delicate Cates, but good plenty of Beans, whereof each person had a certain number allowed him daily.

Quum Demetrius obsedit Athenas, circa annum *Epicuri*, 44. Quanta autem fames civitatem oppresserit eadem obsidione, describit *Plutarchus* [*in vita Demetrii*] ubi inter cætera inquit: *Ferunt etiam Epicurum Philosophum familiares suos sustentasse, partitum cum ipsis ad numerum fabas.*

CHAP. XII.

Of Prudence Civil.

LAstly, as for the concern of *Civil Pru-dence*; we are likewise to deduce the ſum of it, from what we have inſinuated touching the Courſe of life to be elected.

II.

Thus, if there be any, who are by Nature ambitious, deſirous of Glory, Active and fit for the manage of Publick Affairs; and have beſides the advantages of Birth, Fortune, and opportunity that ſeem not only to invite, but alſo to open them an eaſie and ſafe way thereunto: for theſe men it may be convenient to obey the inclination of their Genius, by addicting themſelves to action and the adminiſtration of affairs, wherein the Republick is concerned; becauſe, They are ſo diſpoſed by their Conſtitution, as that they cannot but ſuffer perturbations and diſquiets in an obſcure and unactive life, while they labour with a reſtleſs deſire of what they do not obtain.

III.

But, as for thoſe, who are not by Nature Comparated to much imployment, but to Quiet and Eaſe; or have by force of Re-

ſon repreſſed their Natural Ambition and vain affectation of Popularity; or having learned, by their own coſtly Experience, the certain troubles, and uncertain duration of Grandeur, have withdrawn themſelves from the ſtorm, that frequently threaten men of Publick Charges; or have been made wary and cautelous by the ſad Examples of other Stateſmen, whoſe aſpiring humours occaſioned their præcipitous Downfalls: good reaſon is there, that theſe ſhould eſteem the quiet of a private condition, much better than the diſquiet and dangers of a popular; unleſs, perhaps, ſome accident intervene on the part of the Commonwealth, that doth require their induſtry. And hereupon we conclude, *That a Wiſe man is not to engage himſelf in the adminiſtration of Publick Affairs, unleſs ſome intervening Neceſſity call him thereunto.*

IV.

And why ſhould we not thus conclude; ſince to a Wiſe man, addicting himſelf to Leaſure and Quiet, it may be both much more eaſie, and ſafe to attain to that End, which ambitious men propoſe to themſelves to be acquired by Dangers and reſtleſs Labours?

V.

For, that we may ſpeak of the ſcope, or end, at which the ambitious aim, there never wanted ſome, who, to the end they might attain ſecurity from others (and according to the condition of Principality and Dominion, by which they conceive that ſecurity chiefly acquirable) have affected to render themſelves illuſtrious with Glory and Renown: thinking by that means to advance themſelves to a ſtate of ſecurity and tranquillity. But, if the lives of theſe proved really ſecure and tranquil (as in truth it could hardly be) then did they indeed attain that very thing which, to Nature is ſo good and pleaſant: and if they were not, then did they fall from their hopes, and wholly miſs their aim, inſomuch, as they in vain ſought after what is congruous to Nature, in Greatneſs and Dominion.

VI.

Now, ſeeing the ſcope of a Wiſe man is the very ſame, namely, Security and Tranquility of life; pray, by how much nearer a way doth he arrive at that end, when avoiding the tumults of a civil life, he directly and immediately placeth himſelf in a moſt profound quiet, and a ſtate of higheſt ſilence and tranquility? Truly happy is

that man, who knows, that the chiefeſt good, or a happy life, doth not conſiſt in power and Sovereignty; not in a full Exchequer, nor in ample poſſeſſions: but, in freedom from pain, a calm of all affections, and that diſpoſition of mind, which circumſcribing all his deſires by the ſimple boundaries of Nature, makes him content with a few things, and ſo to be Maſter of that, which the ambitious deſpair to obtain, unleſs they could bear rule over all others, and heap up Treaſures inexhauſtible.

VII.

Certainly, if it be fit for me to ſpeak of my ſelf, I account it for a very great Felicity, that I never yet interpoſed my ſelf in the Factions of our City, nor ever ſought to flatter, pleaſe, and endear the people. And what Reaſon, why I ſhould; ſince the people doth not approve what I know, nor I know what the people approve? Beſides, how far was it from Harm, that I and my familiar friend *Metrodorus* have lived together,

Scribit *Plinius* [*lib.* 19. *cap.* 4.] Epicurum primum inſtituiſſe Athenis agrorum, villarumque delicias, nomine *Hortorum* in ipſa Urbe poſſidere; cùm ad uſque eum mos non fuiſſet in oppidis habitari rura. Hinc accipi ſolet pro ipſa ſecta, ſeu doctrina, quæ ab Epicuro, ſectatoribuſque in horto ejus tradita eſt: unde & *Epicurei* dicuntur eſſe [οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κηπῶν] *ex Hortis Philoſophi*; ſicut οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς intelliguntur *Stoici*, apud *Empirium* [*i. advers. Phyſic.*

ther, not only privately, but in a manner concealed: when among so great Goods, as we were capable of enjoying in my narrow Gardens, and in obscure *Melite*, we were not only unknown, but almost unheard of in our own noble Country of *Greece*.

VIII.

We said, *Unless something intervene on the Common-weals part*: because if the Republick call a Wise man to the Helm, and really stand in need of his advice and assistance; in such a case it would be downright inhumanity in him, not to do a Publick Good when it lies in his power; nay, he would be injurious even to himself, because unless the Common-wealth be in safety, he can very hardly obtain what he chiefly desires, Leasure and Quiet.

IX.

Let not a Wise man, therefore, behave himself, as we have observed some to do who professing Wisdom, have, through excessive pride, had so high a conceit of their own judgment and abilities in the Politicks, as that they were confident they could rival, if not outdo even *Lycurgus* and *Solon* in the Art of Ruling.

X.

But, in case he be desired to make Laws, and to prescribe both a Form of Govern-

ment,

ment, and Charges for the ſeveral Magiſtrates: He is in no wiſe to decline it; as well knowing, that thoſe, who firſt made Laws, and Ordinances of Juſtice, and conſtituted Government and Magiſtracy in Cities, did principally aim at, and prudently provide for Tranquillity and Security of life; foraſmuch as if thoſe Laws and Conſtitutions be once taken away, we ſhould lead the life of Wild Beaſts, and the ſtronger would at leaſt deſpoil, if not devour weaker.

XI.

Again, if he ſhall be Elected to the Higheſt Soveraignty, and to rule according to the Laws formerly made, and the Government already eſtabliſhed; neither will he refuſe that: as well knowing, that though the condition of a Prince be for the moſt part full of incertitude, and above all others open to ſiniſter Chance; yet a Wiſe man may look ſo profoundly into all Affairs, and ſo provide againſt Caſualties, as that while Fortune intervenes in ſome leſs important Occurrences, the Greateſt and moſt weighty Affairs of State are happily managed by his Counſel and Reaſon. His chief and firſt Endeavours will be, to provide, that the weaker, while they do their duties toward the ſtronger, be neither oppreſſed

preſſed by them, nor live in want of thoſe neceſſaries to life, wherewith the others ſuperabound. For, the end of every Society of men, or Common-wealth, is only the Common Good, or that all conſpiring and cooperating to the Publick intereſt, the life of every man may be ſafe, and (as far as may be) Happy.

XII.

Finally, in caſe his Prince, upon ſome urgent occaſion, ſummon him to come and afford him his Counſel, or Aſſiſtance; neither will he refuſe that: as knowing, that, ſince it is not only more honourable, but alſo more pleaſant to give, than to receive a Benefit, it muſt be an Act as moſt honourable, ſo alſo moſt pleaſant, to confer a benefit upon a Prince, from whom it is to redound to Millions of others. And thus much of the Principal, and Sourſe of all the Virtues, *Prudence*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Temperance in General.

THe next place belongs to *Temperance*, which is the firſt part of *Honeſty*, and that which ſeems to comprehend the chief Reaſon of what is Honeſt, or Beſeeming. For, ſince it is the office of Temperance to repreſs a Deſiring, ſo is it of Fortitude to erect a Fearing mind; it is juſtly accounted a leſs Indecorum to be let down by Puſillanimity, than to be wound up by Cupidity, and; therefore, it is a greater Decorum to reſiſt Cupidity, than to ſtrive againſt Fear.

II.

Concerning Temperance, this is firſt to be obſerved; that it is not to be affected and purſued for its own ſake, but for the Pleaſure it brings with it, that is, becauſe it adfers peace to a mans mind, and pleaſantly affects it with a certain Concord. For, its proper operation is the Moderation of our Cupidities; and therefore, that we may follow the conduct of Reaſon, in the Election or avoidance of Objects, it admoniſheth us, that it is not ſufficient for us to judge rightly what is to be done, or not

not to be done: but it behoves us also to ſtand to and execute that judgment.

III.

Moſt men, being not able to hold and keep to what they have reſolved upon, as overcome and enfeebled by the apparence of a preſent Pleaſure; reſign up themſelves to the fetters of Luſts, and never foreſee what is to follow thereupon: and, for the ſame cauſe, inconſiderately purſuing a ſmall, tranſitory, and unneceſſary pleaſure, and ſuch as they might have otherwiſe enjoyed, or wholly wanted, without any offence to Nature; they precipitate themſelves into grievous diſeaſes, into loſſes, into diſgrace, and many times into the penalties decreed by the Laws.

IV.

But, they who would ſo enjoy pleaſures, as that no pains ſhall enſue thereupon; and conſtantly retain their judgment, not to be overcome by Pleaſure, to the doing of what they know ought not to be done: theſe men acquire the greateſt Pleaſure, by pretermitting Pleaſure; and frequently ſuffer ſome pain, to prevent their falling into greater.

V.

And hence is it underſtood, that Temperance is to be deſired, not becauſe it avoids

ſome

ſome Pleaſures, but becauſe by reſtraining a man from them, it declines Troubles, which being avoided, he afterwards obtains greater Pleaſures. And this in the mean time it ſo doth, as that the action becomes Honeſt and Decent: and we may clearly underſtand, that the ſame men are lovers as of Pleaſure, ſo alſo of Decorum; yea, and that ſuch, who eſteem and purſue all Virtues, do for the moſt part perform thoſe actions, and attain to thoſe Ends, as that by them it is made manifeſt, how odious to all men Cruelty is, and how amiable Goodneſs and Clemency; and that thoſe very Pleaſures, which Evil men moſt eagerly deſire and hunt after, do fall into the laps of only good men.

VI.

Moreover, for as much as among Cupidities, about the reſtraint and Moderation of which Temperance is imployed, ſome are Natural, others vain or meerly opinionative; and of the Natural ones ſome are neceſſary, others Not-neceſſary (we omit, that of the Neceſſary ones, ſome pertain ſimply to Life; ſuch is the appetite of meat and drink, together with the Pleaſure, which conſiſts only in Motion: and others abſolutely to Felicity it ſelf; ſuch as that of Indolency and Tranquillity, or the ſtable Plea-

Pleasure) manifest it is, that not without good cause we have, in our Physiology, made Three kinds of Cupidities, *viz.* (1.) some that are both *Natural and Necessary*: (2.) others that are *Natural, but Not-necessary*: and (3.) others that are *neither Natural nor Necessary*, but meerly Vain, or arising from vain *Opinion*.

VII.

And because we said, that those are Natural and Necessary, which cause damage and pain in the body, if they be not satisfied; it is evident, that such Cupidities, which infer no damage nor pain, if not satisfied, and yet are joyned with earnest and vehement instigations, do become such, not by any Necessity, but by Opinion; and though they have their seeds from Nature, yet when they run up to Excess, their growth is caused only by the evil, but powerful influence of Opinion; which makes men far worse than Beasts, since they are not obnoxious to any such diffusion, or Excess; and again, that such Cupidities may be proved to be not only Not-necessary, but also Not-natural, only by this, that they import an appetence in Excess, and very hardly or never to be satisfied, and are, for the most part, worthily accounted the Causes of some Harm or other even to Nature.

VIII. Now,

VIII.

Now, that we may discourse of the chief sorts of Temperance, respectively to the Chief sorts of Cupidities; we are to pitch upon (1.) *Sobriety*, which stands opposed to *Gluttony*, or the excessive desire of meat and drink: (2.) *Continence*, which confronts *Lust*, or the unbridled desire of *Venus:* (3.) *Lenity*, the adversary to *Anger*, or the desire of Revenge: (4.) *Modesty*, the contrary to *Ambition*, or the affectation of Honour: (5.) *Moderation*, the antagonist to *Avarice*, or the Cupidity of Riches: and (6.) in respect of the affinity betwixt Desire and Hope, *Mediocrity*, the mean betwixt *Hope* and *Desperation* of the Future.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Sobriety opposed to Gluttony.

IT can hardly be expressed, how great Good redounds from Sobriety; which reducing a man to a thin, simple, and spare Diet, by happy experience teacheth, how little that is, which Nature requires, and that her Necessities may be abundantly satisfied with slender and easily provided Ali-

ment, such as decocted Barly, Fruits, Herbs, and Fountain Water.

II.

For, these things sufficiently remove the trouble of the body arising from want of sustenance; are every where to be had, in good plenty; and contain the Faculties of dry and moist Aliments. Whatever is more than this, amounts to Luxury, and concerns only the satisfaction of a Cupidity, which is neither Necessary, nor occasioned by any thing, whose defect doth necessarily infer any the least offence or detriment to Nature: but ariseth partly from hence, that the want of somewhat, after which the exorbitant appetite longeth, is imagined real and born with impatience; partly from hence, that an absolute Delight, or such as is entire and neither accompanied with, nor attended on by any trouble, is presumed from the satisfaction thereof.

III.

And forasmuch as such things, as are commonly provided to our hands, abundantly suffice to supply all Natures wants; and these Aliments are such, as partly for their simplicity, partly for their Exiguity, are easily providible: hence it follows, that he who feeds upon flesh, hath need of other things to eat with it; when he, who

satisfies

ſatisfied only with Inanimates, hath need of but half ſo much as the other, and ſuſtains himſelf with what is eaſie in the proviſion, and of ſmall coſt and pains in the preparation.

IV.

Now, as for the *Commodities*, which redound from Sobriety, they are principally *Four*. The *Firſt* is, that it brings and conſerves Health, by accuſtoming the body to ſimple, courſe, and ſpare Diet. For, ſumptuous Feaſts, and full meals, and various diſhes, are they which generate, exaſperate, and prolong Crudities, Head-achs, Rheums, Gouts, Fevers, and other Diſeaſes: not that plain and ſimple fare, which Nature affordeth both as Neceſſary and wholſom, and this not only to other Animals, but alſo to man, who yet depraves them by his exorbitancy, and corrupts them by ſuch Delicates as which while he affects, he affects only his own Deſtruction.

V.

Who ſo is Wiſe, therefore, let him always beware of that Diſh, which his irregular Appetite earneſtly covets and purſues; and upon which he cannot feed, without being afterward convinced, that it was grateful to him only to his own harm. Of this ſort are all coſtly, fat, and luſcious meats; and

therefore the uſe of Fleſh muſt be rather Hurtful, than Beneficial to Health; of which this may be a very good Argument: that ſince Health is preſerved by the ſame means which reſtore it, when loſt; and abſtinence from fleſh is generally preſcribed by learned Phyſicians, in moſt diſeaſes, eſpecially acute ones; certainly, the beſt way of conſerving health, muſt be a ſpare diet, and no Fleſh.

VI.

It is no wonder, that the People commonly cry up the uſe of Fleſh, as an Aliment highly conducing to Health; for, they magnifie all things that pleaſe the Guſt, and think that the direct way to Health lies in the wallowing in Pleaſures, nay, even of Venereal pleaſures; whereof, notwithſtanding there is none, which is beneficial to any man, and that conſtitution is very rare, to which it is not hurtful at all times.

VII.

The *Second* is this; that it makes men ready, vivacious, and quick, in the doing of all actions neceſſary to life. For, if you regard the Functions of the Mind, it conſerves the ſame in ſerenity, acuteneſs, and vigour: if the offices of the Body; it conſerves in health, and ſo in ſtrength, agility, and handineſs. Whereas, on the other ſide, Repletion

tion, overmuch ſatiety, ſurfeiting, beclouds the mind, dulls the edge of it, and brings it to an unmanly languor and ſtupidity: and the body it makes as diſeaſed, ſo feeble, unactive and burdenſom. Now I beſeech you, what great matters can you expect from that man, whoſe members are oppreſſed, joints enfeebled, ſinews relaxed, head beclouded, tongue heavy and paralytical, eys floating in rheums, veins glowing with heat and Choler, mouth full of brawling and clamours, and all by reaſon of Wine drunk in exceſs.

VIII.

Verily, a Wiſe man, who ought to content his ſtomack either with leſs then a pint of ſmall Wine, or with Water from the Fountain, the moſt not only wholſom, but ſweet of all Drinks; will be very far from ſpending the night in Compotations and Drunkenneſs: and as far from gorging it, and oppreſſing Nature with meats fat, ſweet and guſtful, and of heavy and ſlow digeſtion; ſince he well knows, that the moſt ſimple Cates, ſuch as only Nature gives and Cooks, will equally ſatisfie the ſtomach, and better preſerve Health.

IX.

And, what though ſuch ſimple and ſlen der Diet will not make a man as ſtrong *Milo* was, nor pamper the fleſh and corro borate the ſinews? yet this doth no wa diſparage the uſe of it to a Wiſe man, wh hath no need of ſuch Robuſtneſs of bod and intenſion of ſtrength, the buſineſs of h life being chiefly Contemplation, not Act vity and Petulancy.

X.

A *Third* advantage accruing from Sobri ty, is this; that a ſober man, coming to Feaſt, eats his meat with ten times more de light than another, becauſe he brings an e act palate to taſt, and a clean and ſharp ſt mach, to entertain it. Not that courſe an homely Cates do not afford as much de light both to the Guſt and ſtomach, as th moſt ſumptuous Banquets, when a ma brings with him the beſt of ſawces, hunge (for, every man knows, that in caſe of pe fect hunger and thirſt, decocted Barly an clean Water are highly grateful, and ſup ply that defect of nouriſhment, from whenc the trouble of hunger and thirſt ariſe) b becauſe thoſe, who are daily uſed to mo ſumptuous entertainments, have their pala ſo furred and imbued, and their ſtomachs oppreſſed and weakned by the continual u

and ingurgitation of them, that they neither reliſh nor ſwallow their meats and drinks with pleaſure comparable to that, which a ſober man receives, whoſe Guſto is ſincere, and Appetite ſtrong. Thus alſo a Wiſe man, who comes but now and then to publick ſhews and ſpectacles, is ſenſible of far more pleaſure than thoſe, who daily frequent them.

XI.

Nor can what we ſay, concerning the reſultance of as much pleaſure from the courſeſt food, as from diſhes of the greateſt coſt and moſt exquiſite Cookery; be contradicted by any, but him, who expoſeth himſelf to the Tyranny of vain opinions; who doth not obſerve, that thoſe only enjoy magnificence with greateſt pleaſure, who do the leaſt need or care for it; and who never taſted the pleaſure of Bread and Water, when preſſed with pure hunger and thirſt. For mine own part, ſeriouſly, when I feed upon ſimple Bread and Water, and ſometimes (when I would entertain my ſelf ſomewhat more ſplendidly) mend my chear with a little Cheeſe; I apprehend abundant ſatisfaction therein, and bid defiance to thoſe pleaſures, which the ignorant and ſenſual Vulgar ſo much like and cry up in the magnificence of great Entertain-

ments: and hereupon, if I have no more than brown Bread, Decocted Barly, and clean Water; I think my Table so well furnished, as that I dare dispute Felicity even with *Jove* himself.

XII.

We farther affirm, that the magnificence of Feasts, and variety of Dishes, do not only not exempt the mind from Perturbations: but not so much as heighten the pleasure of the Body: forasmuch as the end of Nature in Eating, is the remover of Hunger. For Example; the use of Flesh doth neither more especially take away any thing, that is a trouble to Nature; nor perform any thing, which might occasion or convert to a trouble, if not performed. But, in the mean time it doth affect nature with a certain violent Gratefulness, and such as perhaps may be contrary to it, insomuch as we observe, that it doth the least of all meats conduce to the prolongation of life: and all that it serveth to, is the Variation of Imaginary Pleasures, like the blandishments of *Venus*, and the drinking of Exotique wines, without which Nature, or Life might very well last; since those things, without which nature cannot subsist, are altogether compendious, and may with great ease, and with the safety of Justice, Liberality, and Tranquillity, be obtained.

XIII. Fi-

XIII.

Finally, the *Fourth* advantage of Sobriety is this; that it makes us ſuperior to the threats of Fortune. For, they only are afraid of the frowns of Fortune, who being accuſtomed to live delicately and ſumptuouſly, conceive that their lives muſt be moſt miſerable, unleſs they can have wherewith to ſpend Pounds and Talents every day. And hence comes it, that ſuch for the moſt part, become obnoxious to various and great troubles; and frequently commit Rapines, Murders, and the like horrid and deteſtable Villanies, and all to foment their Luxury, and maintain their Profuſeneſs. But, as for that ſober perſon, who contents himſelf with courſe and cheap food, ſuch as Fruits and Sallets, Bread and Water; who hath bounded his deſires with only the Neceſſaries of Nature; what reaſon is there, why this man ſhould ſtand in fear of Fortune? For, who is there in the whole World ſo poor, as to want theſe things? and what malignity of Fortune hath ever reduced a man to a lower ebb, than Bread and Water?

XIV.

As for my ſelf, truly (I ſpeak modeſtly, and therefore may be permitted) I am not only well content, but highly pleaſed with the

the Plants and Fruits growing in these m
own little Gardens; and have this Inscri
tion over the door: *Stranger, Here, if y
please, you may abide in a good condition
Here, the Supreme Good is Pleasure; t
Steward of this homely Cottage is hospitable
humane, and ready to receive you; He sh
afford you Barly-broth, and pure Water of
Spring, and say Friend, are you not well e
tertained? For, these Gardens do not invi
Hunger, but satisfie it; nor encrease your thi
with drinks, while they should extinguish it,
wholly overcome it with a Natural and Gra
ful Liquor.*

XV.

And in this Pleasure have I grown old
finding upon my accounts, that my expe
ces do not amount to quite a Half-penny
day: and yet, in some certain days, I abs
somewhat of that too, and fare harder; a
this, that I may observe, whether that cou
detract a whit from my full pleasure, or wh
ther more than that were worth my labo
of seeking after.

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CHAP. XV.

Of Continence, opposed to Lust.

THe next species of Temperance, is *Continence* or *Abstinence from the sensual delights of Venus*; which being never beneficial to any, and pernicious to most (as we have already hinted) the forbearance of them must be an Eminent Virtue.

II.

For a man to abuse venereal delights with intemperance, is, in brief, to make his life void of vigour, anxious with Cares, painful with Diseases, short in Duration: and therefore a wise man ought not to suffer himself to be Captivated by the Charms of Love, nor to conceive it to be a Divine Passion, and so to be indulged.

Μὴ δ' ἐς Ἔρωτα γυναικὸς ἅπτεσθαι βιώσιμος ἀκατάσχετον· Οὐ γὰρ Ἔρως θεός ἐστι παθὸς δ' ἀίδηλον ἑκάστῳ. Totus in effrænem ne abeas mulieris amorem; Quippe Amor haud Deus est; tacita est Affectio cuique. *Phocylid.*

III.

And that he may be the less prone to be ensnared by the specious allurements thereof,

of, and want the chief Incentives and Fewel to the flames of *Venus*; let him be punctual in the observance of a spare diet, than which nothing can be more available to Continency, in as much as the plenty and turgescence of seed, which arise from a too liberal diet, are both sparks and fewel to the fire of Love. The preservatives next to this, are constant imployment, especially about the study and practice of Wisdom; and Meditation of those many and great Incommodities, to which they are obnoxious, who suffer themselves to be carried away by the violence of Love.

IV.

For, as to the Incommodities in the General of the immoderate courtship of either Women or Boys; they are, Consumption of strength, decay of Industry, unfitness for business and labour, neglect of Domestick Prudence, impairment of Estate, Mortgages, and Forfeitures, ruine of reputation and fame: and while the pamper'd Body shines again with jewels

Pythagoras, interrogatus quando ad mulierem foret accedendum; quando voles, inquit, fieri imbecillior. *Ex Laertio, lib.* 8.

Res esse saluberrimas [τροφῆς ἀχοείην, πόνων ἀοχνὸν, καὶ σπέρματος ἀσῖης συντήρησιν] citra saturitatem vesci, ad laborem impigrum esse, & substantiam seminis conservare dixit *Hippocrat. 6. Epidem. Sect.* 4.

jewels and other precious Ornaments, the poor neglected Mind, as conſcious to it ſelf of its own Guilt and wretchedneſs, becomes its own continual Tormentor, for that it hath ſpent the flower of life in dull and ſlothful effeminacy, and ſuffer'd ſo many good years to be loſt in that Nothing of Dalliance.

V.

And, as to the Special Incommodities; what Evil doth it not draw upon a man, to deſire to have to do with that Woman, whoſe company the Laws interdict him? Doubtleſs a Wiſe man will be very far from admitting ſuch a deſign into the company of his thoughts; ſince he muſt be deterred from it even by that great ſollicitude, that is neceſſary to the very precaution of thoſe many and great Dangers which threaten him therein: it being obſervable, that ſuch as attempt to enjoy forbidden women, are frequently rewarded with wounds, death, impriſonment, baniſhment, and other grievous puniſhments. Whence it comes, that (as we ſaid before) for a Pleaſure, which is but ſhort, little, and not-neceſſary, and which might have been either otherwiſe enjoyed, or wholly omitted, men frequently expoſe themſelves to very great pain, or moſt tedious and ſore repentance.

VI. Be-

VI.

Besides, to be Incontinent, to resign up ones self to this one kind of Pleasure, is it not in the mean time to defraud himself of other pleasures many and great? which that man enjoys, who living Continently and according to the Laws, so applies himself to Wisdom, as that he doth neither blunt the edge of his Mind, nor excruciate it with cares, nor perturb it with extravagant Affections; and for his Body, he doth neither enfeeble it with excessive Venery, nor vex and macerate it with Diseases, nor torment it with pains. And so he comes to attain the *summum Bonum*, which (as we formerly insinuated) doth not result from the familiarity and embraces of Boys or Women, nor from the taste of rare and delicious Fishes, or other blandishments of a Table richly furnished.

VII.

We need not to insist upon this; that there is no reason why any man should, from this our Commendation of General abstinence from Venereal Embraces, infer, that therefore a man ought to abstain from the legitimate and moderate pleasures of the marriage-bed: since, what our judgment is of that particular, we have formerly declared. What is more necessary here

to

to be added, is this; that what we ſaid, *of Loves being no Divinely-immitted Affection,* hath this importance, that if a man have no iſſue by his Wife, he is not to aſcribe it to the anger of thoſe Imaginary Deities, *Cupid* and *Venus*, but only to ſome natural Defect, on his own or his Wifes ſide: and conſequently that he is not to hope to become a Father by Vows, Prayers, and ſolemn Sacrifices, rather than by Natural Remedies.

VIII.

We ſuperadde this alſo; that a wiſe man ought not to live after the beaſtly manner of the *Cynicks*, or to deport himſelf with that Immodeſty and Impudence, which they not only ſhew but boaſt of in publick. For, when they plead, that they therein follow the directions of Nature, and reprehend and deride us, for calling ſuch things Flagitious, Filthy, or ſhameful, which have no Turpitude really, or in themſelves; and calling by their names ſuch things, as are full of real Turpitude (for, to rob, defraud, commit adultery, is filthy in reality, but named without obſcœnity: and to beget a Child, is an act honeſt and decent in it ſelf, but obſcœne in the name) and alledge divers other arguments againſt ſhamefaſtneſs: They ſeem not ſufficiently to conſider, that they

they live in a Civil Society, and not single and at random abroad in the fields, and after the manner of Wild Beasts.

IX.

For, from the time we have given up our names to a Society, Nature it self commands us to observe the Laws and Customs of that Society; to the end, that participating of the Common Goods, we draw no Evil upon our selves, such as is the Infamy at least, or Ignominy, which follows upon that Impudence, or the want of such shamefastness, as the Customs and Manners of the Society, wherein we live, commonly prescribe, and from the observance of which in voice, aspect, and other seemly gestures that Verecundity, which all virtuous persons so worthily commend, is derived and denominated.

X.

Finally, we adde, that it doth not a little conduce, as to Verecundity in special, so also to Continency in General, to abstain from Musick and Poetry; insomuch as they conjunctively afford those amorous songs, and passionate streins of the voice, which diffusing themselves with a certain sweet violence upon the sense, prove very strong allurements and incentives to Lust.

XI. And

XI.

And this is the ground of our Opinion, that a Wiſe man ought to have no more to do with either Muſick or Poetry, than what may conſiſt with right Reaſon, and the ſevere rules of Virtue. Becauſe, while others being moſt eaſily taken with the flattering temptations of each, indulgently devote themſelves to both; the Wiſe man duly perpending and foreſeeing the Evil conſequent upon them, doth wholly repudiate them: declaring that Muſick is an allurement to drink, an exhauſter of moneys, a friend to Idleneſs, an impediment to every good, honeſt and generous work; and that its ſiſter Poetry is that, which hath in all ages corrupted mens manners, made them prone to all ſorts of Vices, and chiefly to Luſt, and this by the Examples of even the Gods themſelves. Whom the Poets have feigned and frequently introduced as inflamed with Anger, ſo furiouſly enraged with Luſt: and in their Fables we read of not only their Diviſions, Animoſities, Diſcords, Wars, Conflicts, Wounds, Deaths, but alſo their Complaints, Laments, Impriſonments, Coition with Mortals, and Mortal Births of Immortal Parents; and other the like Wildneſſes, from which every man, in his right mind, doth abhor.

CHAP. XII.

Of Lenity, opposed to Anger.

ANother ſpecies of Temperance is *Lenity*, *Manſuetude* or *Mildneſs*; comprehending alſo *Clemency* and *Pity*, or *Commiſeration*. This is ſo excellent an Antidote againſt the malignity of Anger, or the Deſire of Revenge; that it is worthily eſteemed a moſt laudable Virtue: foraſmuch as Anger, if high and exceſſive, is a perfect Madneſs, for the time. For, in a fit of anger the mind is inflamed, the light of reaſon eclipſed, the blood boyls with choler, the eyes ſparkle with fire, the breaſt diſtended and ready to burſt with rage, the teeth gnaſht, the voice interrupted, the hairs ſtand on end, the face glowing with heat, and diſtorted with menacing poſtures, become horrid, truculent, and frightful; ſo that the frame or œconomy of Nature ſeems wholly ſubverted, and the mind as well to have loſt the command of it ſelf, as to have forgotten all decency and Decorum: but then comes Lenity, and that recompenſes all again, becalms the mind, and keeps it in ſuch a becoming temper, as that it is neither moved in it ſelf, nor ſuffers any paſſions to

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eruption or ſalley of the ſpirits and blood forth into the members, that may cauſe any the leaſt indecorum.

II.

But, foraſmuch as anger is commonly kindled and blown into a flame by the opinion of ſome injury received; and no man doth an injury to another, but upon the ſcore of either Hatred, or Envy, or Deſpite and Contempt: how can it be, that a Wiſe man ſhould ſo bear an injury, as to deport himſelf with Lenity and ſweetneſs toward him, who offer'd him that injury? Why, truly, only by committing himſelf to the government of right Reaſon, by which we have already declared he is to fortifie himſelf againſt the blows of Fortune. For, he accounts an injury among Caſualties, or things of meer Chance; and well knows, that it is not in his power, to make other men juſt, honeſt, and ſuperiour to the tranſ-

Velle, improbi ne peccent, inſaniæ eſt: id enim, quod fieri non poteſt, appetit. Tum concedere, ut adverſus alios tales ſint: ſed ne in re peccent poſtulare, & ſtolidum eſt & tyrannicum etiam. *Marcus Antonin. de ſeipſo, lib.* 2 *Sect.* 18. Quando alterius cujuſpiam impudentia offenderis, ſtatim ſic percontare teipſum; Fierinè ergo poteſt, ut impudentes in mundo ne ſint? non poteſt, tu itaque quod non poteſt, ne poſcas. *Idem eodem lib. Sect.* 42.

ports of unruly paſſions: and therefore he is as little moved by wrongs done him by men, as by the incommodities or loſſes ſuſtained by misfortune, and generally by any other event occaſioned by things beyond his power of ordering and controulment.

III.

He is not moved (for example) by thoſe extream Heats and Colds of different ſeaſons or tempeſts; becauſe he knows the Nature of ſuch ſeaſons to be ſuch, as he cannot alter. Nor is he moved by injuries, which petulant, diſhoneſt, and malevolent men do him, becauſe it is from the depravity of their nature that they do them: and it is not in his power to amend that depravity, and make them do otherwiſe. Again, he conceives it not to be Congruous to Reaſon and Wiſdom, to add one Evil to another (*i. e.*) to the harm ariſing to him from Cauſes without him, to ſuperadd a greater harm from Cauſes within him, namely, to raiſe a perturbation in his mind, (by opinion) or becauſe another man would afflict his mind with vexation and anxiety,

Optimus injuriam ulciſcendi modus eſt, inferenti ne ſis ſimilis. *Marcus Antoninus, in de ſeipſo lib. 6. Sect. 6.*

ety, thereupon to be so foolish, as by admitting and fomenting that vexation, to prosper that design, and gratifie the evil intention of his Enemy.

IV.

Fit it is, we confess, that a Wise man should so far look to his Good Name, and be careful of his Reputation, as not to lye open to Contempt and Scorn; seeing there are some Pleasures that arise to a man from a Good Fame, and the esteem from thence resulting; as on the contrary there are some Troubles, that arise from Contempt, and the Consequents thereof: but yet is he not to be tender of his Good Name so much for the Revenging of injuries, or offending of those that do them; as for living well and innocently, and giving no man a just cause or occasion of Contumely and Malediction. For, thus to do, is wholly in his own power: not to hinder another from discharging the malignity of his Nature upon him.

V.

Hereupon, in case a person, who hath, though without cause, conceived an anger against you, and declared himself your Adversary, shall demand any thing of you, upon pretext of expiation or satisfaction; you are not to refuse to give it him: provided,

what he demand be Lawful, Honourable, and conducible to your certain security from his rage; because he differs not from an angry and invading Dog, and so is to be appeased with a morsel. Nevertheless nothing is either more honourable, or more safe, than to confront his malice with Innocence of life, and the security of your own Conscience, and for the rest, to declare yourself to be above his injuries.

Minuti semper & infirmi est animi, exiguique voluptas, Ultio; continuò sic collige, quod vindicta Nemo magis gaudet, quam fœmina. *Juvenal. Sat.* 13.

VI.

Moreover, it may come to pass, that a wise man may be sued at Law, brought to the Bar, and there in the face of the whole Court suffer not only injuries, but gross calumnies, false accusations, yea, and receive condemnation: and yet he ought still to remember, that though it be in his power to live uprightly and Virtuously, yet it is not in his power not to fall into the hands of such as may shew themselves Envious, malignant and unjust toward him; nor to hinder them from accusing him contrary to all right and equity, or himself from receiving a sentence from unrighteous Judges.

become

becomes him not therefore to be angry with either his Accusers, or the Witnesses, or the Judges; but trusting in a good Conscience, still to keep up his Lenity and Tranquillity at the highest; and accounting himself far above this infortune, to entertain it without fear or trouble, and deport himself toward his Judges with constant courage and serene boldness.

VII.

Now, there is not why any man should *object*, that what we here advise concerning Lenity, is repugnant to what we formerly said of the Wise mans *Chastising of his offending Servants:* Because we there limited this Castigation only to Refractory, obstinately Perverse and disobedient Servants: and manifest it is, that punishment ought to be inflicted as well upon the delinquents in a private Family, as in a State or Common-wealth; and as the Prince, or Magistrate doth punish the Crimes of Subjects without anger at their Persons; so likewise may the Master of a Family punish the offences of his Servants, not only with Lenity, but Good will also to their persons.

VIII.

We add, that a Wiſe man is not only to bear injuries from others, with Lenity; not only to pardon the faults of his Servants, with mildneſs and ſweetneſs: but even with kindneſs to encourage and gratulate ſuch as Repent of, and reſolve to reform their evil ways. For, ſince the firſt degree of Reformation, is the Knowledge of ones Fault; therefore is this Gratulation and Encouragement to be given to the penitent Delinquent, that as he is affected with contrition and horror at the apprehenſion of the foulneſs of his offence, ſo he may be re-animated by the pulchritude of what he ought to have done formerly, or is to do in the future.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Modeſty, oppoſed to Ambition.

COncerning this great Virtue, which is the Fourth branch of Temperance, there is very little need of ſaying more, than what we have formerly intimated, when we declared it not to be the part of a Wiſe man,

man, to affect Greatneſs, or Power, or Honours in a Common-wealth; but ſo to contain himſelf, as rather to live not only privately, but even obſcurely and concealed in ſome ſecure corner. And therefore the advice we ſhall chiefly inculcat in this place, ſhall be the very ſame we uſually give to our beſt friends. Live private and concealed (unleſs ſome circumſtance of State call you forth to the aſſiſtance of the Publick) inſomuch as Experience frequently confirms the truth of that proverbial ſaying, *He hath well lived, who hath well concealed himſelf.*

II.

Certainly, it hath been too familiarly obſerved, that many, who had mounted up to the higheſt pinacle of Honour, have been on a ſudden, and as it were with a Thunderbolt, thrown down to the bottom of Miſery and Contempt: and ſo been brought, though too late, to acknowledge, that it is much better for a man quietly and peaceably to obey; than by laborious Climbing up the craggy Rocks of Ambition, to aſpire to Command and Soveraignty; and to ſet his foot rather upon the plain and humble ground, than upon that ſlippery height, from which all that can be with reaſon expected, is a precipitous and ruinous Downfal.

ſal. Beſides, are not thoſe Grandees, upon whom the admiring multitude gaze, as upon refulgent Comets and Prodigies of Glory and Honour; are they not, we ſay, of all men the moſt unhappy, in this one reſpect, that their breaſts ſwarm with moſt weighty and troubleſome Cares, that unceſſantly gall and corrode their very Hearts? Beware, therefore, how you believe that ſuch live ſecurely and tranquilly: ſince it is impoſſible but thoſe, who are feared by many, ſhould themſelves be in continual fear of ſome.

III.

Though you ſee them to be in a manner environed with Power, to have Navies numerous enough to ſend abroad into all Seas, to be in the heads of mighty and victorious Armies, to be guarded with well armed and faithful Legions; yet for all this take heed you do not conceive them to be the only Happy men, nay, that they partake ſo much as of one ſincere Pleaſure: for all theſe things are meer pageantry, ſhadows guilded, and ridiculous Dreams; inſomuch as Fear and Care are not things that are afraid of the noiſe of Arms, or regard the brightneſs of Gold, or the ſplendor of Purple, but boldly intrude themſelves even into the Hearts of Princes and Potentates, and

like

like the Poets Vultur, daily gnaw and consume them.

IV.

Beware likewise, that you do not conceive, that the Body is made one whit the more strong, or healthy, by the Glory, Greatness and Treasures of Monarchy; especially when you may daily observe, that a Fever doth as violently and long hold him, who lies upon a bed of Tissue, under a Covering of Tyrian Scarlet, as him that lies upon a Mattress, and hath no Covering but Raggs; and that we have no reason to complain of the want of Scarlet Robes, of Golden Embroideries, Jewels, and ropes of Pearl, while we have a Course and easie Garment to keep away the Cold. And what if you, lying cheerfully and serenely upon a truss of clean straw, covered with raggs, should gravely instruct men, how vain those are, who with astonisht and turbulent minds gape and thirst after the Trifles of Magnificence, not understanding how few and small those things are, which are requisite to an happy life? believe me, your Discourse would be truly magnificent and High; because delivered by one, whose own happy Experience confirms it.

V. What

V.

What though your Houſe do not ſhine with ſilver and gold Hatchments; nor your arched roofs reſound with the multiplied Echoes of loud Muſick; nor your walls be not thickly beſet with golden Figures of beautiful youths holding great lamps in their extended arms, to give light to your nightly Revels and ſumptuous Banquets: why yet, truly, it is not a whit leſs (if not much more) pleaſant, to repoſe your wearied limbs, upon the Green Graſs, to ſit by ſome cleanly and purling ſtream, under the refreſhing ſhade of ſome well-branched Tree, eſpecially in the Spring time, when the head of every Plant is crowned with beautiful and fragrant Flowers, the merry Birds entertaining you with the muſick of their Wild notes, the freſh Weſtern Winds continually fanning your heats, and all Nature ſmiling upon you.

VI.

Wherefore, when any man may, if he pleaſe, thus live at peace and liberty abroad in the open Fields, or his own Gardens; what reaſon is there, why he ſhould affect and purſue Honours, and not rather modeſtly bound his Deſires with the Calmneſs and ſecurity of that Condition? For, to hunt after Glory, by the oſtentation of Virtue,

of

of Science, of Eloquence, of Nobility, of Wealth, of Attendants, of rich Cloths, of Beauty, of Garb, and the like: seriously, is altogether the Fame of ridiculous Vanity; and in all things Modesty exacts no more then this, that we do not, through Rusticity, want of a decent Garb, or too much Negligence, do any thing, that doth not correspond with Civility and Decorum. For, *it is equally vile, and doth as much denote a Base or Abject mind, to grow insolent and Lofty upon the possession of these adjuncts of Magnificence: as to become Dejected, or sink in Spirit, at the Loss or want of them.*

VII.

Now, according to this rule, if a Wise man chance to have the Statues, or Images of his Ancestors, or other Renowned Persons of Former Ages; he will be very far from being proud of them, from shewing them as Badges of Honour, from affecting a Glory from the Generosity of their Actions and Atchievements: and as far from wholly neglecting them, but will place them (as Memorials of Virtue) indifferently either in his Porch, or Gallery, or elsewhere.

VIII. Nor

VIII.

Nec tumulum curo; sepelit Natura relictos. Nil agis hac ira; tabesne Cadavera solvat, an rogus, haud refert; placido Natura receptat cuncta sinu. *Lucan. lib. 7.*

Nor will he be sollicitous about the manner, or place of his Sepulture; or command his Executors to bestow any great Cost, or Pomp and Ceremony, at his Funeral. The chief subject of his care will be, what may be beneficial and pleasant to his Successors: being well assured, that as for his dead Corps, it will little concern him, what becomes of it. For to propagate Vanity even beyond Death, is the highest madness: and not much inferior thereto is the Fancy of some, who in their lives are afraid to have their Carcasses torn by the teeth of Wild Beasts, after their death. For if that be an Evil; why is it not likewise an Evil, to have the Dead Corps burned, Embalmed and immersed in Honey, * to grow cold and stiff under a ponderous Marble, to be pressed down by the weight of Earth and Passengers?

* Mel enim tanta adversus putredinem facultate insignitum est, ut Babylonii nobilium Cadavera eadem sepelirent; ut *Herodotus in Thalia* testis est.

CHAP

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Moderation, oppoſed to Avarice.

NOw comes *Moderation*, or that Diſpoſition of the Mind, which makes a man contented with a little, and than which he can hardly poſſeſs a greater good. For, to be content with little, is the higheſt preferment, the greateſt wealth in the world: as on the other ſide, great riches without moderation, are but great poverty. Thus, to have wherewithal to prevent Hunger, Thirſt, and Cold; is a Felicity not much inferior to that of Divinity: and whoſo poſſeſſes ſo much, and deſires no more, however the world may account him poor, he really is the richeſt man alive.

II.

And how honeſt a thing is this Poverty, when it is Cheerful, Serene, and Contented with only what is ſufficient, *i. e.* with thoſe riches of Nature, which ſuffice to preſerve from Hunger, from Thirſt, from Cold? Truly, ſeeing that theſe riches of Nature are Terminated and eaſily acquirable; but thoſe, that are coveted out of vain opinions, are difficult in the acquiſition, and have no meaſure, no end: we ought to be highly thankful

thankful to the Wisdom and Bounty of Nature, which made those things easily procurable, that are Necessary; and those Unnecessary, that are hard to come by.

III.

Again, since it behoves a Wise man to be always Confident, that in the whole course of his life he shall never want Necessaries, doth not the very easie parability of such few, small, cheap, and common things, as are necessary, abundantly cherish that Confidence in him? when, on the other side, the Difficulty of acquiring those many, great, sumptuous and rare things, that belong to superfluity and magnificence, cannot but very much stagger and weaken it. And this clearly is the Reason, why the vulgar, though they have great possessions, do yet unceſſantly toil and afflict themselves in the acquisition of more: as if they feared to outlive their riches, and come to want, what, if they used with Moderation, they could never live to spend.

IV.

This considered, let us endeavour to content our selves with what is most simple and most easily procurable; remembring, that not all the wealth of the world, contested into one heap, can avail in the least

measure

measure to cure the least disease, or perturbation of the Mind: whereas mean Riches, such as Nature offers to us, and are most useful to remove that indigence, which is incommodious to the body; as they are the occasion of no Care or other passion, during life; so will it not be grievous to us to part with them, when we think of Death.

V.

Miserable truly, are the Minds of men, and their Hearts surrounded with blindness; in that they will not see, that Nature doth dictate nothing more to them than this: that they should supply the wants of the body, and for the rest, enjoy a well pleased mind, without care, without fear; not that they should spend their days in scraping together more than Nature knows how to make use of, and that with greediness, as if they meant to outlive Death, to prevent want in their Graves, or never bethought themselves of the uncertainty of life, and how deadly a Potion we all drink at our very entrance into the World.

VI.

What though those things, which are purely Necessary, and in respect whereunto no man can be poor, do not afford those Delights, which Vulgar minds so much

love and court; yet Nature doth not want them, nor doth she in the mean time cease to afford real and sincere pleasures in the fruition of meer Necessaries, as we abundantly declared. Hereupon the Wise man stands not only so indifferently affected toward those things, in relation whereunto money is desired (such are Love, Ambition, Luxury, *&c.* all which require expences to maintain them) but so far above them, as that he hath no reason either to desire or care for money.

VII.

Now, as for what we said, of the *Immensity of such Riches, as are coveted upon the suggestion of vain Opinions*; the Reason of it is this, that when Nature is satisfied with Little, vain Opinion ushering in Desire always engageth the mind to think of something, which it doth not possess, and, as if it were really needful, converts and fixeth the Desire wholly and entirely upon it. Whence it comes, that to him, who is not satisfied with a little, nothing can ever be enough: but still the more wealth he possesseth, the more he conceives himself to want.

VIII. Where

VIII.

Wherefore, ſeeing there can never be want of a Little, the Wiſe man, doubtleſs, while he poſſeſſeth that little, ought to account it very great Riches: becauſe therein is no want, whereas other riches, though great in eſteem, are really very ſmall, becauſe they want multiplication to infinity. Whence it follows, that he who thinks not his own Eſtate, how ſmall ſoever, ſufficiently ample; though he ſhould become Lord of the whole World, will ever be miſerable. For, miſery is the companion of Want; and the ſame vain opinion, which firſt perſwaded him that his own Eſtate was not ſufficient, will continue to perſwade him that one World is not ſufficient, but that he wants more and more to infinity.

IX.

Have you, then, a deſign to make any one Rich indeed? Know, that the way is not by adding to his Riches, but by detracting from his deſires. For, when having cut off all vain and ſuperfluous deſires from his breaſt, he ſhall ſo compoſe himſelf to the preſcripts of Nature, as to covet no more than ſhe needs and requires: then at length

ſhall he find himſelf to be a Rich man in reality, becauſe he ſhall then find that nothing is wanting to him. Hereupon may you alſo inculcate this maxim to him; *If you live according to Nature, you ſhall never be poor, but if according to Opinion, you ſhall never be rich. Nature deſires little, Opinion infinite.*

X.

Truly, this Diſpoſition, or (if you pleaſe) Faculty of the mind, whereby a man moderating himſelf, cuts off the deſire of whatſoever is not Neceſſary to Nature, and contents himſelf with proviſions the moſt ſimple and moſt eaſily procurable; this Diſpoſition; we ſay, is that, which begets that Security, that is perceived in a pleaſant Retirement, and Avoidance of the Multitude; foraſmuch as by the benefit thereof, when a man converſeth with crouds of people, he ſhall want no more than when he lives ſequeſtred.

XI.

Finally, when a man wants this Faculty of Detracting or Abdicating from his Deſires, whatever is not purely Neceſſary, how great is the Miſery, to which he

continually ſubject? his mind being, like a veſſel full of holes, always in filling, but never full. And certainly (that we may not inſiſt upon this, that moſt who have heaped up vaſt maſſes of Wealth, have therein found only a Change, not an End of their miſery; either becauſe they loaded themſelves with new Cares, to which they were not ſubject before; or becauſe they gave them occaſion to fall into new Vices, from the ſnares whereof they had formerly eſcaped) this alone is a very high miſery; for a man to have his Appetite Encreaſed by the ſatisfaction of it, *i. e.* the more plentifully he feeds, the more to be tormented with hunger.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Mediocrity betwixt Hope and Deſpair of the Future.

FInally, ſince all Cupidity, or Deſire whatever is carried to that, which is not poſſeſſed, but propoſed as poſſible to be attained, and accompanied with ſome *Hope* of obtaining it; and that Hope, as it were nurſing and cheriſhing that Deſire, is accompanied with a certain pleaſure; as the oppoſite to Hope, *Deſperation*, creating and fomenting Fear, that what is deſired may not be obtained, is accompanied with a certain trouble upon theſe conſiderations, it ſeems neceſſary for us to bring up the rear of this File of Virtues, with the diſcourſe of *Mediocrity*; which is of very great uſe, as well in reſpect of objects in the General, either hoped for, or deſpaired of in the Future; as in particular of the Duration, or rather perpetuity of life, where as there is a Deſire kindled in the breaſts of moſt men, ſo doth the Deſpair of it torment them.

II.

In the firſt place, therefore, we are to adhere to this, as a General Rule; that *wh*

is to come, if it be in the number of ſimple Contingents, is neither abſolutely ours, nor abſolutely Not ours. More plainly; we are neither ſo to hope for a thing that is Contingent, as if it were certainly to come; becauſe it may be prevented or diverted by ſome croſs accident intervenient: Nor ſo to deſpair of it, as if it were certainly not to come; becauſe it may fall out, that no accident may intervene to prevent or divert it. For, by the obſervation of this maxim, we ſhall reap the benefit of Moderation; ſo as not being deſtitute of all Hope, we ſhall not be without ſome Pleaſure: and being altogether fruſtrated of our hopes, we ſhall be affected with no trouble.

III.

For, herein conſiſts the Difference betwixt the Wiſe man and the Fool; that the Wiſe doth, indeed, expect things Future, but not depend upon them, and in the mean time enjoys the Goods that are preſent (by conſidering how great and pleaſant they are) and gratefully remembers what are paſt: but the fool, fixing all his thoughts and dependance upon the Future; makes (as we ſaid in the beginning) his whole life unpleaſant and full of fears.

IV.

And how many may we daily ſee, who neither remember goods paſt, nor enjoy preſent? They are wholly taken up with Expectation of Future things, and thoſe being uncertain, they are perpetually afflicted with anguiſh of mind, with fear, and at length become moſt grievouſly perplexed, when they too late perceive, that they have in vain addicted themſelves to the geting of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Glory: in reſpect they fail of obtaining thoſe Pleaſures, with the hopes whereof being inflamed, they had undergone many and great Difficulties and Labours. That we may not ſay any thing of that other ſort of fools, who being abject and narrow-hearted, deſpair of all things, and are for the moſt part, Malevolent, Envious, Moroſe, Shunners of the light, Evil-ſpeakers, Monſters.

V.

Now the Reaſon, why we ſay, that *the wiſe man doth gratefully remember Goods paſt*, is, becauſe we are generally too ungrateful toward the time Preterite, and do not call to mind, nor account among Pleaſures, the Good things we have formerly received: foraſmuch as no pleaſure is more certain, than what cannot now be taken from us.

For,

For, present Goods are not yet Consummate and wholly solid; some chance or other may intervene and cut them off in half; future things hang upon the pin of uncertainty, what is already past, is only safe and inamissible.

VI.

And among Past Goods we account not only such as we have enjoyed; but also our avoidance of all those Evils, that might have fallen upon us; and our Liberation or Deliverance from such other Evils as did fall upon us, and might have lasted much longer; as also the Recordation, Reputation, Gratulation, that we sustained them constantly and bravely.

VII.

As for the *Desire of prolonging life to Eternity* (the special Evil to be prevented by Mediocrity) we have already hinted, that a Wise man is to entertain no such desire: because thereupon instantly succeeds Desperation, which is always accompanied with trouble and anguish. And this Cogitation imports thus much, that the greater Pleasure cannot be received from an Age of infinite Duration, than may be received from this, which we know to be finite; provided a man measure the Ends of it by Right Reason.

VIII. For,

VIII.

For, seeing that to measure the Ends of Pleasure by right reason, is only to conceive, that the Supreme pleasure is no other but an Exemption from Pain and Perturbation; it is a manifest Consequence, that the Supreme Pleasure of man cannot be encreased by the length, nor diminished by the shortness of Time.

IX.

The Hopes of a more prolonged pleasure, or of a longer age, we confess, may seem to render the present pleasure more Intense; but, it can seem so only to such, who measure the Ends of pleasure not by right Reason, but by vain opinion, and the Consequent thereof, Desire; and who look upon themselves so, as if, when they shall cease to be, they should be sensible of some trouble from the privation of pleasure, as they might in case they should survive. And hence it comes, that perfectly to understand, that Death doth nothing concern us; makes us fully to enjoy this Mortal life, not by adding thereunto any thing of uncertain time, but by cutting off all Desires of Immortality.

X. Where-

X.

Wherefore, since Nature hath prescribed certain bounds or ends to the pleasures of the Body; and the Desire of Eternal Duration takes them wholly away: necessary it is, that the mind, or Reason supervene, so as by ratiocinating upon those ends, and expunging all desires of Sempiternity, to make life in all points perfect and consummate, and us so fully content therewith, as not to want any longer Duration.

XI.

And this Reasoning moreover, causeth, that we shall not be frustrated of pleasure even then, when Death shall take us by the hand, and shew us the period of all these mortal things, insomuch as we shall thereby attain to the perfect, and so delectable End of a very Good Life, rising from the table of the World as Guests well satisfied with the Good Entertainments of life, and having duly performed all those Duties, which to perform, we received life.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of Fortitude, in General.

HItherto of Temperance, and the chief ſorts of it, reſpective to the chief Objects of our Cupidities. We are now come to a new Leſſon, *FORTITUDE*; which we called the other part of Honeſty, in reſpect that the uſe of it is againſt Fear, and all its Cauſes, and that thoſe, who behave themſelves, in any Difficulty or Dangerous Enterpriſe, as eſpecially in War (from which the Vulgar ſeem to have transferred the word to all Generous actions) not timidly and unmanly, but couragiouſly and valiantly, are generally ſaid to behave themſelves Honeſtly and Becomingly.

II.

That this Virtue alſo is to be embraced, in order to Pleaſure, may be inferred from hence; that neither the undergoing of great labours, nor the ſuffering of great pains, are things inviting and deſirable in themſelves; as likewiſe is not Patience, nor Aſſiduity, nor Watchings, nor Induſtry it ſelf, which is ſo highly commended; nay, nor Fortitude: but the reaſon why we commend, and purſue them, is to the End we may

may live without Care and Fear, and ſo free both body and mind (as much as poſſible) from all moleſtation.

III.

For, as by the Fear of death (for example) the quiet of life is wholly perturbed; and as to yield to pains, and endure them with a dejected and weak mind, is a great miſery, and by that baſeneſs and weakneſs of Spirit, many have utterly loſt their Parents, Friends, Country, and moſt themſelves: ſo, on the other ſide, doth a ſtrong and ſublime mind make a man free from all Care and Anguiſh, inſomuch as it contemns death, upon this account, that all who ſuffer it, are in the ſame caſe, as before they were in being; and is fortified againſt all pains, as being aſſured, that the greateſt pains are ſoon determined by death, that ſmall pains have many intervals of quiet, that mean pains are not above our patience; that if they be tolerable, they are to be endured with conſtancy, which much mitigates them; and if intolerable, he is quietly to depart the world, as a Theatre that doth not pleaſe him.

IV.

Now, from theſe conſiderations it is plain, that Timidity and unmanlineſs are not to be diſpraiſed, nor Fortitude and Patience to be praiſed, for their own ſakes:

but

but those are Rejected, because they induce Pain; and these Embraced, because they produce Pleasure.

V.

And, as for what we said of the Efficacy of Fortitude both against Fear, and all things that are wont to cause it; the intent of is, that we may understand, that they are the very same Evils, which torment when they are present, and are feared, when expected as future: and consequently that we learn not to fear those Evils, which we either feign to our selves, or any ways apprehend as to come; and with Constancy and Patience to endure those that are present.

VI.

Now, among such Evils, as we *Imagine* to our selves but are not really Future, the chiefest are those which we fear either from the *Gods*, as if they were Evil themselves, or could be the Authours of any Evil to us; or from *Death*, as if that were evil in it self, or brought us to some eternal Evil after it: & among such Evills, as are in *possibility*, and may come, and do sometimes come and affect us with pain and trouble; they are all such, as infer either *Pain* upon the *Body*, or *Discontent* upon the *Mind*.

VII. Those

VII.

Thoſe which produce *Pain*, are Diſeaſes, Scourgings, Fire, Sword, *&c.* and thoſe which induce *Diſcontent*, are *External* Evils, and either *Publique*, of which ſort are Tyranny, Wars, deſtruction of ones Country, Peſtilence, Famine, and the like; or *Private*, of which ſort are Servitude, Baniſhment, Impriſonment, Infamy, Loſs of Friends, Wife, Children, Eſtate, *&c.*

VIII.

Now, the difference betwixt all theſe things, on the one part, and pain and diſcontent on the other, is this; that Pain and Diſcontent are abſolute evils in themſelves: the others are evils only Reſpectively, or as they may be the Cauſes of pain and diſcontent; nor is there any reaſon, why they ſhould be avoided, unleſs in that reſpect only.

IX.

Upon the Chief of theſe Cauſes of fear we ſhall touch, and in order as they are here enumerated. In the mean time be pleaſed to obſerve, that Fortitude is a Diſpoſition of the mind, not ingenerate by Nature, but acquired by long conſulting with Reaſon. For, Fortitude is very much different from Audacity, Ferocity, inconſiderate Temerity, which is found even in the Brute Animals: and

and being proper to man, and to such men only as act according to Prudence, and the advice of right Reason; is not to be measured by the hot Temperament and strength of the Body, but by the firmness of the Mind, constantly adhering to an honest intention or purpose.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of the Gods.

IN the first place it seems convenient, that we discuss a certain Twofold Fear, much transcending all others; forasmuch as if any thing hath produced the Supreme Pleasure, and that which is proper to the Mind; doubtless, it hath been the Expunction of all such Opinions, as have impressed the greatest Fear upon the Mind. For, such is the condition of miserable Mortalls, that they are generally led, not by sound opinions, but by some certain Affection void of Reason: and so, not defining Evil by reality, but imagination, they render themselves obnoxious to, and frequently suffer as high perturbations from such things, as they only

only Imagine to themselves, as if they were real.

II.

And that, which is the Ground of the greatest Fear, and consequently of the greatest Perturbation to men, is this; that conceiving there are certain *Blissful and Immortal Natures* (which they call *Gods*) in the World, they do yet think them to have such Wills, such Passions, such Operations, as are plainly repugnant to those Attributes of Beatitude and Immortality; such are perpetual Sollicitude, Imployments, Fits of Anger and Kindness: and hereupon they infer, that Losses and Afflictions are by way of punishment, derived to Evil men, and Protection and Benefits, by way of reward and encouragement, derived to Good men, from the Gods. For, Men, being nursed up in their own, *i. e.* Humane affections, imagine and admit Gods in most things like themselves: and what they find incorrespondent to their own inclinations and passions; the very same they conclude to be incompetent to the Deities.

III.

Hereupon it cannot be exprest, how great unhappiness Mankind hath drawn upon it self, by ascribing such attributes to the Gods, as resemble those of Humane na-

ture, and especially those of Anger and Vindictiveness; in respect whereof mens minds being made low and abject, as if the Gods perpetually threatned to call them to a severe account for their actions, and to inflict punishment upon them: you shall scarcely find a man, who is not appaled and strook with terror, at every clap of Thunder, at every Earth-quake, at every high wind, at every storm at Sea, and the like natural occurrents.

IV.

But, so are not Those, who being educated in the School of Reason, have learned, that the Gods live in perpetual security and Tranquillity; and that their Blissful Nature is so far removed from us and our Affairs, as that they can neither be Pleased, nor Displeased at our actions. And, unfeignedly, if they were touched with Anger at our misdeeds, or heard the prayers of men: the whole race of man would soon be destroyed; there being not an hour, wherein Millions of men do not imprecate mischief and destruction each to other.

V.

Be very Cautious, therefore, that when you have conceived *God* to be an *Immortal and Blissful Nature* (or Animal, as the common Notion, concerning God, doth suggest)

you

you do not destroy that Conception, by giving any other Attribute to him, which may be either inconsistent with, or repugnant to those of his Beatitude and Immortality.

VI.

Gods, in truth, there *are*; for the Knowledge of them is evident, as we have elsewhere declared: but, they are not such as men commonly conceive and describe them to be. For, when they have described them to be Immortal and Blissful, they contradict themselves, by affixing other Repugnant Attributes upon them; as that they are always taken up with business themselves, and create business for others; that they are affected with pleasure or displeasure at the good or bad Actions of men; that they are delighted with humane adoration and sacrifices, *&c.* all which pre-suppose great Disquiet, Imbecillity, Fear, and the want of external assistance.

VII.

Nor need you fear, that this Tenent should subject you to the censure of being *Impious*; because, in truth, He is not Impious, who denies and casheirs the Vulgar Gods of the multitude: but he who ascribes to the Gods the opinions of the multitude. For, those are not Genuine Prenotions, but False Opinions, which are common-

ly delivered by men, concerning the Gods.

VIII.

By the ſame reaſon likewiſe, he is not the truly *Pious* man, who bows down upon every ſtone, ſacrificeth upon every Altar, and beſprinkles the doors of every Temple with the blood of victims: but, *He*, who contemplating all things with a ſerene and quiet mind, frames to himſelf, out of a genuine Prenotion, true and correſpondent conceptions concerning the Divine Nature; and being thereunto induced, not by hope or reward, but meerly by apprehenſion of the Majeſty and Supreme Excellency of its eſſence, doth love it, and worſhip it with the higheſt Reverence and Veneration of his mind; and admitting no ſuch Cogitations, as may ſuggeſt any Opinion repugnant to its Attributes, and deſtructive to the Veneration due unto it, doth thereby exempt himſelf from that baſe fear, which others ſuffer, in whoſe minds that Contrariety of Attributes doth beget the higheſt and moſt laſting of all Perturbations.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Fortitude, oppoſed to the Fear of Death.

THE other thing which invades, and ſtrikes the Minds of men with extream Fear and Terror, is *Death*; and this, becauſe of we know not what Everlaſting Evils, that are expected immediately to enſue thereupon (and that's very ſtrange, you'l ſay, that men ſhould fear to ſuffer Evil, then when they ſhall be deprived of all ſenſe, and utterly ceaſe to be) they being ignorant, that all thoſe ſolemn ſtories, that are commonly told of Hell, Rhadamanth, the Furies, *&c.* are the meer Fictions of Poets: and that if they contain any thing of truth in them, they are but cunning alluſions to the miſeries, which many men ſuffer during life, ſince thoſe, who are unceſſantly vexed with vain Fears, ſuperfluous Cares, inſatiable Deſires, and other violent Paſſions, lead lives ſo truly miſerable, as that they may well be ſaid, to ſuffer the torments of Hell.

II.

That you may exempt your ſelf, therefore, from theſe Terrors; accuſtom your

mind to this thought, *That Death doth nothing concern us*; and upon this Argument: whatever of Good or Evil we are capable of in life, we are capable thereof only in respect of our Sense; but, Death is a Privation of all Sense, therefore, *&c.* That Death is a Privation of all Sense, is consequent from hence, that it is a Dissolution; and what is once dissolved, must henceforth remain without all Sense. So that Death seems a thing most easily Contemptible; insomuch as it is an ineffectual Agent, and in vain threatens pain, where the Patient is destroyed, and so ceaseth to be capable of pain.

Nil igitur mors est, ad nos neque pertinet hilum. & mox; Multò igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandum, si minus esse potest, quàm quod nihil esse videmus; *Lucret. lib.* 3.

III.

True it is, indeed, and too true, that men generally abhor Death, sometimes because they look upon it as the Greatest of Pains, sometimes because they apprehend it as the cessation of all their enjoiments, or privation of all things that are dear to them in life; but in both these Respects, altogether without cause: since this thing, *Not-to-live*, or *Not-to-be*, ought to be no occasion of Terror; because when once we come to that, we shall have no faculty left whereby to know, that Not-to-live hath any thing of Evil in it.

IV.

IV.

Hereupon we may conclude that thoſe are great Fools who abhor to think, that after Death their Bodies ſhould be torn by wild beaſts, burned in the flame of the funeral pile, devoured by worms, *&c.* for, they do not conſider, that then they ſhall not be, and ſo not feel, nor complain, that they are torn, burned, devoured by corruption or worms. And that thoſe are Greater Fools, who take it grievouſly, that they ſhall no longer enjoy the converſation of their Wives, Children, Friends, no longer do them good offices, nor afford them their aſſiſtance; for theſe do not conſider, that then they ſhall have no longer Relation to, nor Deſire of Wife, Children, Friends, or any thing elſe.

V.

We ſaid, that *Death* (accounted the King of Terrors, and moſt horrid of all Evils) *doth nothing concern us, becauſe*, while we are, Death is not; and when Death is, we are not; ſo that he, who profoundly conſiders the matter, will ſoon conclude that Death doth concern neither the Living, nor the Dead; not the living, becauſe it yet toucheth them not, not the Dead, becauſe they are not.

Natura ſic ſe habet, ut quomodo initium rerum omnium ortus noſter afferat; ſic exitum Mors; quæ ut nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, ſic nihil poſt mortem pertinebit. In quo quid poteſt eſſe mali, cum mors nec ad vivos pertineat, nec ad mortuos? Alteri nulli ſunt; alteros non attingit. *Cicero, Tuſcul. lib.* 1.

VI.

VI.

And, as the assurance of this that Death nothing concerns us, doth exempt us from the greatest of Terrors, so also doth it make us to enjoy life to the most advantage of pleasure, not by adding thereunto any thing of uncertain Time, but by Detracting all desire of Immortality. For, in life there can be nothing of Evil to him, who doth perfectly understand, that there can be nothing of Evil in the privation of life.

Paratus exire sum; & ideo fruor vita, quia quamdiu futurum hoc sit, non nimis pendeo. *Seneca Epist. 61.*

VII.

Again, He cannot be excused of Folly, who saith, that He fears Death, not because of any Trouble or Anguish that it can bring, when it comes; but because of the perpetual Grief, and Horror, wherewith it afflicts the mind, till it comes, or while it is expected: forasmuch as that, which can bring no trouble or anguish with it, when it comes, ought not to make us sad before it comes. Certainly, if there be any thing of Incommodity, or Fear in the business of Death, it is the fault of him that is Dying, not of Death it self: nor is there any trouble in Death, more than there is after it, and it is no less folly to fear Death, than to fear old Age, since as old Age follows close

close upon the heels of youth, so doth Death upon the heels of old Age.

VIII.

Further, we are to hope at least, that when we come to the point of death, and are even at the last gasp, either we shall feel no pain, or such as will be very short; for as much as no pain that is Great, can be Long; and so every man ought to be confident, that though the dissolution of his Soul and Body be accompanied with some torment; yet after that's once past, he shall never feel more.

IX.

That Philosopher was very ridiculous, who admonisheth the young man to live Honestly, and the old to die Honestly; because a Good Life and a Good Death are not things to be parted, and the Meditation of living Honestly and dying Honestly, is one and the same: and this in respect that a young may die immaturely; and to an old man something of life is remaining, and the last act of his life is a part, yea, and the Crown of his whole life.

X.

And both young and old are to consider this, that though man may provide for his Security, as to other things, yet against Death there is no security, the youngest nor strongest cannot promise themselves immunity

immunity from it, for ſo much as one hour; all men living as it were in a City without Walls, without Gates, to keep out that common Enemy.

XI.

Moreover a young man may die Happy, who conſiders with himſelf, that ſhould he live a thouſand years, yet he could but ſee and act over the ſame things again: and an old man may live unhappy, who, like a veſſel full of holes, receives the Goods of life only to let them run through him, * and ſo is never full of them, nor as a ſober Gueſt of Nature, after a plentiful meal of all her beſt diſhes, willing to riſe and go take his reſt.

* Cur non ut plenus vitæ conviva recedis? *Lucret. lib.* 3. Rarus, qui exacto contentus tempore vitæ, Cedit, uti conviva ſatur. *Flaccus, Satyr.* 1.

XII.

This conſidered, we are not to account an old man Happy, in that he dyed full of years, but in that he dyed full of Goods, and ſated with the World..

XIII.

Finally, moſt of all fooliſh and ridiculous is he, who ſaith, it is good either not to be born at all, or to die as ſoon as born. For, if he ſpeak this in Earneſt, why doth he not preſently

presently rid himself of life, it being very easie for him so to do, in case he hath well deliberated upon the matter beforehand? And, if in jest; he is perfectly mad, because these are things that admit not of jesting. Again, in life there is something amiable in itself; and therefore he is as much to be reprehended, who desires Death, as he that is afraid of it. For, what can be so ridiculous, as for a man to desire Death, when himself makes his life unquiet by the fear of Death? or out of a weariness of life, to fly to the Sanctuary of Death, when his own imprudence and Irregular course of life, is the only cause of that weariness?

XIV.

Every man, therefore, ought to make it his care, so to live, as that life may not be ingrate or tedious to him; and not to be willing to part with life, till either Nature, or some intolerable Case call upon him to surrender it. And in that respect, we are seriously to perpend whether is the more Commodious, for us to stay till Death come to us, or to go and meet it. For, though it be an Evil, indeed, to live in Necessity; yet is there no necessity for us to live in necessity: since Nature hath been so kind as to give us, though but one door into the world, yet many doors out of it.

XV. But,

XV.

But, albeit, there be ſome Caſes ſo extream, as that in reſpect of them we are to haſten and fly to the Sanctuary of Death, leſt ſome power intervene and rob us of that liberty of quitting life: yet nevertheleſs are we not to attempt any thing in that kind, but when it may be attempted conveniently, and opportunely; and when that time comes, then are we to diſpatch and leap over the battlements of life bravely. For, neither is it fit for him, who thinks of flight to ſleep: nor are we to deſpair of a happy Exit even from the greateſt Difficulties, in caſe we neither haſten before our time, nor let it ſlip when it comes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Fortitude againſt Pain of the Body.

Corporal Pain is that alone, which deſerves the name of Evil in it ſelf, and which indeed would carry the Reaſon of the Greateſt of Evils, if ſo be our own deſive opinions had not created and pulled upon our heads another ſort of pain, called the *pain of the Mind*; which many times becomes more grievous and intolerable than any pain of the Body whatever, as we have formerly deduced. For, Diſcontent of mind, conceived upon the loſs of Riches, Honours, Friends, Wife, Children, and the like; doth frequently grow to that height, that it exceeds the ſharpeſt pains of the Body: but ſtill that which gives it both being and growth, is our own Opinion, which if right and ſound, we ſhould never be moved by any ſuch loſs whatever; in regard that all ſuch things are without the circle of our ſelves, and ſo cannot touch us but by the intervention of Opinion, which we coin to our ſelves. And thereupon we may infer, that *we are not ſubject to any other real evil, but only the Pain of the Body:* and that the mind ought to complain of nothing, which

which is not conjoyned to ſome pain of the body, either preſent, or to come.

II.

The Wiſe man, therefore, will be very cautious, that he do not wittingly draw upon himſelf any Corporal pain; nor do any action, whereupon any ſuch pain may be likely to enſue: unleſs it be in order either to the avoidance of ſome greater pain, that would otherwiſe certainly invade him; or the comparation of ſome Greater pleaſure dependent thereupon; as we have formerly inculcated. This conſidered, we may very well wonder at thoſe [Philoſophers] who accounting Health, which is a ſtate of Indolency, a very great Good, as to all other reſpects; do yet, as to this reſpect, hold it to be a thing meerly Indifferent: as if it were not an indecent playing with words, or rather a high piece of Folly, to affirm, that to be in pain, and to be free from pain, is one and the ſame thing.

III.

But, in caſe any Neceſſity either of his native Conſtitution, in reſpect whereof his body is infirm and obnoxious to Diſeaſes; or of any External violence done him, which (ſo ſubject to Caſualties and the injuries of others, is the condition of frail man) he could not prevent or avoid; (for experi-

ence

nce atteſteth) that a Wiſe and Innocent perſon may be wounded by his malicious Enemies; or called to the bar, impleaded, condemned, and beaten with Rods, or otherwiſe cruelly tormented by Tyrants) we ſay, in caſe either of theſe ſhall have brought pain upon him: then is it his part, to endure that pain with Conſtancy and Bravery of mind, and patiently to expect either the Solution, or Relaxation of it.

IV.

For, certainly, Pain doth never continue long in the Body; but, if it be Great and Highly intenſe, it ceaſeth in a ſhort time, becauſe either it is determined of its ſelf, and ſucceeded if not by abſolute Indolency, yet by very great mitigation; or is determined by Death, in which there can be no pain. And as for that pain, which is laſting; it is not only gentle and remiſs in it ſelf, but alſo admits many lucid intervals, ſo that there are not many days, nay, not hours, in which the body may enjoy not only eaſe, but very much pleaſure alſo.

V.

And may we not obſerve, that all long or Chronique Diſeaſes have many more hours of Eaſe and quiet, than of pain and trouble? For, (to omit this, that if a Diſeaſe encreaſe our Thirſt, it doth as much increaſe our

pleaſure

pleaſure in drinking) they give us time for our Refection, frequent reſpites to hold comfortable Conferences with our Friends, leaſure to recreate our ſelves with ſome gentle Game, and admit many and long intervals of eaſe, in which we may apply our ſelves to our ſtudies and any other neceſſary affairs. Whereupon it is moſt evident, that Great pain cannot be Long; nor Long pain Great: and ſo, we may conſolate our ſelves againſt the Violence of pain, by an aſſurance of the ſhortneſs of it; and with the Remiſſneſs againſt the Diuturnity of it.

V I.

Let this, therefore, be our frequent ſuccour, that *No pain is either Intolerable, or Perpetual*; becauſe, if it be long, it muſt be light; if great, ſhort. Provided always, that we remember the ends or bounds preſcribed to things by Nature; and do not by our own opinion adde any thing thereunto, which may make our pain greater, or us to apprehend it to be greater, than really it is. For the only way to heighten pain to the degree of intolerable, is to exaſperate it by impatience, and oppreſs and wear out nature by effeminate

Dejiciat miſeram tibi nulla moleſtia vitam; Si longa eſt, levis eſt: ſi gravis eſt, brevis eſt. *Morus* noſter.

Com-

Complainings: whereas, on the other side, nothing doth so much alleviate, mitigate, and blunt the edge of any pain, as Constancy, and Custom of suffering; since thence it comes, that a Wise man, who hath been used to diseases and pains, doth very often rejoyce and smile even in the highest fury of his sickness.

VII.

Thus much we can testifie of our friend *Metrodorus*; who hath at all times born himself undauntedly, and with exemplary Constancy, as against Death, so against all Pain. For concerning *our selves*, we need not say much; it being very familiar to us, to suffer such tortures of the Bladder and Bowels, as none can be greater: and yet, as we find them fully compensated with that alacrity of mind, which redounds to us from the remembrance of our Philosophy and former Inventions; so do we entertain them with that Constancy and Patience, as that we are not destitute of very great delights even in those very days, wherein we are most tormented with those sharp Fits of the Stone and Colick.

VIII.

And indeed, this is the very Reason, why we formerly said, that *a wise man, though invaded and surrounded with the cruellest of*

Torments, may yet keep poſſeſſion of his happineſs: becauſe he doth both by his Patience ſoften that Neceſſity which he cannot break; and as much as poſſible, withdraw his mind from being concerned in the ſufferings of his body, converſing no more with it, than as with a fragil and complaining part. He reflects the eye of his mind backward, and conſiders what Honeſt, what Generous and Magnanimous Actions he hath at any time done; and fixing his cogitations upon thoſe things, which he hath moſt admired, and which have moſt delighted him: he recreates his mind with the remembrance of Paſt Goods, for which he is very far from ſhewing himſelf Ungrateful, as Unwiſe men uſually are.

IX.

He conſiders, that he can do nothing more worthy that Virtue and Wiſdom, which he profeſſeth, than not to yield the victory to pain, the moſt hard to be ſuſtained of all things; than to hold up his head nobly in ſo difficult a conflict; to vanquiſh ſo potent and malicious an Enemy, and at length to make ſo perfect a Conqueſt thereof, as that the very Remembrance of it will be at all times delightful, and eſpecially in the time of abſolute Indolency; which will be ſo much the more Grateful, by

by how much the greater pains ſhall have preceded, as a Calm, or Haven is always moſt welcome after a Tempeſt.

X.

Now, if a Wiſe man is not without his Alleviations and Comforts even in the moſt Grievous pain; what ſhall we ſay of him in Remiſs and Gentle pains, or in the loſs of ſome Member, or privation of ſome one of his Senſes? Truly, it was not without good reaſon, that we formerly ſaid, that *a Wiſe man might ſtill be happy, though deprived of the beſt of his Senſes, his Sight:* for, if the Night doth not diminiſh the Happineſs of life; why ſhould Blindneſs, that ſo neerly reſembles Night, do it? and however he may want ſome pleaſures, that depend upon the light: yet are there many others that lie open to his enjoyment, and what is much above all others, the pleaſure of Contemplation.

XI.

For, ſeeing that to a wiſe man, *to live, is to Think*, certainly his Thoughts are not beholding to the aſſiſtance of his Eyes, in the buſineſs of inveſtigating Truth. And that man, to whoſe Doctrine we ſometimes gave up our Name, did live long and happy, without being able to diſtinguiſh of Colours: but, without the Notion of Things,

he could not have lived happy. Nay, that Great man was of opinion, that the Perſpicacity of the Mind was very much dimmed by the ſight of the eyes: and while others could ſcarcely be ſaid, to ſee the things, that were before them; the opticks of his reaſon flew abroad into all Infinity, nor could the acies of his mind be terminated by the Extreams of the Univerſe.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Fortitude, againſt Diſcontent of Mind.

YOu may remember, we ſaid even now, that all Diſcontent of Mind is conceived for ſuch things, that are External Evils, and the Contraries to thoſe Goods that we moſt love and deſire. For, men uſually call ſome things Adverſe, and others Proſperous: and we may generally obſerve, that the Mind, which is elevated and inſolent with Proſperity, and dejected with Adverſity; is low, abject and baſe. This conſidered, you may eaſily collect, that all we ſhould in this place ſay, concerning Evils inducing Diſcontent, and in reſpect whereof,

of, we have need of Fortitude; may be ſufficiently inferred from what we formerly ſaid, concerning thoſe Goods, that are the General Objects of our Deſires or Cupidities, and in reſpect whereof we have need of Temperance.

II.

Let this General Axiom, therefore, ſuffice; that *Diſcontent of Mind is not grounded upon Nature, but upon meer Opinion of Evil*; and in reſpect thereof it becomes neceſſary, that every man be in Diſcontent, who conceives himſelf to be under ſome Evil, whether only previſed and expected, or already come upon him. For, how comes it, that a Father, whoſe Son is killed, is not a whit leſs chearful or merry, if he know not of the death of his Son, than if he were yet alive and in health? or, that he, who hath loſt much of his good fame abroad, or all his goods and Cattel by robbery at home; is not at all ſenſible of either loſs till he hears of it? Is it not Opinion alone, which makes him ſad and diſcontented thereupon? Certainly, if Nature it ſelf were the Author of that ſadneſs, the Fathers mind would be ſtruck with a ſenſe of the loſs of his Son, in the ſame moment wherein he was ſlain: and in like manner, he that hath ſuffered Detraction from his honour, or been robbed of

his Goods and Cattel, would in the ſame inſtant receive intelligence of his loſs, from the ſecret Regret impreſſed upon his mind.

III.

To the production of Diſcontent, therefore, in the mind, it is abſolutely neceſſary, that Opinion (not Nature) intervene betwixt the ſuppoſed Evil and the Mind. However, that you may be the more confirmed in this truth, be pleaſed to obſerve this; If a man have an Opinion, that ſuch a one is his true Son, who was indeed begotten by another man; and again, believe, that ſuch a one is not his Son, though himſelf be the right Father of him: let it be told him, that he, whom he accounts not to be his true Son, but really is ſo, is Dead; and he ſhall never be moved at the ſad tidings: but let him hear of the death of the other, whom he took for his true Son, but really was not ſo, and he ſhall inſtantly be moved at the news, and ſuddenly break forth into ſorrow and laments. And this, not from any Natural Inſtinct, or Sentiments Paternal: but only from the deluſive ſuggeſtions of Opinion, that the one, who was his Son, was not ſo; and that the other, who was not his Son, was ſo.

IV. Hence

IV.

Hence is it a perſpicuous Truth, that thoſe things, for which the mind becomes male-content and contriſtate, are not Real Evils to us; foraſmuch as they are without the orb of our Nature, and can never touch us immediately or of themſelves, but by the mediation of our own Opinion. And this was the ground of our former Aſſertion, *that it is Reaſon alone which makes life happy and pleaſant, by expelling all ſuch falſe Conceptions or Opinions, as may any way occaſion perturbation of mind.* For, it is Diſcontent alone, that perturbs the mind, and wholly ſubverts the Tranquillity, and ſo the jucundity thereof.

Nihil quicquam ad mentem faciunt, quæ extra mentem ſita ſunt. *Marc. Antonin. in lib. de ſe-ipſo 7. Sect. 2.*

V.

But, how can Reaſon expel all ſuch erroneous Opinions, after they have once taken poſſeſſion of the Mind? Why, truly, only by teaching the Wiſe man to arm his mind againſt the blows of Fortune. For thoſe very External things, which perſwaded by opinion, we conceive to be Good and

Non poſſidemus propria mortales bona, Sed jus Deorum, noſtra diſpenſatio eſt. Et commodata cùm volunt, repetunt Dii. *Eurip. Phœniſ.* ὧδ' ἐν ἴδιον ὧδ' ἄλλος. *Marc. Anton. lib.* 12.

for the loſs of which we conceive ſuch Diſcontent of mind; are alſo juſtly called the Goods of Fortune; becauſe they are not really our own, but may be poſſeſſed, or taken away, as Fortune pleaſeth.

VI.

This the Wiſe man well knowing, accounts ſuch goods no more his own, than other mens, and doth never ſo poſſeſs them, as not to be willing and ready at any time to part with them. For, he hath diveſted his mind of that opinion, which would perſwade him, that they are real Goods, that they are his own, that they are permanent and inamiſſible, and put on that right opinion, which aſſures him, that they are neither really Good, nor abſolutely his own, nor inamiſſible, but tranſitory and ſubject to be blown away from him by every guſt of adverſe Fortune. And hereupon he foreſees what to do, in caſe he ſhould be deprived of them; that is, not to cruciate himſelf

Quicquid eſt hoc, quod circa nos ex adventitio fulget, liberi, honores, opes, ampla atria, nobilis aut formoſa conjux, cæteraq; ex incerta mobiliq; ſorte pendentia; alieni commodatiq; apparatus ſunt. Nihil horum dono datur: collatitiis & ad dominos redituris ſcenâ adornatur. Alia ex his primo die, alia ſecundo referentur &c. *Gratius in cap.* 10. *Marc.* Sic accipe, ne faſtuoſus fias; ſic poſſide, ut dimittere proclivis ſis. *Marc. Antonin. de ſeipſo lib.* 8 *Sect.* 33. *in codice Gatakeriano.*

with

with vain ſorrow and fruitleſs Diſcontent; but to take it quietly and contentedly, that Fortune hath redemanded what ſhe did not give, but only lend him.

VII.

Certainly, to thoſe, who account it an Evil to be deprived of theſe External Goods, it cannot but prove of grievous conſequence, that Premeditation ſhould encreaſe thoſe Evils which it might very much have diminiſhed at leaſt, if not wholly prevented. For by this they come to be diſcontented not only at preſent infortunes, but alſo at ſuch as they apprehend are likely to befall them, but perhaps may never befall them: and ſo every Evil is troubleſom, not only when it comes, but when it is only expected, though it never comes. Doubtleſs, it is moſt vain and fooliſh in a man, to run into a voluntary miſery; and he that doth ſo, ſhall always be Diſcontented, either by receiving, or thinking of Evil: for, whoſo always thinks, that ſome Evil or Adverſity may befall him; this very thought doth prove an Eternal Evil to him.

VIII.

And, as for the Wiſe man, in caſe it happen, that by being long accuſtomed to the poſ-

poſſeſſion and uſe of the Goods of Fortune, he hath not totally expunged out of his mind that Opinion, that they are real Goods, and wholly his own; and ſo ſome little of Fortune intervene, and give him a blow, that may put him to ſome ſmall Regret and Diſcontent: in this caſe, he is for the Alleviation of that his Diſcontent, to have recourſe to thoſe two things formerly preſcribed by us, as the moſt potent remedies for the mitigation of Pain in the body; *viz.* Avocation of his thoughts from his loſs and the Cauſes of it; and Revocation of them to thoſe things, which he knows to be Grateful and Pleaſant to his Mind.

IX.

For, the Mind of a Wiſe man is inſtructed to conform to the Laws of Reaſon, and preciſely follow the conduct thereof; and Reaſon forbids him to fix his cogitations upon thoſe things, which may advance and foment his diſcontent, and by that means helps him to abſtract his thoughts from all regret, & convert them upon Goods either to come, or formerly enjoyed, and eſpecially ſuch as he hath frequently found to be delightful.

X. And,

X.

And, what though ſad and importune thoughts are apt frequently to recur; yet is he ſtill to inſiſt upon that Avocation and Revocation of his Mind: becauſe the mind, by continual Diverſion to other objects, is brought by little and little to wear out and deface the Characters of ſorrow imprinted upon it by a misfortune; nor, indeed, doth Time conduce to the cure of Diſcontent, by any other way, but only by exhibiting various occaſions of divertiſement, by which the mind being by degrees taken off from the Cauſe of its trouble, is brought at length to almoſt an abſolute forgetfulneſs thereof.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Justice in General.

THus far of that part of Honesty, which concerns Ones self: we are now come to the other, that relates also to others, and belongs to a man as living in a Civil Society; and that is *Justice*. For, most certain it is, that Justice is as it were the common Tye, or Ligament, which holds men together in peace, and without which no Society can subsist: insomuch as it is *a Virtue, which gives to every one his Due, and provides that Injury be done to none.*

II.

What we have formerly said, of the Foundation and Benefits of the other Virtues, hitherto handled; doth exactly correspond also to this Virtue: for as we have taught, that Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude are inseparably conjoyned to Pleasure; so may we affirm the very same of Justice, which doth not only never cause Harm to any man, but on the contrary, always preserve and nourish something, that

that may calm and quiet the minds of men; and this as well by its own and Natures power, as by a constant Hope, that none shall ever want any of those things; which pure and depraved Nature can desire.

III.

And, as Temerity, Lust, and Cowardise do always excruciate the mind, and stir up troubles: so is it impossible, that a mind, which lodgeth Injustice, should at any time be quiet and at peace either with it self, or others; because though such a mind should attempt any unjust action, with the greatest secrecy imaginable; yet can it not perswade it self, that the Injustice thereof shall never be brought to light. And though some may think themselves so great, as to be walled in and fortified against all revenge of their Injustice, by their Riches, Honours, Powers, *&c.* yet do they still lye open to the revenge of an Evil Conscience, which whispers them in the ear, every moment, that all those sollicitudes and perturbations, wherewith their minds are unceſſantly tormented, are inflicted upon them, by the Immortal Gods, by way of punishment for their improbity.

IV. There

IV.

There is no man can propose to himself a Diminution of the troubles of life, by any unjust way; but he must be sure to find them to be highly Encreased and Aggravated by the remorse of Conscience, the penalties of the Laws, and the Odium of all his fellow-Citizens. And yet notwithstanding there are Millions of men, who never think they have enough of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Lusts, of Riotings, and the like exorbitant Cupidities; which no wealth unjustly gotten can diminish, but doth rather encrease and enflame: so that such men seem fitter to be Restrained by severe Laws, than to be instructed by the mild precepts of Reason.

V.

All sound and judicious men, therefore, are by Right Reason invited to Justice Equity, Faith; and as for Impotent persons, and such as in their Non-age, neither can unjust actions any way avail them, who can neither easily effect, what they endeavour, nor obtain their Ends, when they have effected it: and Riches are more convenient to Fortune, or Liberality of ingeny; which whoever use, thereby procure

ure to themſelves the Reſpect and Good-will of others, and (what is moſt conducible to quiet living) render themſelves Dear and Beloved; eſpecially when there is no cauſe of offending.

VI.

For, thoſe Deſires that ariſe from ſimple Nature are eaſily ſatisfied: and all others, that are derived from vain Opinions, are not to be obeyed, but ſuppreſſed; becauſe they incite us to the fruition of nothing that is truly Deſiderable, and always there is more of Detriment accruing from the injury it ſelf, than there is of Emolument or advantage from thoſe things that are gotten by that injury.

VII.

Nevertheleſs, no man can ſay rightly, that Juſtice is a Virtue to be wiſhed for, embraced, and purſued, immediately for it ſelf; but mediately, or for the great pleaſure it brings with it. For, to be beloved by, and to be Dear to others is very Pleaſant; why? only becauſe it conduceth to the greater Safety, Peace, and Pleaſure of a mans life. This conſidered, we infer, that Improbity is to be avoided, not only in reſpect of thoſe many and great external Incom-

Incommodities, which happen to Unjuſt perſons; but alſo, and much more, in reſpect of thoſe internal Diſquiets and Perplexities of mind, which it always cauſeth.

VIII.

Now, though theſe Conſiderations ſeem ſufficient to the Endearment of this excellent Virtue, Juſtice; yet we are concerned to enlarge our Diſcourſe, partly touching *Right*, or what is Juſt, that ſo we may come the better to underſtand the *Original* of Juſtice, among *whom* it is to be practiſed, and with what *Advantages*: and partly touching ſome *other Virtues*, that are nearly allied to Juſtice, as *Beneficence*, *Gratitude*, *Piety*, *Obſervance*, and *Friendſhip*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Right, or Juſt; from whence Juſtice is named.

IN the firſt place, therefore, foraſmuch as it is evident, that *Juſtice* is denominated from hence, that the *Right* of another man is conſerved, or that what is *Right* or *Juſt*, is performed: it is worth our knowing what that is, which ought to be accounted Right or Juſt.

II.

Since Juſtice was excogitated and inſtituted in order to the Common Good; neceſſary it is, that that Right or Juſt, to which Juſtice hath reſpect, ſhould be ſuch a certain Good, as may be in *Common* to all and every ſingle member of the Society. And, becauſe every one, by the direction of Nature, deſires what is Good for Himſelf: it is alſo neceſſary, that what is Right, or Juſt, be ſomething of Natures own inſtitution, and ſo may be called *Natural.*

III.

Nor is it for nothing that we touch upon this particular; becauſe it ſometimes comes to paſs, that in a Society that may be preſcribed for Right and Juſt, which is not re-

ally Good for the Society: and ſo being not Natural, or according to the dictates of Nature, it cannot, but by abuſe, be reputed Right or Juſt; ſince that, which hath the true reaſon of Right or Juſt Natural, is ſuch, as that it is not only preſcribed as Profitable and Good, but is alſo Really ſo.

IV.

To ſpeak plainly and properly, therefore; Right or Juſt Natural, is nothing elſe but *Teſſera Utilitatis*, the Symbol of Utility, propoſed and agreed upon by the concurrent votes of all in the Society, to the end, that they may be kept from mutually harming each other, and that each one may live ſecurely; which as it is a Good, ſo doth every man, by the direction of Nature, deſire it.

V.

Here we take Profitable and Good, for the ſame thing; and judge that there are two Reaſons, that require the preſervation of Right: the one, that it may be *Profitable*, or reſpect the Common Utility, *i. e.* the Common Security; the other, that it be *Preſcribed* by the Common Conſent of the Society, for nothing is compleatly Juſt, but what the Society hath, by common Conſent, or

or common Pact, decreed to be observed and kept inviolate.

VI.

And hence is it, that the name of Right or Just is usually given to each of these Two; since not only what is profitable is said to be Just, but also the very Paction, or Agreement, or Prescription of the Society; which is also called Law, as being that, which expressly prescribes to every one what is Profitable or Just.

VII.

Some there are, we know, who conceive and affirm, that all things, that can be said to be Just, are so of their own proper and invariate Nature; and that Laws do not make them to be just, but only declare and prescribe them to be so, in respect of their own Nature: but truly the matter is far otherwise, the case in this point being as in most other things that are Useful and Profitable, as in those which concern Health, and many others of the like nature; of which some may be beneficial to one man, and hurtful to another, and so being oftentimes misapplyed, they fail of the end proposed, as well in common, as in private.

VIII.

And, certainly, since every thing is every

where, always, and by all men, deprehended to be ſuch, as really it is in its own Nature; becauſe that Nature is invariate: we may juſtly demand of the Authours of that opinion, whether or no ſuch things as are accounted juſt at ſometimes, in ſome places, by ſome men, are ſo at all times, in all places, and to all men? Ought not ſuch to have obſerved, that many of thoſe things, that are conſtituted by Laws, and ſo accounted Lawful and Juſt; are not ſo conſtituted, nor accounted among all Nations; but are partly neglected as things Indifferent, by many; and partly rejected as Hurtful, and condemned as abſolutely Unjuſt, by as many others? And are there not ſome, who accept ſome things as Univerſally Profitable, which really are rather univerſally Deſtructive; and accordingly embrace and enact them to be Univerſally Accommodate, in caſe they judge them to be Accommodate, and to promiſe ſome General Emolument to that particular Society, in which they live?

IX.

This duly conſidered, the moſt that can be ſaid, in favour of that Opinion, is only this; that that is Univerſally Juſt, which is Profitable, or conform to the Notion of Right or Juſt, even now deſcribed: for, in ſpecial, indeed, as Utility is varied among vari-

various Nations, ſo alſo is Right or Juſt; ſo as what may be accounted and really is Juſt in reſpect of one Nation, may be Unjuſt in reſpect of another. And, therefore, if it be demanded, *Whether or no the ſame thing be Right or Juſt among all men?* our anſwer muſt be, that as to the General, it is the ſame, as being ſomewhat that is profitable in mutual Society; but as to particulars, it may come not to be the ſame among all men, particular Countries, and particular Cauſes in ſeveral Nations conſidered.

X.

And (that we may deduce a few obſervations from hence) whatever is by Experience found to be Profitable to mutual Society, or the Common participation of ſuch things, as are reputed Juſt; that, certainly, hath truly and fully the nature of Juſt, in caſe it be ſuch, as that the Utility thereof may be extended to all: but, if any man ſhall determine and eſtabliſh ſuch a thing for Juſt, and the ſame ſhall notwithſtanding happen not to be Profitable to mutual Society; in that caſe, it doth not fullfil the nature of Juſt. XI.

Again, and though the Utility of that, which was accounted Juſt, and ſo embraced, doth ſometimes fail; yet nevertheleſs, if there be ſome Utility therein ſometimes,

ſo that it reſpond to the Notion, which we have given of what is Juſt; it is truly Juſt, for that time: eſpecially with thoſe, who do not confound themſelves with vain loquacity, and look into Humane Affairs with the eye of more General obſervation.

XII.

Finally, where, no new Circumſtance of Affairs intervening, thoſe very things, that were accounted and decreed to be Juſt, concerning the actions of men, are found by experience, not to be fully correſpondent or congruous to the Notion of Juſt: there are they in no ſort juſt. But, where, upon the innovation or change of affairs, thoſe things, which were formerly decreed to be juſt, have ceaſed to be Profitable: there alſo do they ceaſe to be juſt; becauſe, when they ceaſe to be Profitable to mutual Society, they at the ſame time ceaſe to be congruous to the Notion of Juſt.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the Original of Right and Juſtice.

BUt, that we may go much higher, and derive Right or Juſt from its firſt Fountain or *Original*; it appears that Right and Juſtice are as antient as Societies of men.

II.

For, in the Beginning or firſt age of the World, men lived wandering up and down, like wild Beaſts, and ſuffered many incommodities both from the fury of Wild Beaſts, and the inclemency of the Aër; till, Reaſon adviſing them thereunto, they convened and conjoined themſelves in certain Companies or Societies, that ſo they might the better provide againſt thoſe incommodities, by Building themſelves Huts or Cottages, and furniſhing themſelves with other Defenſatives againſt the fury of Wild Beaſts, and againſt the injuries of weather. But, in this ſtate every one being deſirous to have his particular condition better than another, and ſtriving to make it ſo; there aroſe various Contentions and Claſhings among them, about Food, Women, and other Commodities, which the ſtronger always

took from the weaker: until at length they found, that they could not live ſecure and commodiouſly together; unleſs they made a Common Agreement, and entred into mutual obligations not to do Harm or Injury each to other; and that in caſe any one did harm or injure another, the reſt would puniſh him for it accordingly.

III.

And this was the firſt Tye, or Bond of Society; which, as it ſuppoſed, that every one might have ſomething peculiar and proper to himſelf, or that might be called his own, as being his either by primire uſurpation, or by gift, or by purchaſe, or by invention, or by acquiſition of his own induſtry, or otherwiſe: ſo did it provide, decree and enact, that the ſame ſhould continue entirely his Own, till he ſhould willingly and freely alienate his propriety therein, by diſpoſing of it to another. And this Bond, or General Paction among them, was nothing elſe but a Common Law, which all were equally bound to obſerve, and which did confirm to every man a certain Right or Faculty of Uſing and Diſpoſing of whatever was his own, according as himſelf thought meet. Whereupon that very Law alſo came to be (as we formerly intimated) as it were the Common Right of the Society.

IV. We

IV.

We need not commemorate, how the whole Society, by Common Consent, transferred their Power of Coercing or Punishing Delinquents, upon some few Wise and Good men; or upon One single person, who had the reputation of being the Wisest and best among them all. That which will be more pertinent and useful for us to observe, is this; that in a Society those only were accounted Just, or Favourers and Maintainers of Justice, who being content with their own Rights, did not invade the Rights of any other man, and so did injury to none: and those Unjust, or Doers of Injustice, who being not content with their own Rights, did fly out and invade those of others; and so doing them harm either by rapine, or personal violence, or some other way, were the Authours of an Injury.

V.

And thus, truly, for some time, men lived Peaceably and Happily, and especially under either many Wise and Good Governours, or one only Wise and Good Prince or King; who being wholly intent upon the conservation of the publick Utility, made, and by the Consent of the People, established divers Laws, by which they might either prevent Dissentions among the People,

or

or compose them, if any did arise. But, (such was the Corruption of mens manners) in process of time; it came to pass, that the Government delapsed into the hands of Princes, or Kings that were not Good, but Vicious and Tyrannical: and they being either Deposed, or killed, the whole returned again upon the People, who instantly destroying each other, by reason of Tumults and the Factions of those who affected superiority and aspired to Empire; and being at length weary of living by force and hostility, and exhausted by Enmities and Dissentions, they became willing again to submit to the Government of Magistrates, Princes, or Kings. But, having by sad experience found, that the Wills and mandates of Princes had formerly passed for absolute Laws; the People enter into certain Compacts, or Covenants with their Governours, about those Laws, according to which they desired to be Governed: and thus they again brought themselves under Laws, *i. e.* under strict Rights.

VI.

But, not to descend to Latter times; and that we may touch upon only that Chief Head, which regards the preservation of mans *Life*, (as the Dearest of things) whereof special Care was had from the beginning, that

that every mans ſecurity might be eſtabliſhed by Common Pactions and Laws: it appears that thoſe moſt Wiſe and Good Founders of Laws, fixing their eye of Providence upon the Society of life, and thoſe things, which men uſually do each to other; did not only declare that it was a wicked act and hainous Crime, to kill a man, but alſo decree that the Murderer ſhould be puniſhed with more than common Ignominy, and the loſs of his Head. And to this they ſeem to have been induced, partly by conſidering the Conciliation of men among themſelves (of which we hinted ſomewhat even now) in reſpect whereof men ought not to be as forward to deſtroy an Animal of the ſame ſpecies with themſelves, as to deſtroy one of another ſpecies, over whoſe life they have a power granted them by Nature: and partly by the conſideration of this, that men ought to abhor that, from which no emolument or advantage toward the quiet and happy ſpending of their days can accrue, but on the contrary, muſt be wholly deſtructive thereunto.

VII.

For, indeed, from the Beginning, to thoſe, who fully underſtood and attended to the Utility of that Conſtitution; there was no need of any other Cauſe or Reſpect, to make

make them contain themſelves from doing any act toward the Violation thereof: but, as for thoſe, who could not ſufficiently comprehend of what high moment or Concern that Cauſe, the common Utility, was; theſe abſteined from committing mutual ſlaughters, only upon the account of Fear of thoſe ſharp Puniſhments, which the Laws, in that caſe made, threaten to inflict upon thoſe who break them. And this we may obſerve to be frequently Exemplified even in our own days. And, truly, whoſo well conſider, how great the Utility of ſuch a Conſtitution is; they are ſufficiently inſtructed and comparated to the conſtant obſervance thereof, without any other ſiniſter reſpect: but, ſuch as are not capable of underſtanding that grand and fundamental reſpect, the Utility of it, do conform themſelves thereunto only out of Fear of thoſe Puniſhments, that the Laws threaten them, and which were, by the more prudent ſort of men, invented and made againſt ſuch, as had no regard to the Utility of the Conſtitution, the Major part of the multitude admitting them as Legitimate.

VIII.

For, at firſt, no one of thoſe Laws, which have been either in Writing, or by Tradition, derived to us, and are to deſcend down

to

to our posterity, did subsist or depend upon any Force or Violence whatsoever; but (as we touch't before) upon the meer Consent of the People that used it. For, it was not by strength of Body, or imperious sway, but only Prudence of mind, whereby those transcended the Vulgar, who proposed those Laws to the suffrage of the People; and this by inducing some men to consider what would be profitable (especially, when they did not before so well understand it, as they ought) and by terrifying others meerly with the greatness of the punishments annexed. Nor could they, indeed, make use of any other remedy for the Cure of the peoples ignorance of the Utility of those Laws, than that of their own Fear of the Punishments prescribed by the Laws: because even in our days, it is Fear alone which contains Vulgar men within the bounds of their duty, and hinders them from committing any thing against either the publick or private Commodity.

IX.

And, assuredly, if all men could equally both understand, and bear in mind, what is truly Profitable; they would need no Laws at all, but would of their own accord beware of doing such things, as the Laws forbid, and do such as the Laws prescribe and

and injoin: ſince, only to know what is profitable, and what hurtful, would be more than ſufficient to induce them to avoid this, and purſue that. But, as for thoſe, who do not diſcern what is Beneficial, what Hurtful; doubtleſs, the Commination of Puniſhments againſt them, is highly neceſſary: inſomuch as the very Fear of the Puniſhment impendent doth cauſe them to ſuppreſs and bridle thoſe heats of their paſſions, which inſtigate them to unjuſt actions; and in a manner compel them, though againſt their Wills, to do what is right and conſentaneous to Reaſon.

X.

Hereupon was it, that the Antient Lawmakers ordained, that even the Involuntary and meerly Caſual ſlaughter of a man, ſhould not be free from all Mulct, or puniſhment. Not that they might not, to ſuch as affected Voluntary man-ſlaughter, give any occaſion of pretext or excuſe for what they ſhould do of ſet purpoſe in that kind: but that they might not ſeem not to have uſed ſufficient Caution and Diligence, as to that Difficult particular. Nor could this courſe but prove Beneficial, for the ſame Cauſes, for which men were expreſly prohibited to kill each other. So that conſidering, that of thoſe actions of this kind that are done involun-

involuntarily, ſome happen to Humane Nature from Cauſes that could not be foreſeen, nor any ways prevented; and others again happen meerly through our Negligence, want of circumſpection, and incogitancy of the danger imminent: therefore, that they might, as much as poſſible, prevent our negligence and heedfulneſs, that may conduce to the deſtruction of our Neighbours; they provided, that even an involuntary ſlaughter of a man ſhould not paſs altogether unpuniſhed, and by the very fear of that puniſhment or Mulct, making men more heedful and circumſpect, they moſt happily diminiſhed the Frequency of this Crime of Homicide.

XI.

Nay, we farther conceive, that even thoſe ſlaughters of men which were permitted by the Law, were made lyable to thoſe accuſtomed Expiations by publick Luſtrations, for no other cauſe but only this; that thoſe, who firſt introduced the uſe of thoſe ſolemn Expiations of Humane blood, had it in their thoughts, to deter men from involuntary ſlaughter, which was too too frequent.

XII.

For the Vulgar ſort of men ſtood in need of ſomething to reſtrain even their Heedleſsneſs, that ſo they might be kept from doing

ing, out of raſhneſs, any action, that ſhould not conduce to the Publick Utility, or Security which the Antient Sages and firſt Lawmakers well underſtanding, did not only decree ſevere Puniſhments, but ſtrook alſo a certain grievous Fear into their Minds, the Reaſon of which was not equally manifeſt to common heads, with that of the puniſhments expreſſed: and this chiefly by declaring, that ſuch, who had killed a man, by what means or Accident ſoever, ſhould remain Impure and Polluted, till they had purged themſelves of that blood by ſolemn Luſtrations.

XIII.

For, the Brutal part of the Soul, or that wherein the Affections and Paſſions have their reſidence, being by wholſom Laws as it were new moulded and framed, came at length to that Manſuetude and Gentleneſs, which now adays ſo much flouriſheth in the World: thoſe Arts of Taming and Civilizing mens minds, which were from the beginning invented and practiſed by thoſe Sages, who firſt ruled the raſh multitude, being applyed as Soveraign and effectual Remedies againſt the violence of their Wild and furious Affections; of which this is one chief act among the reſt, that men ſhould not indiſcriminately deſtroy each other.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Between whom Right and Juſtice is to be exerciſed.

THe premiſes conſidered, it may with good reaſon be enquired of us, *between whom aſwell Right and the violation of it, which is Injury, as Juſtice and what is oppoſed unto it, Injuſtice, doth properly conſiſt, or is to be found?* and therefore we are to ſtate and explicate the matter, by a compariſon betwixt Men and other Animals.

II.

As therefore, there is no Reaſon of Right or Injury, or Juſt and Unjuſt, betwixt Animals that could not make a common Agreement, not to hurt, nor be hurt by mutual invaſion: ſo neither is there between thoſe Nations which either would not, or could not enter into a Common Pact and reciprocal Engagement, not to hurt each other, or to ſuffer hurt each from other.

Omnia, quæ in hoc capite tradita invenies, verbatim deſumpta fuerunt, ex *Porphyrii libro* [περὶ Ἀποχῆς] *de Abſtinentia primo.*

III.

For, Juſt or Right, the conſervation whereof is Juſtice, hath no being at all, but in mutual Society, and ſo Juſtice is a Good of a Society, inſomuch as the effect of it is, that every ſingle perſon of the Society may live in ſecurity, and void of that anxiety, which the continual Fear of harm doth create. Whence it evidently follows that whatever Animals, or whatever men either cannot or will not make an Aſſociation among themſelves, upon the condition of mutual ſafety, muſt want that Good, or be reciprocally obliged by no bond of Right or Juſtice, in order to their living ſecurely: and ſo to them there can remain no other Reaſon of ſecurity, but only this, to do harm to others, that they be not harmed themſelves.

IV.

As, therefore, when one of thoſe Brute Animals, among which there hath paſt no ſuch Agreement or Pact, doth hurt another; though it may be ſaid that he doth harm or hurt to the other, yet it cannot be ſaid, that he doth an Injury to the other, becauſe he was not bound by any Right, Compact, or Law, not to hurt him: exactly ſo, if one man of that Nation, among which is no Paction or Society, doth hurt another man; though

though it may be ſaid, that he doth hurt him, yet not that he is Injurious to him; or doth him an Injury, becauſe he was not obliged by any Compact or Law, not to hurt him.

V.

We here ſpeak of Brute Animals, not as if there were any even of thoſe, who live in Herds or Companies, that are capable of entring into Agreements or Pacts not to harm each other; and ſo might be conceived to be Juſt, if they do not hurt each other, and Unjuſt, if they do: but only to the end, that from thence it may be the better underſtood, that even among Men Juſtice of it ſelf is nothing, inſomuch as it is found only in the mutual Societies, according to the amplitude of every Country, in which the Inhabitants may conveniently enter into Agreements and Covenants of doing nor receiving any hurt; ſince otherwiſe, and in a man conſidered as Solitary, or out of all Society, there can be no Juſtice at all; and what is Juſtice in one Society of men, may be, and frequently is, in reſpect of Contrary Pactions and Covenants, downright injuſtice in another.

VI.

But *can Juſtice intervene betwixt Men and any other Animals?* Certainly, *not.* For, if men could make a Covenant with Brute Animals, as they can with other men, that they ſhould not Kill, nor be indiſcreetly Killed by them; then, indeed, might the Reaſon of Juſt or Right be founded betwixt them and us, inſomuch as the end of that covenant would be the Security of both Parties: but, becauſe it is impoſſible, that Animals void of Reaſon ſhould be obliged by a Law common betwixt them and us, who are endowed with Reaſon; it muſt alſo be impoſſible for us to obtain more aſſurance of Security from Animals, than from things Inanimate; ſo that there is no other way for us to ſecure our ſelves from Brutes, but only to execute that power of Deſtroying them, which Nature hath given us.

VII.

And here, perhaps you'l aſk us, by the way; *Why is it that we uſually Kill even ſuch Animals, as are weak and innoxious, and ſo ought not to be feared?* Whereto we anſwer, that moſt men deſtroy ſuch Animals, out of Intemperance and a certain Savageneſs or Cruelty in their nature; as many do, out of Immanity or Cruelty, commit outrages alſo upon men living out of their Society, though

though there be no reaſon why they ſhould fear any harm from them. But, ſtill it is one thing to offend againſt the rules of *Temperance*, or any of its ſubordinate Virtues, as Sobriety, Lenity or Manſuetude, or (if you pleaſe) meer Humanity, or Goodneſs of Nature: and another thing to violate *Juſtice*, which preſuppoſeth certain Laws and Pacts eſtabliſhed by mutual Conſent and Obligation.

VIII.

Nor can it be truly ſaid (what ſome affirm) that we have a power granted to us by Law, to deſtroy any ſuch Animals, as can be no way offenſive or deſtructive to Mankind: though, to ſpeak freely, there is ſcarce any kind of Living Creatures, among all thoſe, which we have a power granted us to deſtroy, but, being permitted to encreaſe to infinite multitudes, would prove pernicious to Mankind; however, being preſerved alive in Competent numbers, they are many ways very uſeful to our lives.

IX.

This may be exemplified in ſheep, Kine and Bulls, Horſes, *&c.* which being kept alive in a Competent number, afford as ma-

ny neceſſaries for life; but, if they were let alone to multiply to exceſſive numbers, certainly they could not but prove very hurtful, if not altogether deſtructive to us; and this partly in reſpect of their ſtrength, partly in reſpect of their Conſuming or Devouring the fruits of the Earth, that ſhould ſerve for our ſubſiſtence; And, for this very cauſe is it, that we are not prohibited to deſtroy ſuch Animals: and reaſon adviſeth us to preſerve ſo many of them alive, as may be both uſeful to us, and eaſily ruled by us.

X.

For, as to Lions, Bears, Wolves, and other Beaſts called Wild (whether little or great) we cannot take ſuch a certain number of them, as being preſerved may afford us any neceſſary relief, or be of uſe to us in our lives; as we may of Kine, Sheep, Horſes, and the reſt that are called Tame and Gentle Animals: and thence is it, that we endeavour wholly to exterminate and deſtroy thoſe; and of theſe to cut off only ſo many, as are over and above a competent ſtock.

XI.

Hereupon (that we may highly touch upon that alſo) we may conceive, that even among

among thoſe Nations, who make their choice of certain ſorts of Animals for their food, the matter was determined and preſcribed by certain Laws, grounded upon Reaſons correſpondent to thoſe, we have now given: and as for thoſe Animals, that were not to be eaten; there was reſpect had to their Utility, and Inutility in other reſpects, and for ſome reaſon peculiar to each Country; to the Conſtitutions whereof there is no neceſſity for us to adhere, who live not in any of thoſe places.

XII.

Now from theſe Conſiderations we come to underſtand, that from the very Beginning a Difference was put betwixt the Killing of Men and the Killing of all other Animals. For, as to other Animals, it is manifeſt, that no one of thoſe antient Sages, who have expreſly preſcribed what we ſhould, and what we ſhould not do, did forbid us to kill them: becauſe that Utility, which is perceived in reſpect of them, aroſe from a cuſtom of acting, contrary to that, which we have mentioned concerning men; nor could it be, that men, living promiſcuouſly among Beaſts, could preſerve themſelves in ſafety otherwiſe than by expelling, or deſtroying them.

XIII.

But, as concerning Mankind; when among thoſe, who lived in the days of old, there were ſome more Comely and Graceful than the reſt (and likely enough it is that ſuch were the Firſt Perſwaders of men to enter into Pact, for the Common ſafety) who remembring how they had ſometimes abſtained from ſlaughter, in reſpect of that Utility, which concerned their ſafety; had alſo, when they were congregated into one Company, put others in mind of what had then hapned, when they lived promiſcuouſly; that by abſtaining from the ſlaughter of an Animal of their own ſpecies, they might defend the Society of life, which is Generally the cauſe of his proper ſafety, to every ſingle perſon, and that it had been formerly profitable to go apart from the Society of other Animals, or men flocking together, that ſo they might not provoke or incenſe them, that were ready enough of themſelves to do harm: Hereupon, we ſay, men came to reſtrain themſelves from laying hands upon an Animal of their own ſpecies, that came and offered himſelf into the Communion of things neceſſary to ſafety of life.

XIV. But,

XIV.

But, in proceſs of time, their Progenies multiplying on each part, and Animals of different ſpecies being depulſed and kept apart; men began to make uſe of their Reaſon (whereas before that time, they had truſted altogether to Memory) and to enter into Conſultation, about what was to be done in order to their ſafety, when they ſhould come together and conjoyn their habitations. For, they mainly endeavoured to coeree thoſe, who raſhly and impudently cut each others throats, and thereby made the mutual aſſiſtance, that men were able to afford each other, daily the weaker; and this, chiefly becauſe thoſe great incommodities which had frequently fallen upon their Predeceſſors, in the like caſes, were utterly forgotten. And earneſtly ſtriving to bring matters to that good paſs, they at length made and introduced thoſe very Laws and Conſtitutions, which continue in all Cities and Nations even to this very day: the multitude of their own accord conſenting to them; foraſmuch as the Major part were already very ſenſible, how much greater Utility would from thence accrue unto them living in mutual Society. In like manner, it conduceth alſo to common ſecurity, as to deſtroy whatever is per-

pernicious: ſo alſo to preſerve whatever is uſeful to the extermination of what is pernicious.

XV.

And thus is it profitable; that upon theſe conſiderations, the ſlaughter of all other Animals came to be permitted, and that of *Men*, expreſly prohibited, by the Law: but we have ſtay'd too long upon this argument.

CHAP. XXIX.

With what right Juſtice is to be exerciſed.

IT being certain, then, that Juſtice is founded upon the mutual agreement, and Common Paction of men living in Society; it remains that every man, whether Native, or Stranger admitted, ought, from the time he hath given up his name to a Society, to account himſelf to be a Member of that Society, upon this Condition, either expreſly, or tacitly, that he hurt none of his Fellow Members, nor be hurt by any other. Wherefore, let him either ſtand to this Condition of the Common Paction; or depart out of the Society: becauſe he is not to be tolerated to live in the Society, upon any other

other Condition, but the very ſame, upon which he was incorporated into it. Whereupon it neceſſarily follows, that ſince, by Nature, no man is willing either to receive harm from, or to do harm to another: therefore ought no man to do that to another, which he would not another ſhould do to him. II.

This conſidered, it may well be thought, that the Laws of all Societies were made principally, if not ſolely for the ſake of Wiſe men; though not that Wiſe men ſhould not do unjuſtly by others: but that others ſhould not do unjuſtly by them; who are ſo well prepared and diſpoſed of themſelves, as to need no Laws to reſtrain them from doing harm to any man. For, they have preſcribed bounds to their Cupidities, and compoſed their Deſires to the ſimple rules of Nature, which requires nothing that cannot be obtained but by ways of injuſtice: nor indeed, is there any of Natures Pleaſures, that doth induce a man to do injury to another; but that which doth induce him thereunto, muſt be ſome ſuch exorbitant Cupidity, as is created by vain and unbridled Opinion. III.

For, Nature having (for Example) in abundance produced Herbs, Corn, Fruits, for

for food competent and useful, and Water for Drink pleasant and wholsom; it cannot be the pleasure of satisfying pure Hunger and Thirst, that should cause a man to rob, spoil, defraud, or murder his Neighbour, or do any of those Injuries to others, which men usually do: but it must be the vain desire of living more opulently, splendidly and wantonly, that so he may acquire wealth enough to discharge the expences of his Luxury. The same may be said also of those, who not being content with simple Cloaths, simple Houses, simple Wives, *&c.* and carried away by Ambition, Pride, Lust, and the like enormous passions, desire infinitely more than what sober and temperate Nature either wants or knows how to use.

IV.

Furthermore, seeing that the Wise man doth all things for his own sake, or with reflection upon himself; nothing, certainly can more conduce to his own advantage, than strictly to celebrate, and constantly uphold Justice. For, in giving to every one his due, and harming no man; he, to the most of his power, doth keep the Society whole and sound, and consequently preserve himself in peace and safety: forasmuch as he cannot be safe, when the peace of the Society is disturbed and endangered, nor doth he

he provoke any man to avenge an injury ſuffered at his hands, or fear any Mulct or puniſhment to be inflicted upon him by publick decree; and ſo, being Conſcious to himſelf of no Evil by him done, he remains free from all Perturbations; from which to be free, is the chiefeſt of all the fruits of Juſtice, and while he reaps that, what can he do, that ſhould more conduce to his own advantage.

V.

Nor is there why you ſhould conceive, that he, who violates the Right of another, though ſecretly and without the knowledge of any man, can live in the ſame ſecurity and freedom from Perturbation, as the Juſt man doth, becauſe (as we ſaid afore) he cannot aſſure himſelf, that his Injuſtice ſhall never be brought to light; for, *Crimes, though they may be ſecret, yet can they never be ſecure; nor doth it avail an Offendor, to be concealed from others, while he can never be concealed from himſelf.*

VI.

And, truly, though his offence be never ſo much concealed in the preſent; yet is it very uncertain, whether or no it will remain ſo concealed till his death. For, firſt, there is a Kind of Jealouſie and Suſpition that always follows cloſe at the heels of Improbity:

probity: and again, there have been many, who have detected themſelves, ſome in dreams, others in fits of Deliriums in Fevers, others in their Wine, others out of forgetfulneſs for the time. So that a wicked man, though he may for a time deceive even the Gods and men (as they ſay) yet ought he not to be confident, that his Deceits ſhall always continue undiſcovered.

VII.

Upon theſe grounds, it is manifeſt, that notwithſtanding Injuſtice be not Evil abſolutely, or in it ſelf, becauſe, what is reputed Injuſt in one place, may be very Juſt, and Legal in another: yet nevertheleſs it is always an evil in reſpect of that fear which ariſing from, and fomented by the horrour and ſtings of an evil Conſcience, createth a continual ſuſpect in him, that ſome time or other his unjuſt deeds may come to the ears of the Avengers of Injuſtice, and ſo he be called to a ſevere account for them. And ſo *there is nothing that more conduceth, as to ſecurity, ſo likewiſe to a quiet and pleaſant life, than to live Innocently, i. e.* upon no occaſion to violate the Common Covenant of Peace.

VIII.

Wherefore, ſince the Juſt and Unjuſt have this Contrariety between them; that the Juſt

Juſt of all men are moſt free from Perturbations, and the Unjuſt, of all men, moſt obnoxious to Perturbations: what can be more profitable than Juſtice to thoſe; what more hurtful than Injuſtice to theſe? For, can Anguiſh of mind, Sollicitudes, and continual Fears be profitable to any man?

IX.

Juſtice, therefore, being ſo great a Good, and Injuſtice ſo great an Evil; let us always embrace the one, and abhor the other. And if at any time our mind ſeem to ſtagger, and incline toward Injuſtice; let us think upon ſome Grave, Wiſe, and Good man, and ſuppoſing him to be always preſent with us, and overlooking all our actions: that ſo we may do nothing, which we would not do, if he were really preſent.

In ſcriptis Epicureis præcipitur, ut in mente ac memoria ſemper habeamus Antiquorum aliquem eorum, qui Virtutem coluerint. *Marc. Antonin. lib. de Seipſo 12. Sect. 26.*

X.

Hereby we ſhall not only avoid the doing of any thing openly againſt Juſtice, but alſo of offending in ſecret againſt the rules and principles of Honeſty. For, this Wiſe and Good man will be to us inſtead of a Guardian or Tutor, whom becauſe we revere, we ſhall be afraid to offend. Following

lowing this Counſel therefore, thus argue with your ſelf; if this Reverend Perſon were preſent, I would not do this: why therefore ſhall I do it in his abſence? He doubtleſs, would check me for doing this, becauſe it is Unjuſt: why therefore ſhall I not check my ſelf, and not do it? And if you do all things ſo, as if ſome Reverend Perſon ſaw all you did; you ſhall ſoon learn to do nothing amiſs: for, if you ſo fear another man, you will quickly come to fear your ſelf.

Conſonum plane monito illi Pythagorico, in aureis carmi.--πάντων ϑ μάλις' αἰχύνεο σεαυτὸν. Tu plus quam cunctos alios te diſce revereri.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Obſervance.

HAving done with the conſideration of Juſtice, we come to thoſe Virtues that are Couſin-Germans thereunto, as we formerly intimated; in that each of them alſo doth concern others directly, and our ſelves but by reflection: and though they be not, as Juſtice is, preſcribed by Laws and Covenants; yet do they import a certain obligation

ligation like that of Juſtice, and that from Decorum, Office and Uſe.

II.

Of theſe, the firſt is *Beneficence*, or the doing of Good turns to others; to which all are obliged, who are able either by their aſſiſtance, or purſe, to help ſuch as ſtand in need of their help. Foraſmuch as if they refuſe to afford the needy their aſſiſtance, then do they inevitably incur the cenſure of being Barbarous, Cruel, Inhumane: and if to relieve their wants with their purſe, then cannot they eſcape the opprobrious terms of Sordid, Tenacious, Avaricious perſons. Whereas, on the contrary, if they aſſiſt them in one kind; then ſhall they be reputed Benign, Officious, Good natur'd: and if they relieve them in the other, preſently they are cryed up for Liberal, Munificent, Magnificent, and Noble-minded perſons. So that hence it appears, that all men, who are able, in reſpect either of Power or Eſtate, to aſſiſt and relieve others of the Society; are obliged thereunto, (provided it extends not

Diis acceptum tulit optimus & Imperatorum & Hominum ille vir, *Marcus Antoninus*; quod, quotieſcunq; illi animus fuit pauperi alicui, aut aliàs indigo, opem ferre, nunquam reſponderit, non ſuppetere illi nummos, unde id fieret; quodq; nulla illi unquam talis neceſſitas obtigerit, ut ab alio ſumere cogeretur. *in de ſeipſo lib.* 1. *ſub calcem.*

to Prodigence, or the impairing of their own Fortunes) upon the Consideration of their own Good or Utility.

III.

For, those, who practise this Virtue of Beneficence, thereby certainly procure to themselves Respect, Good-will, and (what very much conduceth to their quiet living) a Dearness or tender Estimation from those, upon whom they practise it: as, on the other side, who neglect the exercise of it, gain to themselves the Disrespect, Ill-will, and (what very much conduceth to their troublesom living) the odium and Contempt of others. Take special heed, therefore, that you do not omit to be Beneficent at least in small matters; that so you may not lose the advantage of being accounted ready to gratifie others even in Great.

IV.

τὸ ἓυ ποιεῖν ἥδιον ἔιναι τῦ πάσχειν. *Plutarch. 2. advers. Colotem.* Conforme plane est sacræ illi Sententiæ: Μακάριόν ἐστι διδόναι μᾶλλον, ἢ λαμβάνειν, beatum magis est Dare, quàm Accipere. *Act.* 20.

It was not without good Consideration we formerly said, that *it was not only more Honourable, but also more Delightful, to Give, than to receive a benefit:* because, the Giver thereby makes himself Superior to the Receiver, and reaps

reaps moreover the intereſt of Thanks; and nothing adfers more joy to a man, than to be heartily thanked for a favour. For, a Beneficent perſon is like a Fountain; to which if you but grant a Reaſonable Soul, or Mind, what joy will it not be poſſeſſed of, when it ſhall ſee how many ſpacious Corn-fields and Paſtures do flouriſh and even ſmile again with plenty and verdure, and all by the Diffuſion of its ſtreams upon them? V.

The ſecond is *Gratitude*, to which every man is reciprocally obliged, who receives a benefit: at leaſt, unleſs he hath a mind to expoſe himſelf to common Hatred and the greateſt of ſhames. For ingratitude is worthily hateful in the eyes of all men: becauſe ſeeing nothing can be more according to Nature, than to be propenſe to receive a Good; it muſt be highly Contrary to Nature not to be propenſe to return the tribute of Thankfulneſs to the Author of that Good. VI.

But, ſeeing that no man ſtands more gratefully affected toward his Benefactors, than the Wiſe man; it may be lawful for us to aſſert, that it is the Wiſe man only, who knows how to fulfil, and doth fulfil

Solum Sapientem ſcire Gratiam, qualem oportet, referre, affirmat, *Seneca Epiſt.* 81.

the duty of Gratitude: becauſe he alone ſtands ready, upon all occaſions, to expreſs his thankfulneſs to his Friends both preſent and abſent; yea, though they are extinct.

VII.

Others, indeed, many times pay the debt of thanks to their preſent friends, and this perhaps for their own farther ends, and to incite and encourage them to ſome new favour: but, how few are there, who gratefully commemorate the beneficence and liberality of their abſent Benefactors? Where ſhall we find him, that honours the memory of his deceaſed Patron? that doth not in his his heart rejoice, that his Benefactor is dead; as if death had cut off all the bonds of his Gratitude, and cancelled all the obligations of his Good turns? that ſtudies all ways of Retribution, Kindneſs, Reſpect, and Aſſiſtance to the Wife, Children, Friends, Family, and Kindred of his Dead Reliever?

VIII.

The third is *Piety*, the moſt ſacred ſpecies of Gratitude. This Virtue we are to exerciſe primarily toward our Parents, to whom we are more obliged, than to all the World beſide: for, we may owe our education, fortune, erudition, &c. to others; but

to

to our Parents we owe even our ſelves: and therefore if ingratitude to others be hateful, that which is ſhewn to our Parents muſt certainly be moſt hateful and deteſtable.

IX.

We ſay, *Primarily* to our Parents; becauſe Piety is ſecondarily, and as it were upon conſequence, extended to our Kindred, and chiefly to our Brothers and Siſters, to whom we are obliged by the bond of Conſanguinity, and the intervening intereſt of our Parents: ſo that we cannot ſhew our ſelves diſreſpectful and unkind to any of our blood, but we muſt be, at the ſame time, highly ungrateful to our Parents, Grand-Parents, and all the line of our Progenitors; who in the circle of their love, and benevolence, comprehended all that were, and ſhould be derived from their loyns.

X.

Nor is this Piety diſtinguiſhable from that Charity or Dearneſs, we are to conceive, and conſtantly bear toward our Native Country, which comprehends our Parents and all our Kindred, and doth both receive us when we are born, and nouriſh and protect us afterward. Wherefore, as we are, by the relation of our blood, obliged to bear Reſpect and Kindneſs toward thoſe of our Kindred; ſo are we by the more General

intereſt of our Country, obliged to reſpect and tender the good of all thoſe of our Society; but more eſpecially the Magiſtrates and Princes, or Monarch thereof, who by defending our Country, and the Laws of it in general, confer this benefit upon us in particular; that under the protection of their Care and Power, our Rights are ſo preſerved, as that we may live ſecurely and peaceably.

XI.

The fourth is *Obſervance*, or that Veneration we owe to all perſons of Eminency, in any kind. And this affection of Awe and Reverence is accompanied partly with Gratitude and Piety; inſomuch as we cannot any way better expreſs the gratefulneſs of our minds, than by giving due Veneration and Worſhip to our Benefactors, Parents, Governours, Princes, and all men of Dignity and Power: and partly with Honour and Reſpects; inſomuch as it is the beſt teſtimony we can give of our internal ſentiments of their deſervings, who excel in Age, Wiſdom, Learning, and eſpecially Virtue; which is the moſt Honourable of all Humane Excellencies.

XII.

To this Obſervance belongs alſo that, which men call *Religion* and *Sanctity* toward the

the *Gods*, whom we are bound to Revere and Honour no otherwiſe than we are our Parents; yet, not in reſpect to any Good either received, or expected at their hands; but (as we formerly intimated) only in reſpect of the tranſcendent Excellency, Majeſty, and Supremacy of their Nature. Becauſe, whatever is excellent deſerves a juſt Veneration; and no Excellence can equal that of the Divine Nature, it being Immortal and moſt Bliſsful. And thus, underſtanding that the * Gods do neither create troubles to themſelves, nor give any occaſion of troubles to us; we ſhall come to be truly Religious, *i. e.* piouſly and holily to Revere and admire their moſt Excellent Nature, without all Hope or Reward.

* Dum plus æquo Pius in Deum eſſe vult, Impius & Blaſphemus deprehenditur.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Friendſhip.

TO the exerciſe of this Virtue (the laſt of all thoſe, that retain to Juſtice) all are obliged, who Love, and are beloved again by the ſame perſons. And well

may we make it the Crown of this our Discourse upon the Virtues, or means to make life happy; when nothing that lies in the power of Wisdom to obtain, doth afford more Comfort, more Delight, than true Friendship: and the same Reason that confirms the mind not to fear any lasting or eternal Evil; doth also assure, that during life there is no Sanctuary so safe, no protection so secure, as that of true Friendship, which together with that Security, doth offer also very great pleasures.

II.

For, as Enmity, Hate, Envy, Despite, are adverse to, and inconsistent with Pleasures; so are Friendships, and Amities not only the most faithful Conservers, but also the most effectual and certain Causers of Pleasures, and that as well to ones Friend, as to ones self: in that thereby men do not only enjoy the Good things of the present more fully; but are erected and animated with hope of such as are to succeed in the future. And, since Solitude and want of Friends exposeth a man to dangers and fears; certainly it must be very highly rational in us, to procure Friendships, whereby the mind may be confirmed in the present, and possessed with lively hopes of enjoying very great Pleasures in the future.

III.

III.

But, in the choice of our Friends, we are to be exceeding cautious and prudent: for it concerns us to be more circumſpect with whom we eat; than about what we eat: To eat ones meat alone, and ſpend ones days in Solitude; indeed, is to live the life of a Lion or a Wolf: and yet no Friend is better than ſuch a one, that is not as well pleaſant, as faithful, ſo that his Converſation may be the beſt ſawce to our meat. Such a Friend, therefore, is to be ſought for, to whom nothing is more in eſteem, than Candor, Simplicity and Verity; and who is not moroſe, querulous and murmuring at all things, but full of Complacency, Alacrity, and pleaſant Hopes, that ſo his Converſation may not ſowre, but ſweeten the occurrences of life.

IV.

Friendſhip, we acknowledge, doth conſiſt in, and is kept alive by the mutual participation of Pleaſures, or Goods; and yet we cannot admit it to be therefore neceſſary, that betwixt Friends there ſhould be a Community of the Goods of Fortune: as that Philoſopher conceived, who was the Author of that ſaying, that *among Friends all things are Common.* And our Reaſon is, that Community of Eſtates implies mutual diffidence

diffidence or diſtruſt of each others Conſtancy, in caſe of Adverſity or Poverty on one part: and Diſtruſt is wholly inconſiſtent with friendſhip. They only are friends, who can with full Confidence and freedom take and make uſe of ſo much of their friends Goods or Eſtate, as the neceſſity of their preſent condition doth require; & this no otherwiſe, than as if it were abſolutely their own, though each partly ſtill reſerves a propriety in the full of his own Eſtate.

V.

This, we are aſſured, will ſound ſtrange in the ears of the Vulgar; but, what are the Common People to us, ſeeing that no Faith or Conſtancy is to be found in their Kindneſs and Friendſhip? For, being wholly uncapable of any part of Wiſdom, that might render their Converſation commendable and grateful; and as uncapable of either underſtanding what is privately, what publickly profitable, or what's the difference betwixt Good Manners and Bad: it is impoſſible they ſhould have any Sentiments of the Goods of Amity and Friendſhip; and conſequently that they ſhould in any meaſure fulfil the duties thereof.

VI.

We ſpeak, therefore, of Wiſe men only, among whom there is as it were a firm Covenant

venant and League, not to love their friends leſs than themſelves. Reaſon dictating, that it may, and ſhould be ſo; and Experience aſſuring that it frequently hath been ſo. So that it is moſt evident, as well that ſuch a perfect Conjunction (you may call it Union) may be made betwixt Wiſe men; as that nothing doth more conduce to the Quiet and Pleaſure of life; than ſuch a Conjunction once made and conſerved.

VII.

For, as it is impoſſible for us, to conſerve the ſweetneſs and ſecurity of our lives firm and laſting, without the influence of friendſhip: ſo it is equally impoſſible to conſerve Friendſhip firm and laſting, without that Cement of Loving our Friends, at the ſame rate, as we do our ſelves. This, therefore, and Pleaſure are the inſeparable Adjuncts of Friendſhip: and who ſo doth not hold ſo full a Sympathy with his Friend, as to rejoyce at his joy, and condole with him in his ſorrow; doth but pretend to the noble title of a Friend.

VIII.

Conſidering this, the Wiſe man will be ſure, to ſtand equally affected toward himſelf, and his Friend; what labours and pains he undergoes for his own Security and Pleaſures, the ſame will he undergo for the Security and Plea-

Pleaſures of his Friend: and as he rejoiceth to think, that he hath one, with whom he may ſit, and to whom he may adminiſter in his ſickneſs, whom he may viſit and aſſiſt in caſe of impriſonment, and whom he may relieve in caſe of want; ſo will it rejoice him to be confident that he hath one, who will ſtick cloſe to him, in ſickneſs, impriſonment, want and all other Calamities. And not only this; but his love will be ſo great to him, as to oblige him to ſuffer the greateſt of torments, nay, if occaſion be, even Death it ſelf for his Friends ſake.

IX.

We have known, Certainly (and from our Fathers, in whoſe memories it was freſh) that many of thoſe Wiſe and Good men, who had the happineſs of procuring to themſelves full Confidence and Security in the Society of men, living in one and the ſame opinion, and the ſelf-ſame affections with themſelves; have lived in a moſt pleaſant and mutually comfortable League of Friendſhip, and been conjoined with ſo abſolute a Neerneſs each to other, as that they could heartily, and without the leaſt of reluctancy, wiſh to ſuffer death in the place of their friend deſtined to die.

CON-

CONCLUSION.

AND this is the ſum of all we had to ſay, concerning ETHICKS or MORALS, which from the very beginning we aſſerted to be the Nobleſt and moſt Uſeful part of Philoſophy. We now, therefore, Conclude with this Admonition to you, whoever you are that aſpire to true Wiſdom (for, our Deſign herein was to do a piece of acceptable ſervice to all ſuch) that you both meditate upon, and earneſtly endeavour to put in practice each one of thoſe many Rules and Axioms of Prudence, that we have here laid down: aſſuring your ſelf, that they are the very Elements or Fundamentals of the Art of Living Honeſtly or Virtuouſly, and (upon conſequence) Peaceably and Happily.

We ſay, to Meditate upon them night and day; and as well when you are alone, as when you are in company of ſome faithful Friend, ſuch to whom you may ſafely and comfortably ſay: *We are (indeed) Alone: but ſo much the better, inſomuch as we have the greater opportunity of diſcourſing things ſincerely, and making the ſtricter inquiſition for Truth: I ſpeak not to many, but to you alone; and you ſpeak not to many, but to me alone, and*

and that's enough, ſince we are an ample Theatre each to other.

By this time, we preſume, you are fully convinced, that he is the only *Brave and Happy* man, who hath his mind poſſeſſed with true and correſpondent Conceptions of the Nature of the Gods: who is at all times prepared to bid death welcom, without the leaſt of Fear: who hath ſo reaſoned concerning the end of Nature, or the higheſt of Goods, as fully to underſtand, that it may be attained with the greateſt facility imaginable: who ſtands confirmed, that whatever of Evil is to be endured by him, muſt, if Vehement, be ſhort in duration; if not Vehement, eaſie in toleration: who doth not emaſculate and ſoften himſelf with the Childiſh apprehenſion of any ſuch thing as inevitable Neceſſity, or the vulgar belief of Fate; but well underſtands, that he hath an abſolute Freedom of Will, in all his actions, and is not ſubject to the Control of any influence, beſides that of his own Reaſon; and knows alſo that nothing at all, or (at moſt) very little of Fortune can at any time intervene to croſs his deſigns, defeat his hopes, interrupt his Felicity: and, finally, who hath compoſed all his Deſires to the ſober model of Nature, and the Rules of Wiſdom, by us preſcribed in this ſmall Treatiſe.

And,

And, assuredly, when you shall come to be such a Man as this; you shall never know a Perturbation, day nor night, waking nor sleeping (for, a well composed Mind keeps the same constant tenour of Serenity as well in sleep, as waking: and unquiet Dreams are but the effects of Sollicitude and unquiet thoughts in the day) and shall live like some Deity among men. For, *that man hath sublimed himself to a whole Sphear above the common condition of Mortality, who spends his days in the possession of Immortal Goods.*

Sapiens nomine Jove. *H. lib. 1. Epist.* Sapiens ille, plenus gaudio, hilaris, & placidus, inconcussus, cum Diis ex pari vivit. Ac rursus: Hoc est summum bonum, quod si occupas, incipis Deorum socius esse, non supplex. *Seneca Epist.* 21. Cum Diis vivendum. Hoc autem faciet, qui animum exhibuerit ita

jugitèr affectum, ut rebus sibi destinatis acquiescat; faciatque quæcunq; Genius ille voluerit, quem sui particulam à se vulsam Jupiter cuique attribuet, præsidem ducemque eidem futurum. Hic autem cujusque mens est & ratio. *Marc. Antonin. de seipso, lib. 5. sect. 27.*

FINIS